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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This dissertation provides a concise account of U.S. intervention in the Congo 
between 1960 and 1967, explaining the decisions made by U.S. policymakers and their 
Congolese counterparts. It argues that the intervention occurred not only because of a 
commitment to contain the communist threat, but also because of a commitment to a 
liberal ideology, one devoted to remaking the world in the image of the United States. By 
confining the meanings of liberty, equality, and development to an American framework, 
however, the United States found itself in competition with local leaders’ visions for their 
own country. As a consequence, the intervention not only failed to deliver freedom to the 
Congolese people, but tragically abetted Mobutu Sese Seko’s rise to power, a dictator 
whose kleptocratic rule removed any hope for meaningful development over a thirty-year 
period. 	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INTRODUCTION 
 
U.S. intervention in the Congo Crisis (1960-1967) marked an unprecedented 
projection of American power in sub-Saharan Africa. As conventional narratives have 
argued, fears of a communist takeover provoked the United States to intervene. American 
policymakers believed Soviet control of the Congo, a country roughly the size of Western 
Europe and strategically located in the heart of Africa, would lead to the loss of central, if 
not all of, sub-Saharan Africa. The effects on Europe, and the Western economy at large, 
would be devastating. In 1959 the Congo alone produced seven percent of the West’s tin, 
nine percent of its copper, forty-nine percent of its cobalt, and sixty-nine percent of its 
industrial diamonds.1 John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, accurately 
referred to Africa as “the hinterland of Europe.”2  
But Cold War concerns were not the only factor given consideration by American 
policymakers. Decolonization had changed the dynamics of the international system. As 
empires ended, a North-South dimension emerged alongside the East-West competition 
that had dominated the international scene since the end of World War II. Leaders of 
Third World nations sought assistance in their quest for political, economic, and social 
freedom, placing the United States, the so-called leader of the “free world,” in the 
limelight on issues such as self-determination, development, and racial discrimination.3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These minerals, in particular cobalt (used in jet engines), had contributed to the rise of American 
airpower. Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa since 1960 
(New York: W. Morrow, 1982), 23; Alfred E. Eckes, The United States and the Global Struggle for 
Minerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 172, 233.  
2 Memorandum of Conversation, 8 October 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(hereafter, FRUS) 1958-1960, XIV: 251-253. 
3 Some pertinent examples of scholarship that have addressed this changing dynamic include: 
Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image 
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This dissertation seeks to provide a clear and concise account of U.S. intervention 
in the Congo, explaining the decisions made by U.S. policymakers and their Congolese 
counterparts.4 Like traditional diplomatic histories, it is concerned with the nature and 
effects of U.S. power.5 It argues that U.S. intervention in the Congo ended in tragedy 
(American support for a right-wing dictator) not only because of a commitment to 
contain the communist threat, but also because of a commitment to a liberal ideology, one 
devoted to remaking the world in its own image.6 Adopting the methodology of recent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thomas Borstelmann, The 
Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2001); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and 
"Nation-Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Nils 
Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003); Ryan M. Irwin, "A Wind of Change?: White Redoubt and the Postcolonial 
Moment, 1960–1963," Diplomatic History 33, no. 5 (2009): 897-925; Matthew Connelly, "Taking Off the 
Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During the Algerian War for Independence," The 
American Historical Review 105, no. 3 (2000): 739-769. 
4 One of my motivations for providing a clear and concise account of the Congo Crisis is to 
provide incentive for historians to include it in the narrative of twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations. In 
order to achieve this I have boiled it down to its most basic elements, and am aware that leaving out events 
that are conventionally discussed alongside the crisis, such as the Soviet proposed Troika for the UN in 
1961, will concern some scholars.   
5 Implicit in this statement is the belief in the significance and centrality of the state in shaping 
international affairs, a belief called into question first by social and cultural historians, and most recently by 
international, transnational, and global historians. While I believe debate on the matter has proved fruitful, I 
accept Jeffrey Engel’s opinion on the matter, “The contemporary scholar must be willfully blind to suggest 
state power does not matter.” Jeffrey A. Engel, "Diplomatic History's Ill-Deserved Reputation and Bright 
Future," Perspectives in American History 50, (Dec. 2012): 41-43; William J. Novak, "The Myth of the 
“Weak” American State," The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (2008): 752-772; Thomas W. Zeiler, 
"The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field," Journal of American History 95, no. 4 (2009); 
Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in The Past before Us : 
Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, ed. Michael G. Kammen(Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1980), 355-387. 
6 For a history of the containment policy see, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982).  For other instances where U.S. Cold War concerns led to the support of authoritarian regimes, see 
Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds., Dealing with Dictators: Dilemmas of U.S. Diplomacy and 
Intelligence Analysis, 1945-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006); David F. Schmitz, Thank God 
They're on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999). For histories explaining how American liberalism and Manifest Destiny 
affected U.S. foreign policy, see Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the 
Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy (New York: Norton, 1988). For examples of how American liberalism has 
historically expressed itself as state- or nation-building, see David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: 
Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government : Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines 
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international histories, this dissertation also seeks to elucidate the agency of Congolese 
leaders, treating local actors as subjects, rather than objects, of U.S. power.7 In this 
regard, my project is a “joint history,” as defined by Frederick Cooper, one that explains 
the outcome in the Congo as “a confluence of forces, some internal to Africa and some 
not.”8 As my access to archival sources from the Congo remained limited, I drew upon 
Congolese voices found in collections published by the Centre de Recherche et 
d'Information Socio-Politiques in Brussels, U.S. government documents, as well as a rich 
secondary literature on the Congo itself.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: 
Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2006).  
7 In particular, recent scholarship on the Vietnam War has provided an excellent model for 
elucidating the agency of local actors. It has shown that Third World leaders had their own vision, power, 
and agency, and that like American actors, were constrained by local politics, where they had to operate 
amidst factions, seek to create consensus, and were not immune to careerism. Fredrik Logevall, “What 
Really Happened in Vietnam: The North, the South, and the American Defeat,” Foreign Affairs 91 
(Nov./Dec. 2012): 129-136; Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for 
Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Edward Garvey Miller, "Vision, 
Power and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh Diem, 1945-54," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, no. 3 
(2004); Edward Garvey Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South 
Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013). I have previously addressed this topic 
elsewhere, see William Mountz, “Congolese Agency in the Congo Crisis: Towards a New Narrative” 
(paper presented at the annual meeting for the World History Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 
26-29, 2013). 
8 This summarization of Frederick Cooper’s argument is provided by Daniel Immerwahr, 
"Modernization and Development in U.S. Foreign Relations," Passport 43, (Sep. 2012): 22-25, 24. Also 
see Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); Frederick Cooper, "Writing the History of Development," Journal of Modern European History 8, 
(2010): 5-23. 
9 When it comes to local actors’ voices, the debate continues on what can and cannot be gleaned 
from U.S. government archives. But in my opinion, these archives, like European colonial archives, contain 
voices of local actors that prove insightful to the historian conscious of the agenda behind their collection, 
preservation, and presentation. For more on this matter see, Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic 
Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), vii-xiv; Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties 
and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Antoinette M. Burton, ed. 
Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); 
Antoinette M. Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late 
Colonial India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: 
Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (New York: Verso, 1993); Carolyn Hamilton, ed. Refiguring the 
Archive (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2002).  
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Though there are many well-researched and sophisticated works examining U.S. 
intervention in the Congo Crisis, few have sought to treat local actors as subjects, rather 
than objects, of U.S. power. For example, interpretations using a traditional Cold War 
framework, such as Madeleine Kalb’s The Congo Cables (1982) and Lise Namikas’s 
Battleground Africa (2013), portray the Congolese as pawns in part of a larger American-
Soviet showdown.10 Interpretations using a neocolonial or rudimentary Marxist-Leninist 
framework such as Kwame Nkrumah’s Challenge of the Congo (1967) and David N. 
Gibbs’ The Political Economy of Third World Intervention (1991) portray the Congolese 
as puppets of Western capitalist interests.11 Interpretations that have emphasized the role 
of American liberalism as inspiring U.S. intervention, such as Stephen Weissman’s 
American Foreign Policy in the Congo (1974) and Richard Mahoney’s JFK: Ordeal in 
Africa (1983), have not treated equally Congolese visions with those of the Americans.12 
Stated otherwise, despite the seemingly wide range of interpretations that exist, they are 
more alike than they first appear, denying the Congolese the capacity to control their own 
thoughts and actions. 
Applying a framework that accounts for Congolese agency while also drawing 
upon recently declassified documents from the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Namikas, though, does take into consideration UN and Soviet perspectives, and along with 
Sergey Mazov, has convincingly argued that the United States overstated the degree of Soviet infiltration in 
the Congo.  Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa--from Eisenhower to Kennedy 
(New York: Macmillan, 1982); S. V. Mazov, A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West Africa 
and the Congo, 1956-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010); Lise A. Namikas, 
Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo, 1960-1965 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 
2013).  
11 Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1967); David 
N. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo 
Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
12 Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964 (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1974); Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983). Also see, Larry Grubbs, Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009). One exception is John Kent, America, the U.N. And 
Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
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administrations (the latter of which I worked personally with archivists to acquire), 
provides a new and more nuanced recounting of the Congo Crisis. Chapter one explores 
the colonial legacy of King Leopold II and Belgium, and the origins of U.S. involvement. 
It discusses how the problems confronted by the Congolese at independence developed 
during colonial rule. It then examines Eisenhower’s response to the crisis, arguing that 
his policies accounted for the effects of decolonization in world affairs, and in general 
were more tactful, if not any less cunning, than previously portrayed.13 The chapter also 
argues that Congolese agency is as important as any covert operations carried out by the 
Americans for understanding Mobutu’s first coup in September 1960. It concludes by 
displaying how the Kennedy administration continued to carry out many of the policies 
established by the Eisenhower administration. While the new administration embarked on 
a mission to “modernize” the Congo, it nonetheless accepted the Eisenhower 
administration’s rationale for continuing to plot against Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s 
first democratically elected prime minister, and using the UN to resolve the crisis in order 
to keep the Cold War out of the region (i.e., keep the Soviets out).  
Chapter two examines the role of the Kennedy administration in the election of 
Cyrille Adoula as prime minister in August 1961. This was arguably the administration’s 
greatest achievement during the crisis, having maneuvered through a wide range of 
international and local interests in order to form a consensus that temporarily unified the 
country. Nevertheless, it ultimately undermined its long-term goals of creating political 
stability and instilling liberal values by employing bribery, blackmail, and threats that 
ended up widening the credibility gap between Adoula and the Congolese people. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	  for	  example,	  George	  White,	  Holding	  the	  Line:	  Race,	  Racism,	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  
toward	  Africa,	  1953-­‐1961	  (Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2005).	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Chapters three and four examine the secession of the Katanga province that ended in 
January 1963 after having lasted nearly two and a half years. They argue that Kennedy’s 
political pragmatism, itself a product of American liberal ideology, prolonged the 
secession, and as a result led to the loss of Congolese support for the Adoula government 
and the implementation of repressive policies. Furthermore, these two chapters give 
credit to Adoula and UN leaders, whose actions, rather than those of a reticent Kennedy 
administration, were responsible for ending the secession.14	  
Chapter five examines the Kennedy administration’s nation-building efforts that 
occurred throughout 1963. It argues that the White House’s attempt to right the Congo’s 
economy failed because it ignored the advice of Adoula and other Congolese leaders who 
recommended a large injection of capital to finance road and bridge development, 
education, and what we now call micro-financing of indigenous entrepreneurs. The 
Kennedy administration did almost the complete opposite by implementing an austerity 
program and focusing on monetary reform. This failure, I argue, left the Johnson 
administration committed to the Congo with few choices but to create a semblance of 
stability and withdraw the United States as quickly as possible.15 Chapter six examines 
the outbreak of revolts that occurred in 1964 as a result of the deteriorating economic 
conditions. Congolese revolutionaries declared war against their government, calling for 
a “deuxième independence” (a “second independence”), one that promised social and 
economic equality, and most importantly, freedom from foreign control. This chapter also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	  dissertation	  is	  not	  the	  first	  to	  make	  these	  assertions	  about	  Adoula	  and	  the	  UN.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Lise	  A.	  Namikas,	  “Battleground	  Africa:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Congo	  Crisis,	  1960-­‐1965”	  (Ph.D.	  diss.,	  University	  of	  Southern	  California,	  2002).	  
15 This chapter challenges how the Johnson administration is conventionally portrayed, as 
abandoning Kennedy’s plans to establish a democratic government and modernize the Congo. See for 
example, Kent. 
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explains how the political turmoil combined with the Johnson administration’s desire to 
extricate the United States from the Congo led to Moise Tshombe, leader of the Katanga 
secession, becoming prime minister in June 1964, and Mobutu becoming dictator in 
November 1965.  
This recounting of the Congo Crisis concludes by arguing that the U.S. 
intervention is critical to our understanding of the current political landscape in the 
Congo, as well as the nature of U.S. foreign policy.16 The 1960s were a testing ground for 
American liberalism. Nowhere had there been more optimism for what American 
liberalism could achieve abroad than in Africa. And nowhere did American policymakers 
expend more time and energy on that continent than in the Congo. But American 
liberalism failed to deliver freedom to that country, leaving long-lasting consequences for 
the Congolese people to deal with. The decay of the state under Mobutu’s rule, for 
example, contributed to the destabilization of the region and approximately five million 
deaths since 1998, the year after he left power.17 The intervention revealed the limits of 
American ideas and power, and the poverty of American liberalism as a guiding 
ideology, causing American policymakers to discard it in the 1970s in favor of a 
realpolitik paradigm.18 As the historian William Appleman Williams observed over fifty 
years ago, “By its exaggerated confidence in American economic strength and military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In this regard, this study is part of an emerging literature that views events in the Third World as 
central to interpreting the Cold War (as opposed to being “periphery”). Heonik Kwon, The Other Cold War 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 11; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World 
Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Marilyn B. 
Young, "Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the Cold War," Diplomatic History 36, (Nov. 
2012): 955-961, 961. 
 17 Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a 
Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory 
of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011). 
18 Ending apartheid in South Africa, as Ryan Irwin has pointed out, was another area where 
American liberalism had failed in Africa, and as he notes, also contributed to the abandonment of American 
liberalism as a guiding ideology. Ryan M. Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the 
Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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might, by its own arrogance and self-righteousness, and by its messianic distortion of a 
sincere humanitarian desire to help other peoples,” U.S. foreign policy often tragically 
committed more harm than good.19 So it was in the Congo. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Williams, 8.	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CHAPTER ONE:  
BACKGROUND TO CRISIS AND THE ORIGINS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
 
The crisis that unfolded in the Congo after independence had been long in the 
making. King Leopold II of Belgium claimed the territory as his personal colony in 1885. 
His quest for profit led to the brutal exploitation of the indigenous population. Colonial 
agents forced the Congolese by means of kidnapping, mutilation, rape, and murder to 
collect sap from rubber trees. Much profit was made, but at the expense of ten million 
Congolese lives. An international reform movement led by the Belgian-shipping-clerk-
turned-activist, E.D. Morel, and including the likes of Mark Twain and Arthur Conan 
Doyle, publicized these atrocities, and as a result King Leopold was forced to relinquish 
control of the Congo to the Belgian government in 1908.1  
Picking up the so-called “white man’s burden,” the new Belgian overlords 
employed a thoroughgoing paternalism designed to “civilize” the Congolese and prepare 
them for self-rule. Though the number of atrocities decreased, key elements of Leopold’s 
policies remained in place, and the quest for profit outweighed any commitment by 
Belgium to prepare the Congo for independence. As Louis Franck, the Belgian minister 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mark Twain, King Leopold's Soliloquy: A Defense of His Congo Rule (Boston: P.R. Warren, 
1905); Arthur Conan Doyle, The Crime of the Congo (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1909); E. 
D. Morel, Red Rubber: The Story of the Rubber Slave Trade Flourishing on the Congo (New York: Negro 
Universities Press, 1969); William Roger Louis and Jean Stengers, eds., E. D. Morel's History of the Congo 
Reform Movement (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1968); Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of 
Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 177-291; John Hope 
Franklin, George Washington Williams: A Biography (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); 
Sharon Sliwinski, "The Childhood of Human Rights: The Kodak on the Congo," Journal of Visual Culture 
5, no. 3 (2006): 333-363. 
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of colonial affairs wrote in 1921, the main goal in the Congo was to develop “the 
economic action of Belgium.”2 
For over half a century Belgium was able to rule over a territory nearly eighty 
times its size by employing a strategy of “divide and conquer.” It kept the Congolese 
divided along tribal lines, and exploited these divisions by enabling one ethnic group to 
gain wealth or power at the expense of another.3 As a result, tribal identity became 
imbued with political and class divisions.4 In this way, African agency also played a role, 
as some chieftains collaborated with the colonial government to secure wealth and power 
for their people.5 The Lunda, for example, were already a powerful tribe in Katanga 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Quoted in Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History 
(New York: Zed Books 2002), 33; Georges Brausch, Belgian Administration in the Congo (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1961); Roger Anstey, King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo under Belgian Rule, 
1908-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Alan P. Merriam, Congo, Background of Conflict 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1961); Jean Stengers, "The Congo Free State and the 
Belgian Congo before 1914," in Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: The History and Politics of 
Colonialism, 1870-1914, ed. Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan(London: Cambridge University Press, 
1969), 261-292. 
3 As noted by some scholars, this reliance on traditional chieftains in the Congo, “indirect-rule” so 
to speak, differed with Belgian rule in Rwanda, where the colonial bureaucracy defined tribes by making 
distinctions between racial characterizations rather than traditional ethnic identities. This was the case, for 
example, with the Hutu and Tutsi, whose rivalry has spilt beyond Rwanda’s borders and plagued the 
mineral-rich Eastern Congo with violence. See Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: 
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
4 Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "African Peasants in the Totalitarian Colonial Society of the Belgian 
Congo," in Peasants in Africa: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Martin A. Klein(Beverly 
Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980), 45-75; Jean-Luc Vellut, "Mining in the Belgian Congo," in History 
of Central Africa, ed. David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin(New York: Longman, 1983), 126-162; 
Crawford Young, "Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class in Africa: A Retrospective," Cahiers d'Études 
Africaines 26, no. 103 (1986): 421-495, esp. 442-455; John Higginson, A Working Class in the Making: 
Belgian Colonial Labor Policy, Private Enterprise, and the African Mineworker, 1907-1951 (Madison, 
Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); Ruth M. Slade, King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the 
Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1962); Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The Bourgeoisie and Revolution in the Congo," The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 8, no. 4 (1970): 511-530. 
5 Some historians have described African “collaborators” with European colonizers as “selling 
out,” or more specifically, as Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, who originally conceived of the term, 
have stated, denoted an African “who sacrifices the interests of his nation for his own selfish ends.” Adu 
Boahen proposed a more nuanced definition, and one I accept, arguing that African collaborators formed 
relationships with Europeans, “not to further the interests of the European imperialists or even to gain their 
own selfish ends, but to preserve the sovereignty and independence of their states.” A. Adu Boahen, 
"Towards a New Categorization and Periodization of African Reactions and Responses to Colonialism," in 
Africa in the Twentieth Century: The Adu Boahen Reader, ed. Toyin Falola(Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
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before the arrival of European colonizers, and under Belgian rule were able to retain, and 
even increase, their power. Moise Tshombe’s family, who hailed from Lunda royalty, 
became millionaires.6 
Of course the Belgians also relied on more direct means of rule. The most 
notorious instrument used to control the Congolese was the Force Publique, the colonial 
army. A product of the very doctrine it sought to instill, it used indigenous soldiers from 
one region or ethnic group to police and “pacify” those of another. While the full effect 
of forcing Congolese to inflict violence upon each other is difficult to discern, the most 
immediate result seems to be the continued use of violence by Congolese as a political 
tool immediately following independence. The constant presence of the colonial 
administration also likely left an indelible mark on the Congolese psyche. By the time of 
independence, as the scholar Crawford Young notes, “No Congolese, rural or urban, 
could have failed to perceive that he was being administered.”7 Additionally, Belgium 
kept the Congolese isolated from the world, and limited their access to higher education 
out of fear that that they would be introduced to “radical” notions of independence. When 
a group of Congolese intellectuals emerged in the 1950s, the colonial government 
designated them as “évolués” (“evolved ones”), and monitored their activities.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press, 2004), 341-354, 346, 351; A. Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on Colonialism (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 44; Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European 
Imperialism: A Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed. Roger 
Owen and Robert B. Sutcliffe(London: Longman, 1972), 117-142. 
6 On the Lunda, see Edouard Bustin, Lunda under Belgian Rule: The Politics of Ethnicity 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). For another example of how Belgian colonialism could 
affect a specific tribe, see Jan Vansina, Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880-1960 
(Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010). For more on Moise Tshombe, see Moïse Tshombe, 
My Fifteen Months in Government (Plano, Tex.: University of Plano, 1967); Ian Goodhope Colvin, The 
Rise and Fall of Moise Tshombe: A Biography (London: Frewin, 1968). 
7 Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1965), 11.  
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These efforts to keep the Congolese under control began to backfire by the late-
1950s. Decades of colonial oppression—being subjected to violence, coercion, and 
racism—served to unite the Congolese, who rose up and challenged the Belgians for 
independence. Patrice Lumumba, a charismatic Congolese postal-clerk-turned-beer-
salesman who had become one of the leaders in the independence movement, traveled 
across provinces delivering rousing speeches demanding freedom for the Congolese 
people.8 “We want our country, our great country, to have another face,” Lumumba said 
in front of a crowd of ten thousand in Leopoldville during December of 1958, “the face 
of an independent and happy people freed from anxiety, fear, and every sort of colonialist 
domination.”9  
Belgium did not want to part ways with its colony. Even by 1955, after the first 
wave of decolonization had swept across Asia in the wake of World War II, the Belgians 
were so confident that their colonial policies were producing a “happy colony” that the 
only plan under serious consideration to grant the Congo independence proposed another 
thirty years of colonial rule.10 The Congo had provided the small European nation with 
wealth and prestige, and had even become an integral part of Belgian identity, serving to 
unite the historically divided population of Dutch-speaking Flemish and French-speaking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Biographies on Lumumba: Leo Zeilig, Lumumba: Africa's Lost Leader (London: Haus, 2008); 
Thomas R. Kanza, Conflict in the Congo: The Rise and Fall of Lumumba (Rochester, VT: Schenkman 
Books, 1994); Patrice Lumumba, Panaf Great Lives (London: Panaf Books, 1973); Robin McKown, 
Lumumba: A Biography (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969); G. Heinz and H. Donnay, Lumumba: The 
Last Fifty Days (New York: Grove Press, 1970); Karen Bouwer, Gender and Decolonization in the Congo: 
The Legacy of Patrice Lumumba (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Jean Tshonda Omasombo and 
Benoît Verhaegen, Patrice Lumumba: Jeunesse Et Apprentissage Politique, 1925-1956 (Paris: 
L'Harmattan, 1998); Jean Tshonda Omasombo and Benoît Verhaegen, Patrice Lumumba: Acteur Politique: 
De La Prison Aux Portes De Pouvoir, Juillet 1956-Février 1960 (Paris: Harmattan, 1998). Also see, Patrice 
Lumumba, Congo, My Country (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962). 
9 Patrice Lumumba, “Speech at Lepoldville, December 28, 1958,” in Lumumba Speaks: The 
Speeches and Writings of Patrice Lumumba, 1958-1961, ed. Jean Van Lierde (Boston: Little, 1972): 58-68. 
10 Ch Didier Gondola, The History of Congo (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002), 97-98; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History, 81-82. 
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Walloons behind a colonial mission that could be celebrated by all as Belgicains.11 
Extravagant memorials and lavish palaces funded by profits from the Congo adorn 
Belgium still today. As one economic historian has written, “The Congolese economy 
was a goldmine for the Belgian investors.”12 Belgium emerged after World War II with a 
reverse lend-lease credit of approximately $120 million, and could even claim a stake in 
ending the war, since the uranium used in the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan had 
come from Congolese mines.13 For these reasons, even when Congolese activism left 
Brussels little choice but to grant the Congo independence in 1959, the Belgians plotted 
to keep control over their soon to be former colony. 
Belgium hoped that giving into Congolese leaders’ demand for an “indépendence 
immédiate” (“immediate independence”) would force Congolese leaders to rely on 
Belgian assistance to run the state bureaucracy, placing it in a position to receive or exert 
political and economic influence.14 After meeting with Congolese leaders in Brussels in 
January 1960, Belgium agreed to grant the Congo independence on June 30 of that year. 
Much to the chagrin of the Belgian government, Lumumba, the newly elected Congolese 
prime minister, dispelled any notion of allowing Belgium to continue to influence affairs 
in the Congo during his Independence Day speech. “No Congolese will ever forget that 
independence was won in struggle,” he declared, “it was just and noble and indispensable 
in putting an end to the humiliating bondage forced upon us. That was our lot for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Matthew G. Stanard, Selling the Congo: A History of European Pro-Empire Propaganda and 
the Making of Belgian Imperialism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012). 
12 Frans Buelens quoted in Guy Vanthemsche, Belgium and the Congo, 1885-1980 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 185. 
13 Jonathan E. Helmreich, United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940-1960 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press 1998), 72-73; Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to 
Kabila: A People's History, 29. 
14 Belgian leaders also hoped that giving into this demand would allow them to avoid a violent war 
for independence, such as the then ongoing war in Algeria, which would endanger the lives of expatriates 
and jeopardize its mining operations. 
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eighty years of colonial rule and our wounds are too fresh and much too painful to be 
forgotten…Morning, noon and night we were subjected to jeers, insults and blows 
because we were ‘Negroes.’”15 Celebrations erupted throughout the Congo when 
Lumumba finished his speech, which had been broadcast live over radio.   
But the celebrations were short lived. Within two weeks, the country was mired in 
crisis. Seventy-five years of Belgian colonialism had left the country ill prepared for 
independence. Out of a population of about fourteen million, only about thirty had 
graduated college. There were no Congolese physicians or military officers, and only one 
lawyer. Furthermore, Belgian rule had created a disjointed and fragmented society in the 
Congo. There were approximately one hundred political parties organized largely along 
tribal lines, and when the struggle for independence was achieved, Congolese unity 
dissolved.16  
On July 5, Congolese soldiers in the Force Publique mutinied when General 
Emile Janssens, their Belgian commander, wrote on a chalkboard in front of his troops, 
“before independence = after independence.” Lumumba attempted to calm the soldiers by 
meeting their demand for better pay and by Africanizing the army. He changed the name 
of the Force Publique to the Armée nationale congolaise (ANC), and appointed 
Congolese officers, including Joseph Mobutu as Army Chief of Staff. The Belgian 
government deployed troops in the Congo during the mutiny to protect its expatriates and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Patrice Lumumba, “Speech at Proclamation of Independence, June 30, 1960,” in Lumumba 
Speaks, ed. Van Lierde (Boston: Little, 1972): 220-224. 
16 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History, 66; Alan James, 
Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 14; Young, Politics in the 
Congo: Decolonization and Independence, 298; Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence, 
January 1960-December, 1961 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965); René Lemarchand, Political 
Awakening in the Belgian Congo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Herbert F. Weiss, 
Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain During the Independence Struggle (Princeton, 
N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1967).  
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mining operations. Lumumba demanded that Belgium withdraw its troops, declaring the 
deployment an act of aggression.  
On July 11, Tshombe declared the Katanga province independent from the 
Congo.17 Though Tshombe had worked alongside Lumumba in Brussels to gain national 
independence, he believed the only way forward for the Congolese people was by 
maintaining a close relationship with Belgium. By seceding, Tshombe hoped to pursue 
this path, and protect his province’s affluence from the chaos spreading throughout the 
rest of the country.18 Lumumba knew that the secession threatened the survival of the 
young state. An independent Katanga would take with it a large portion of the Congo’s 
mineral wealth as well as open the door for other provinces to secede. His government 
incapable of removing the Belgian troops and preventing the secession of Katanga, 
Lumumba called upon the international community for help. 
With only a little over six months left in office, the Eisenhower administration 
would have preferred that the Belgians resolve the crisis in the Congo themselves. 
Containing the communist threat was the primary objective of the administration’s 
foreign policy, but preventing the United States from bankrupting itself during the 
process was a close second. If the crisis had arisen only a few years earlier the 
administration would have likely supported Belgium in trying to re-conquer its former 
colony, much like it had supported France in Vietnam during its first term.  
But the dynamics of the international system had changed since the beginning of 
the decade. World opinion had become intolerant of colonialism, and the increasing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History, 98-99. 
18 Katangans had benefitted from the Belgian mining companies located in their province. As one 
journalist noted, Katangan “workers earned on the average three times as much per capita as other 
Congolese.” Colvin, 21. For more on the secession of Katanga, see Jules Gérard-Libois, Katanga Secession 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966). 
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rhetoric of independence movements propelled the United States, the so-called leader of 
the “free world,” to the fore of international affairs. As it was the administration quickly 
abandoned its instinctively “hands off policy” out of fear that communism would spread 
into the heart of Africa.19 As Eisenhower later recalled, “With a position of leadership in 
the Free World, we did not want to see chaos run wild among hopeful, expectant peoples 
and could not afford to see turmoil in an area where the Communists would be only too 
delighted to take an advantage.”20 
The Eisenhower administration viewed decolonization as a destabilizing force, 
creating chaos in the international system that the communists would be sure to exploit. 
According to Eisenhower, Congolese nationalism in particular “resembled a torrent 
overrunning everything in its path, including, frequently, the best interests of those 
concerned.”21  Others in the administration shared his sentiment. One member of the 
National Security Council (NSC) concluded “the best thing for the area would be a plan 
which did not grant independence for twenty-five years.”22 Only two years prior to the 
outbreak of the crisis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the Belgian foreign 
minister that the United States “had spent 50 years preparing the Philippines for 
independence [sic] and there were times we believed that that had perhaps not been long 
enough.”23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Telegram from the Consulate General at Leopoldville to the Department of State, 14 June 1960, 
FRUS 1958-1960, XIV: 275-277. 
20 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-196: The White House Years (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1965), 572. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Editorial Note, FRUS 1958-1960, XIV: 257-258. 
23 Memorandum of Conversation, 8 October 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, XIV: 251-253. 
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But Eisenhower was a deft and cunning president.24 Just as his “well-honed sense 
of expediency superseded his well-documented condescension toward African Americans 
and ‘the race question,’” as the historian Penny Von Eschen has insightfully written, so 
too did it supersede his disdain for the Third World’s quest for self-determination and 
racial equality.25 When Lumumba requested U.S. assistance to help restore order in his 
country, the Eisenhower administration shrewdly urged him to call upon the UN instead. 
It knew that the Afro-Asian bloc, a body of newly emerging nations in the UN who clung 
to the spirit of non-alignment and the guiding principles of the UN itself, would support 
this decision.26 The administration was also confident that the United Nations would 
represent American aims. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold was anti-communist, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In general see, Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New 
York: Basic Books, 1982); Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An 
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and his three closest advisers on the Congo were American.27 Furthermore, during 1956 
the administration had successfully used the UN in a similar situation during the Suez 
Crisis.28 If push came to shove, it knew U.S. purse strings and its veto on the Security 
Council could be used to win influence over the Soviet Union, the Afro-Asian bloc, and 
even UN leaders. 
Turning over the reins to the UN was also in consonance with the administration’s 
overarching Cold War strategy. While fighting the Cold War, it wanted to keep the 
United States off the frontlines in order to limit both its liability and expenditures. “We 
would be completely in error to go in unilaterally,” Eisenhower told Secretary of State 
Christian Herter.29 The administration believed any “vigorous US action” might draw the 
Soviets into a showdown, and be misconstrued as preserving colonialism by the Africans, 
or poaching empire by the Europeans.30 On July 12 the administration issued a press 
release explaining the U.S. position. It stated that any assistance by a country to the 
Congo should be channeled through the UN, and that members of NATO would refrain 
from contributing soldiers in the UN force.31 “This should,” American Ambassador to the 
Congo Clare Timberlake told Herter, “keep bears out of the Congo caviar.”32 Indeed, 
pressure from the Afro-Asian bloc, which was concerned about keeping the Cold War out 
of the crisis, forced the Soviet Union to accept similar terms, and on July 14 the Security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Ralph Bunche, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs; Heinz Wieschoff, the Secretariat’s 
African Expert; and Andrew Cordier, the Secretary-General’s Executive Assistant. 
28 At that time the UN, with American support, successfully diffused a crisis between the Egyptian 
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Council passed a resolution committing UN military and technical assistance to the 
Congo with the provisions proposed by the United States.  
The resolution also required the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops. The 
Afro-Asian bloc had insisted that the Security Council accede to this demand made by 
Lumumba during his request for UN assistance.33  While the Eisenhower administration 
wanted to avoid withdrawing Belgian troops until UN forces arrived, it did not want to 
take any action that might have delayed getting the “UN force out into [the] field at 
once.” Herter therefore told Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, to 
support the resolution as is. This angered NATO allies. Both France and the United 
Kingdom abstained from voting on the resolution. The situation reminded both countries 
of the Suez Crisis, during which they felt the United States, the Third World, and the UN 
had joined forces to supplant the colonial powers’ control over their traditional spheres of 
influence. Belgium was also livid. Its UN representative told Lodge that it seemed the 
“US was seeking [to] cut Belgium off and out from [the] Congo entirely, and injuring 
NATO in [the] bargain.”34 
The Eisenhower administration was coming to realize that the crisis was 
“intimately, if unhappily” part of a “great-power struggle.” Belgium had no intention of 
leaving its investments and approximately 10,000 expatriates at the disposal of 
Lumumba. Supporting Tshombe and the secession appeared to be the only way to protect 
its interests. Meanwhile, the government of the Congo was becoming “violently anti-
Belgian,” and as Timberlake pointed out, its feelings were not completely unwarranted. 
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“Some Belgians…particularly the military,” he wrote, “have become completely 
irrational and in many instances have behaved worse than the worst Congolese.” 
Timberlake believed it was “imperative” the United States wade into this “ugly” 
situation. On July 17, he wrote to Herter, “We face immediately ahead the need to make a 
major policy decision which is complex, full of imponderables and charged with fateful 
portent not only for the Congo but for Africa.”35  
The administration determined that the only way to “salvage” the situation was to 
have all parties reach common ground.36 On one hand, it believed Belgium should give 
up on the idea of an independent Katanga.   It knew this position would “seriously offend 
[the] Belgians as well as other metropolitan powers” and possibly cause a “serious split 
among NATO powers,” but it believed that if Katanga became independent it would lead 
to the balkanization of the Congo, making the region susceptible to communist 
subversion.37 Furthermore, the Afro-Asian bloc would be “enraged,” and likely withdraw 
its troops from the UN force, which would leave the door open for the possibility of a 
U.S.-Soviet showdown.38  
On the other hand, the administration wanted Lumumba’s government and the 
Afro-Asian bloc to accept the fact that Belgian technicians would need to remain in the 
Congo. It knew both would have an “adverse reaction” to this proposal, but it was 
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convinced that the government of the Congo had “not the slightest idea of what is 
happening let alone what might be done about it.”39 A Belgian presence, the 
administration believed, would have the added bonus of denying the area to the 
communists, and helping to alleviate concerns that the United States was “fostering 
extinction [of] Belgian interests there or attempting [to] supplant those interests.”40  
The administration, however, was beginning to doubt that any sort of common 
ground could be reached so long as Lumumba remained prime minister. Not without 
reason, Lumumba wanted the Belgians out of the country. Belgium had violated the 
sovereignty of the Congo by deploying troops within its border without permission, and 
by aiding and abetting the secessionist leader Tshombe. Furthermore, the administration’s 
propensity to view the world through a lens colored by race also made it predisposed to 
disfavor Lumumba.41 Rather than see him as a skilled politician who had risen from 
modest means and created consensus amongst a multitude of political parties, it instead 
saw him as “irresponsible,” “untrustworthy,” and “unreliable.”42  
The administration also believed Soviet intervention was much more likely to 
occur under Lumumba’s reign.43 His threat to invite the Soviet Union to intervene unless 
the UN removed all Belgian troops from the Congo by midnight on July 19 validated this 	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concern. Afterwards, American Ambassador to Belgium William Burden concluded 
“Lumumba has now maneuvered himself into position of opposition to [the] West” and 
“threatens our vital interests in Congo and Africa generally.” Burden proposed that the 
“principal objective of...political and diplomatic action must therefore be to destroy 
Lumumba government as now constituted” and to “find or develop another horse to back 
which would be acceptable in rest of Africa and defensible against Soviet political 
attack.”44 During an NSC meeting on July 21, CIA Director Allen Dulles called 
Lumumba “a Castro or worse.”45  
In some respects Lumumba was a Castro. Even though he did not subscribe to 
communist ideology, he sought to regain control over his nation’s natural resources and 
free his people from Western exploitation. Some in the State Department saw Lumumba 
for what he really was—a nationalist. Hugh Cumming, Director of the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, argued that Lumumba’s famous 
declaration of July 5—“We are not Communists, Catholics, or Socialists. We are African 
nationalists.”—was “the most accurate summary of his views.”46 Robinson McIlvaine, 
Consul General in the Congo, tried explaining to the State Department that “Lumumba is 
an opportunist and not a Communist” and that he was seeking to take advantage of 
international rivalries in order to obtain genuine independence for the Congo.47  At the 
end of July, Lumumba restated his commitment to non-alignment at both the UN and the 
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White House.48 He explained to Herter that “he did not wish the Congo to emerge from a 
colonial status, only to fall under the domination of some other form of dictatorship or 
ideological influence.” He said that he “knew that the Congo had a friend in the United 
States because it, too, struggled to obtain its independence.”49  
But the leadership in the administration viewed Lumumba as the main obstacle to 
U.S. objectives rather than viewing him as a possible friend. Before his visit to the United 
States it had already withdrawn its support from the prime minister.50 Herter suggested at 
an NSC meeting on July 25 that if Lumumba “stayed away from the Congo long enough, 
he would find he had no government when he returned.” Eisenhower responded by 
saying they should “provide Lumumba with a three weeks tour of the U.S. on a modest 
basis.”51 Lumumba’s alleged request for white female companionship during his stay at 
Blair House as well as other inappropriate behavior further undermined his position with 
the administration.52 Mounting pressure from Belgium also caused the administration to 
draw back from Lumumba. Already irritated by the lack of U.S. support in the UN, 	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Belgium was outraged over Lumumba’s visit to the White House.53 One Belgian 
newspaper could not believe the Americans had allowed Lumumba, whom some in 
Europe referred to as the “sale nègre,” to sleep in the same bed that King Baudouin of 
Belgium had.54 The Belgian ambassador to the United States told Herter that the reaction 
in Belgium “was somewhat similar to that which would occur in the United States if the 
Belgian Government were to invite Fidel Castro to visit Brussels and accord him a great 
reception.”55  
As the administration’s opinions of Lumumba soured, it was coming to regard 
Tshombe as a potential ally due to his self-avowed anti-communism and willingness to 
partner with the Belgians. Rather than “close [the] door” on Tshombe, Herter wanted to 
make clear that the administration wanted to maintain a “frank and friendly” relationship 
with him, and that the administration’s inability to recognize Katanga did “not constitute 
any hostility toward Tshombe or his Government.”56 Eisenhower knew that the 
consequences of supporting Katanga in the current international climate would be too 
much to bear, but he did not want to take any action that would improve Lumumba’s 
position over that of Tshombe.57 The Afro-Asian bloc, for example, was calling for the 
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UN to end the secession, which would permit Lumumba to reassert control over Katanga 
and remove Tshombe from the political scene. Tshombe had refused to allow the UN 
force to enter the province to remove Belgian troops. On August 3 he declared that UN 
troops “will have to fight their way in.”58 A few days later two key leaders of the Afro-
Asian bloc, Kwame Nkrumah, president of Ghana, and Sekou Toure, president of 
Guinea, wrote to the United States demanding a “speedy” withdrawal of Belgian troops 
from Katanga and “respect for the territorial integrity of that State.” Nkrumah warned 
Washington, “So far as Katanga is concerned, any attempt to detach it from the Congo 
state in anybody’s interest will have the most disastrous consequences not only upon 
African opinion, but upon the whole balance of political forces in the world.”59  
Facing similar pressure from the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN, Hammarskjold 
requested another Security Council resolution permitting him to use force to enter 
Katanga.  Belgium and the United States made it clear to him that they believed “the UN 
should not be any party to the internal conflict in the Congo” (i.e., support Lumumba 
over Tshombe).60 Consequently, Hammarskjold, who found it difficult to work with 
Lumumba, carefully worded the new resolution so as to allow UN troops to use force to 
enter the province, but to prevent the UN “in any way [to] intervene in or be used to 
influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise.”61 The 
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Security Council passed the resolution on August 9 with the support of the Afro-Asian 
bloc, the United States, and the Soviet Union. 
The resolution infuriated Lumumba. He had hoped to use UN troops to end the 
secession quickly, since his own army was incapable of the task. The prime minister 
believed doing so would supplant the mounting domestic pressures facing his 
government. While in the United States, his opponents had organized protests against him 
in Leopoldville, the nation’s capital, and the diamond-rich province of Kasai had 
proclaimed independence, adding a second secessionist crisis to the many problems 
already confronting him. Upon returning home, Lumumba declared a state of emergency 
and ordered the army into Leopoldville to disperse protestors. He also expelled the 
Belgian ambassador, believing correctly that the Belgian government had helped 
organize the protests and was conspiring against him.62  
To Lumumba the resolution signaled that Hammarskjold was in league with the 
West and Katanga. Lumumba was half-right. It was obvious that Western nations held 
more sway in the UN than his government (a reality Lumumba found difficult to accept 
considering it had been his government that had requested the UN intervention).63 By no 
means, however, was the UN in league with Katangan secessionists. The UN, like the 
United States, was “anxious that Belgians remain to keep [the] economy going,” but the 
white Katangan business community was especially suspicious of UN motives. They, 
including the head of Union Miniere du Haute Katanga, the largest mining company in 
the province, claimed that the “UN [was] trying to take Katanga” for other Western 
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interests. When the Secretary-General’s representative for Economic Affairs met with 
them, the group greeted him with “curses, spat upon him and called him a criminal.” 
They believed that the “arrival of UN troops would signal [the] departure by whites as 
well as Congolese business personnel and [that] economic collapse would come.”64  
Nonetheless, Lumumba remained convinced that the UN had betrayed him. On 
August 14 he sent a letter to Hammarskjold citing the July 14 resolution that stated the 
UN was supposed to provide military assistance to the Congolese Government in 
consultation with it. “It is therefore clear,” Lumumba wrote him, “that in its intervention 
in the Congo the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organization but rather that the 
Security Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of my Government.” 
Lumumba warned that if his government did not “receive satisfaction,” it would be 
“obliged to take other steps,” implying that he would rely on assistance outside the 
confines of the UN to obtain his objectives.65 The next day he wrote Hammarskjold, “The 
government and people of the Congo have lost their confidence in the Secretary-
General.”66 
This was the breaking point with Lumumba as far as the Eisenhower 
administration was concerned. His actions now directly jeopardized the cornerstone of 
U.S. policy in the Congo, keeping the UN in as a means of keeping the Cold War out 
(i.e., keeping the Soviets out). Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon summarized what 
the administration believed would happen if Lumumba got his way:  
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We believe UN withdrawal from Congo would prove calamitous. Certain result would be 
chaos in Congo with Lumumba probably turning to USSR for help. Further result would 
be intense cold war struggle for control of area with potential danger of conflict spreading 
beyond Congo. Thus, in our view, issue is much broader than fate of Congo alone.67  
 
Lumumba’s acceptance of eighteen Soviet transport planes reinforced American 
perceptions of a possible Soviet intervention. On August 18 the CIA station in 
Leopoldville cabled Washington that the “Congo [is] experiencing [a] classic Communist 
effort [to] takeover [the] government. There may be little time left in which [to] take 
action to avoid another Cuba.”68  
In order to prevent such a scenario from arising, the administration came to the 
conclusion that Lumumba had to be removed from power. “We were talking of one man 
forcing us out of the Congo,” President Eisenhower said in an NSC meeting on August 
18.69 “A United Nations presence should be maintained in the Congo in the interests both 
of the Free World and the United Nations, despite Lumumba’s efforts, supported by the 
Soviet Bloc, to expel UN forces,” Eisenhower continued.70 On August 25 an NSC 
subcommittee discussed “plans for an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo.” The next 
day Dulles cabled Lawrence Devlin, the CIA Station Chief in the Congo, that  
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In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if (Lumumba) continues to hold 
high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to 
Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the 
UN and for the interests of the free world generally. Consequently we conclude that his 
removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this 
should be a high priority of our covert action.71  
 
Timberlake and Devlin believed the best way to remove Lumumba was to 
encourage his opponents to throw a coup, which would provide the United States and 
Belgium cover from charges of foul play. Both men were aware of the animosities 
growing against Lumumba in the Congo, and had suggested earlier that the 
administration “discreetly…strengthen those moderates who might be a restraining 
influence at the least and might be expected to replace him, under the most favorable 
circumstances, with a government much nearer the middle of the road.”72 On August 17 
Timberlake had even reported that “I would not, accordingly, be surprised if an attempt is 
made on Lumumba’s life.”73  
Later that month, Lumumba ordered government troops to invade Kasai and put 
an end to that province’s secession. They succeeded, but in the process massacred 
innocent civilians in what Hammarskjold described as “genocide” against the Luba 
people. Using the event as a pretext to get rid of Lumumba, the UN urged Kasavubu to 
dismiss the prime minister.74 On September 5 Kasavubu did so and told Timberlake and 
Averell Harriman, who was on a fact-finding mission for presidential candidate John F. 
Kennedy, that the “population was behind him.” He explained that “Lumumba was 
surrounded by Communist advisers” and that so long as he “remained in power such 	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perturbation would continue thereby causing [the] country to flounder deeper into 
political and economic anarchy.”75 
Lumumba, who suspected that this was all part of a Western plot led by the UN, 
responded by dismissing Kasavubu as president.76 Privately, Hammarskjold admitted to 
the Americans that “what he was trying to do was get rid of Lumumba without 
compromising UN position,” and that the “UN command is making an effort to establish 
the authority of Congo’s President Kasavubu and set the stage for an early attempt to 
remove Lumumba from power.”77 In late-August, Hammarskjold had told them that he 
considered “Lumumba an impossible person” and that he believed the “situation in [the] 
Congo would not be straightened out until Lumumba was dealt with.”78 While part of 
Hammarskjold’s reasoning was likely affected by Lumumba’s hostility towards him, he 
had come to believe that the “Katanga problem could and must be resolved once 
Lumumba was out of [the] way,” believing that “there was no Katanga problem between 
Tshombe and Kasavubu or [Joseph] Ileo [the prime minister’s two likely successors] but 
only with Lumumba.”79 More importantly, he feared that if Lumumba stayed in power 
that the Belgians and other Europeans would flee, creating a gap that would be “filled by 
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Russians and their friends.”80 Herter let Hammarskjold know that the United States was 
“with him 1000%.”81 
Then on September 14, General Joseph Mobutu staged his first coup. Shortly after 
seizing power he expelled Soviet and other Communist Bloc diplomats from the country, 
and placed what he called a College of Commissioners (university students) in charge of 
running the government. While it remains unclear if his actions were part of a CIA plot, 
his own ambition and opportunism cannot be understated.82  Timberlake cabled 
Washington that this event had given him “some hope that act one of the Congo drama 
has ended.”83 But Timberlake warned Washington that even out of government 
Lumumba “would be a serious threat to peace and reconstruction.”84 Harriman agreed 
with this analysis. He wrote to Herter and Dillon that  
Lumumba will continue to cause difficulties in the Congo whether he is in control of the 
government, in jail or released. He is a rabblerousing speaker, a shrewd maneuverer with 
clever left-wing advisers, aided and encouraged by Soviet and Czech Ambassadors. He is 
obsessed with his mission to unify the Congo, believes he is the only man who speaks for 
80 percent of the Congolese people. If the UN does not do his bidding, he considers it a 
new form of colonialism. He thinks if he can get his troops into Katanga and the Belgians 
removed that the people will give him their support. He is confident he can be successful 
in a civil war if UN keeps hands off. He is of course counting on full support from 
Soviets.85  
 
On September 21 Dulles reported to Eisenhower that “Mobutu appeared to be the 
effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and 	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remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.”86 Just a few days earlier 
Eisenhower told Lord Home, the British foreign minister, that he wished “Lumumba 
would fall into a river full of crocodiles.”87 That same day Devlin received a cable from 
CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell, who was in charge of clandestine operations, 
instructing him to meet a fellow agent in Leopoldville who would identify himself as 
“Joe from Paris.” “Joe,” now known to be the chemist Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, arrived in the 
Congo later that month carrying poison concealed as toothpaste. Gottlieb told Devlin that 
President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba assassinated. “It’s your responsibility to carry 
out the operation,” he told Devlin, “you alone.”88 On September 24 Dulles cabled Devlin, 
“We wish [to] give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility 
[of] resuming governmental position or if he fails in Leo[poldville], setting himself [up] 
in Stanleyville or elsewhere.”89 
Meanwhile, the UN, in particular Rajeshwar Dayal, whom Hammarskjold 
appointed as his personal representative in the Congo, was pushing for a legal 
government recognized by the Congolese Parliament. While the administration wanted to 
acquire some form of legitimacy for Mobutu, it opposed convening parliament because it 
knew Lumumba would have to be allowed to participate and “might very well emerge 
with stamp of parliamentary approval.” Furthermore, the administration was not 
convinced democracy could work in the Congo. “Fact is,” Timberlake cabled the State 
Department, “Congo is years away from more than [a] facade of democracy…They 	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obviously cannot practice something they do not understand.” He believed that, “Even 
[the] most sympathetic observers know this country cannot govern itself in any intelligent 
fashion and that, left to its own devices and without outside aid, could not survive as a 
national entity.”90 
The administration was convinced that there was not a single Congolese leader 
capable of running the government effectively. Mobutu, the administration was 
discovering, was “impulsive,” “naïve,” and “anti-UN.” Kasavubu, whom the 
administration persuaded Mobutu to keep on as president to ensure some sort of 
legitimacy, did not want the day-to-day responsibilities of prime minister. Ileo, one 
possibility for prime minister, it believed lacked the “necessary drive and flair,” and Jean 
Bolikongo, another possibility, was considered too “weak” and at any rate bore a “pro-
Belgian tag.”91 Tshombe, whom the administration would have been content supporting 
in a national role, had declared to Timberlake in late-November that “Katangan 
independence was fact and they would never resume political association with [the] 
Congo.”92  
In the midst of sorting out whom the United States should support long-term, 
Kasavubu had Lumumba imprisoned in Thysville after the former-prime minister escaped 
from house arrest on November 27. In a plan orchestrated by Belgium, Lumumba was 
then flown to Elisabethville on January 17, where he was assassinated, buried, exhumed 
the next day by Belgian officers, and dissolved in acid. Timberlake had warned in August 
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that “while Lumumba’s elimination would remove one problem, it might well create 
many more.”93 Just as Timberlake had predicted, shortly after news of Lumumba’s 
imprisonment had spread, Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba’s deputy prime minister and chief 
lieutenant, declared himself interim prime minister on December 12. The State 
Department issued a circular to select diplomatic missions warning that the “result could 
be eventual Korean-type conflict” if Gizenga received support from the Communists.94 
“Every time I look at this truly discouraging mess,” Timberlake had written that 
November, “I shudder over the painfully slow, frustrating and costly job ahead for the 
UN and US if the Congo is to really be helped.”95 Indeed, by the end of Eisenhower’s 
second term, U.S. intervention in the Congo was only gearing up.  
On January 20, 1961 the Kennedy administration inherited U.S. involvement in 
what was by then being referred to as the Congo Crisis. Kennedy maintained the previous 
administration’s commitment to keeping the communists out of the country, but the real 
impetus driving U.S. intervention under the new administration was “nation-building.” 
Through nation-building the Kennedy administration believed it could overcome the 
perils caused by colonialism and set the Third World on a path towards what many 
Americans believed to be the hallmarks of modernity—political and economic freedom—
fulfilling in the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., one of Kennedy’s presidential advisors, 
the United States’ historic “obligation to deal with poverty, repression and injustice 
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‘everywhere in the world.’”96 Such an accomplishment, the administration hoped, would 
make the Congo a beacon to newly emerging nations on the African continent, as well as 
the Third World at large, displaying that democracy and capitalism, rather than 
communism, could transform former colonies into viable nation-states.  
Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy viewed decolonization as an opportunity to extend 
American leadership, values, and influence. During what became known as his “Algerian 
speech,” delivered on the Senate floor in July 1957, Kennedy argued that the values of 
Third World nationalists laid within the realm of the United States’ “traditional and 
deeply felt philosophy of freedom and independence for all peoples everywhere,” thus 
providing the United States an opportunity in “seizing the initiative in foreign affairs.”97 
The speech gained the type of notoriety a young congressman with presidential 
aspirations needed, but it also expressed his belief in the current significance of Africa in 
world affairs. “Call it nationalism, call it anti-colonialism, call it what you will, Africa is 
going through a revolution,” Kennedy declared in 1959.98  
On the campaign trail Kennedy referred to the continent 479 times, appointed 
Chester Bowles, the author of Africa’s Challenge to America (1956), as his adviser on 
foreign policy, and repeatedly argued that the United States must ally itself “with the 	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rising sea of nationalism in Africa.”99 As some historians have charged, discussing Africa 
was a shrewd way of attracting African-American voters while skirting the contentious 
issue of Civil Rights.100 But Kennedy’s commitment to improving U.S.-African relations 
proved authentic. Seventeen African nations, including the Congo, gained independence 
the year he was elected, and as president, he dedicated more time and resources to the 
continent than any previous administration.101 “What we want for Africa is what Africans 
want for themselves,” said G. Mennen Williams, Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, an “Africa for the Africans.”102 
As such, U.S. intervention in the Congo was central to Kennedy’s foreign policy 
at large.103 Nowhere had there been more optimism for what American liberalism could 
achieve abroad than in Africa, and nowhere did American policymakers expend more 
time and energy on that continent than in the Congo. It marked an unprecedented 
projection of American power in sub-Saharan Africa, creating a paper trail at the 
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Kennedy Presidential Library second only in volume to Vietnam; surpassing that of 
Britain, and even of the Soviet Union. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk said in July of 
1962, “There was no other problem including Berlin in which [the] President, [the] 
Secretary and senior colleagues have spent as much time as [the] Congo.”104  
This reappraisal of U.S-African relations, however, did not immediately change 
American policy in the Congo. Perhaps lending some credence to the consensus school of 
thought in American politics, U.S. policy initially remained the same. As Ted Sorenson, 
Kennedy’s special counsel, later recalled, “The Kennedy Congo policy was largely an 
extension of the Eisenhower policy.”105 The new administration continued to use the UN 
as an umbrella organization under which it could pursue American aims while keeping 
the Cold War out of the Congo (i.e., keeping the Soviets out). It also supported a unified 
Congo for the same reasons that the Eisenhower administration had, believing that an 
independent Katanga would leave the rest of the country ripe for communist subversion 
as well as draw strong criticism from the Afro-Asian bloc. Because of this, it shared the 
previous administration’s conclusion that the success of U.S. policy was tied to the 
success of the UN operation. As Kennedy’s Director of the Bureau of Intelligence 
Research at the State Department, Roger Hilsman, later explained, the administration 
believed that “if anything less than a unified Congo came out of the UN operation the 
United States would get the blame. It would be on the wrong side of history in African 
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eyes; our influence throughout black Africa would be all but destroyed; and the Congo 
would be only the first of many defeats.”106  
Most surprising, though, was that the Kennedy administration continued to plot 
against Lumumba in order to prevent him from becoming prime minister. Throughout his 
presidency, Kennedy proved he would work with African nationalists that Eisenhower 
had deemed leftists and therefore dangerous, such as Kwame Nkrumah, the president of 
Ghana, and Sekou Toure, the president of Guinea, but not so in the case of Lumumba.107 
Rather than accept Lumumba’s famous declaration made on July 5, 1960—“We are not 
Communists, Catholics, or Socialists. We are African nationalists.”—Kennedy 
maintained the previous administration’s belief that the former prime minister was “a 
rabble rousing speaker, a shrewd maneuverer with clever left-wing advisers, aided and 
encouraged by Soviet and Czech Ambassadors” who would “continue to cause 
difficulties in the Congo whether he is in control of the government, in jail or 
released.”108  
Unaware that plans made by the Belgian and Katangan governments were already 
in motion to assassinate Lumumba, the Kennedy administration planned to let him 
remain imprisoned until a new government was formed. (Mobutu had imprisoned 
Lumumba in Thysville after he had escaped from house arrest on November 27, 1960.) 
At best the Kennedy administration wanted a moderate government slanted towards the 
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West, and at worse “a more broadly based Congolese Government which would include 
Lumumba elements but not Lumumba himself as Prime Minister.” Either way, Rusk 
wrote Kennedy, “Only after…a new Congolese Government was established, would all 
political prisoners, including Lumumba, be released.”109 Remarkably, the administration 
maintained this position even while it was willing to admit, as Ambassador Clare 
Timberlake did before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 6, 1961, that 
“there is not anybody down there really outside of Lumumba who has got the kind of 
energy and drive and imagination which would let him be Prime Minister in fact, not just 
name.”110  
The biggest difference then between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations 
was that the latter sought to “modernize” the Congo. This commitment to develop the 
Congo’s economy would increase U.S. expenditures and liability in a way that the 
Eisenhower administration had deemed undesirable. To signal this change of policy, 
Kennedy announced during his first press conference as president that the United States 
would “increase substantially its contribution towards relieving the famine in the Congo,” 
promising the delivery of American dry food goods, “and airlifting 1,000 tons of food 
supplies, seeds, and hospital supplies from a number of African nations to the Congo.”111 
Kennedy also created a Congo task force headed by Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland. Cleveland was an academic who 
specialized in development economics (he had coined the phrase “the revolution of rising 
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expectations”), and had experience working with the UN administering aid to countries 
after World War II.112  
After having been told by Rusk to “take the ceiling off our thinking as to 
solutions,” the task force recommended to the president on February 1 that the UN take 
on a greater role in the Congo.113 Before any steps could be taken to develop the country, 
the task force believed that “all principle military elements” had to be “neutralized.” 
Specifically, it recommended passing a new Security-Council resolution that would give 
the UN “authority to bring under control all principal military elements in the Congo,” 
and allow it to “undertake a training program of the Congolese troops.” By using the UN 
to rein in the different military elements in the Congo, the task force believed it would 
help bring an end to Katanga’s secession and prevent the spread of civil war throughout 
the rest of the country. It also recommended that the UN take on “a greater administrative 
role” until a government emerged that could effectively “govern and administer.”114 As 
Rusk later wrote, it was the U.S. position that “the UN had to stop the Congo from 
disintegrating and at the same time help an independent government emerge that could 
govern the country.”115  
Rusk also told the president that increasing the role of the UN would have the 
added benefit “to reorient the United States position so that it will have the support of 
world opinion generally, and in particular the support of principal segments of opinion in 
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Africa and Asia.”116 Upon entering office, the Afro-Asian bloc had been pressuring 
Kennedy to support an expansion of the UN’s authority in the Congo. A letter from 
Nkrumah dated January 23 warned him that 
the reputation of the United States could be irretrievably damaged in Africa if your 
powerful nation sits by and watches one of your close military allies—Belgium which is 
after all dependent on the United States for its defense and to a considerable measure 
economic existence crumpling up democracy in Africa in flagrant disregard of the 
unanimous opinion and sentiment of all those African people who are free to express 
their views.117  
 
The Afro-Asian bloc would not have been pleased to know, however, that part of the 
reason the United States wanted to place “a good deal of the operational machinery…in 
the hands of the United Nations” was that it believed it “would provide added safeguard 
against a Lumumba takeover.”118 
Then on February 13, fear of a Lumumba takeover was no longer relevant. 
Kennedy was informed that the former prime minister had been assassinated. The 
administration worried that once the news spread it would explode the situation in the 
Congo. Many in the Third World considered Lumumba to be the legitimate leader of the 
Congolese, and believed that his ousting had been orchestrated by Western financial 
interests dedicated to preventing the Congo from achieving a genuine independence.119 
Indeed, protests broke out across the globe. People gathered to mourn the loss of the 
Congo’s fallen leader and to express their outrage in places such as New York, London, 
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Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Cairo, Lagos, and Accra.120 But many of the protests, like 
the one staged by African-Americans in the General Assembly during the U.S. 
Representative to the UN’s speech, proved in the end to be largely insignificant, and 
rather than blowing up the situation in the Congo as the administration had anticipated, 
then provided an avenue for the United States to expand the capacity of the UN operation 
as it had originally intended.121 
The administration used an enraged Afro-Asian bloc as leverage to move NATO 
allies towards accepting a new UN resolution on February 21 that gave the Secretary-
General the power to use force in order “to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the 
Congo.”122 With this resolution in place, the Kennedy administration could focus on 
establishing a legitimate government, one that would win approval from parliament, 
hopefully providing it enough strength to put an end to any further political splintering. 
This, it believed, was the first step towards developing the Congo; an issue Lumumba’s 
death had hardened the administration’s resolve on. Immediately following news of the 
former prime minister’s assassination, Walt Rostow, Deputy Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, wrote a memo to his superior saying that the hope 
was “to concert our policies and to create a framework within which Congo can be built 
and its people may begin the long creative task of modernizing their society, in their own 
fashion.”123  
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But the question remained, whom would the United States support to become the 
Congo’s next leader so that it could achieve these objectives? The “best possibility,” 
according to Timberlake, was a man named Cyrille Adoula.124 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
FORMATION OF THE ADOULA GOVERNMENT 
 
On one hand, the formation of the Adoula government could be regarded as the 
Kennedy administration’s greatest achievement during the crisis. Maneuvering through a 
wide range of international and local interests, the administration successfully formed a 
government around Adoula that temporarily unified the country (aside from Katanga). 
Yet a closer examination reveals that in doing so, it undermined its goal of instilling 
liberal values in the Congo. Despite lacking popular support, American policymakers 
nonetheless sought to empower Adoula, and in the process employed bribery, blackmail, 
and threats that in the long run would only further widen the credibility gap between 
Adoula and the Congolese people. While the administration celebrated the newly 
“democratically elected” government in the Congo, the truth was that the United States, 
in collusion with the Binza group (the clique that had helped orchestrate the coup against 
the first democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba), as opposed to the 
Congolese people, had conceived of and created the Adoula government, and as result 
helped sow the seeds for further political discord rather than the stability it so desired. 
The United States’ top priority in the wake of Lumumba’s death was to establish a 
broad-based government in the Congo. More serious than the pressure mounting 
internationally to resolve the crisis was the situation developing within the Congo itself. 
As Ambassador Clare Timberlake cabled back to the State Department, “Problems here 
could scarcely be more complex.”1 Four armed political camps divided the country. Two 
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factions competed for national jurisdiction. One resided in the country’s capital, 
Leopoldville, under the leadership of Joseph Kasavubu and General Joseph Mobutu who 
commanded about 7,000 troops. The other resided in Lumumba’s hometown, 
Stanleyville, under the leadership of Antoine Gizenga who commanded about 5,500 
troops. Two other factions sought to secede from the Congo. Albert Kalonji led the 
secession of the diamond-rich province, South Kasai, and commanded about 3,000 
troops. And of course, Moise Tshombe led the secession of Katanga, and commanded 
between 5,000 and 7,000 troops.2 The relationship between the UN military force and the 
government in Leopoldville was also deteriorating. Timberlake reported that an 
“explosive atmosphere” had developed between the two, and “a spark could touch it off 
at any minute.”3 As the fog of war rolled in, conflicting intelligence reports on troop 
movements and skirmishes kept the Congo in a state of panic and the White House on 
edge.4 War seemed imminent unless a government uniting these factions could be 
formed.  
During the process of creating a unified government, the Kennedy administration 
focused on preventing it from being Lumumbist-led. After Mobutu imprisoned Lumumba 
in September 1960, Gizenga, Lumumba’s Deputy Prime Minister, proclaimed that the 
lawful government of the Congo resided in Stanleyville under his leadership. Christophe 
Gbenye and Pierre Mulele, both of whom also had held ministerial ranks under 
Lumumba, served as Gizenga’s lieutenants. The Lumumbists, as the historian Georges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1965), 51-52. 
3 Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 4 March 1961, FRUS 
1961-1963, XX: 89-91; Editorial Note, FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 91-93. 
4 Clifton to Bundy, Memorandum, 3 March 1961, Box 27, NSF, JFKL; Dulles to Clifton, 
Memorandum, 27 February 1961, Box 27, NSF, JFKL. 
 
	  
46 
Nzongola-Ntalaja noted, were “emotionally committed to obtaining genuine 
independence, politically and economically, although they were not very clear on how to 
achieve this goal.”5 In essence, they were “progressive nationalists who sought to create 
nationally oriented and mass-based political parties, and saw independence as an 
opportunity for some changes likely to benefit ordinary people economically and 
socially…they espoused the pan-African ideal of African unity and the Bandung 
principle of…non-alignment.”6 Because of their appointments in Lumumba’s 
government—the only government to have been lawfully empowered by the 
constitution—the Afro-Asian bloc and the UN generally considered this faction to have 
the strongest claim in governing the Congo. 
A group of moderates in Leopoldville opposed the Lumumbists in Stanleyville. 
Nzongola-Ntalaja has accurately described them as “nationalists who tended on the 
whole to be conservative in their political outlook” and who were willing “to accept 
Western tutelage.”7 Kasavubu, Ileo, and Adoula were the public face of the moderates, 
while the real power resided within a clique of ministers known as the “Binza group.”8 
Mobutu, Justin Bomboko, and Victor Nendaka were its most influential members, and 
along with some additional cohorts, controlled the most important government 
institutions: the army, the central bank, the secret police, the foreign ministry, and the 
ministry of the interior.9 Outside the Leopoldville government, Kalonji and Tshombe also 
subscribed to the moderate platform; in general they opposed the Lumumbists and also 
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favored working with the West. They, however, desired an autonomous relationship with 
the central government in order to preserve the wealth and lifestyle their mineral-rich 
provinces had garnered for them.10 
The success of a brokered government relied upon finding a prime minister of 
whom the moderate and Lumumbist political factions would approve, and who appeared 
legitimate to the Afro-Asian bloc. The State Department also desired the candidate be 
pro-West, accepting U.S. nation-building plans and opposing Soviet expansion in the 
Congo. “The problem—and it is not a problem unique to the Congo,” Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk later wrote, “was finding people who could organize and lead a 
government.”11  The task that awaited the new prime minister was enormous, and would 
require the greatest degree of political acumen. He would have to hold together a 
coalition government, end any secessionist movements, and right the economy. As if the 
stakes were not high enough, the State Department believed that failing to procure an 
adequate government would adversely affect the rest of the continent. “We believed that 
what happened in that large, diverse, and complex country in the heart of Africa,” Rusk 
wrote, “was important to the rest of Africa.”12 
The Eisenhower administration initially believed Mobutu could run the country. 
But during his short-lived dictatorship during the fall of 1960, he proved to be 
incompetent. In cables back to Washington, Timberlake (an Eisenhower appointee) 
described Mobutu as “impulsive” and “naïve.”13 The ambassador reiterated these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Kalonji would eventually ally with the moderates in Leopoldville, while Tshombe steadfastly 
refused. 
11 Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 281. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 1 November 1961, FRUS 
1958-1960, XIV: 561-562. 
 
	  
48 
observations in an official report, noting that the commissioners Mobutu appointed to run 
the country were “more interested in high life than in the serious business of providing a 
government.” Furthermore, Timberlake noted that providing Mobutu with the additional 
money and arms that was being requested would “not cure the disease from which 
Mobutu’s army is suffering but will simply provide expensive aspirin tablets to reduce 
fevers temporarily.”14 
Supporting Mobutu also placed the United States in an uncomfortable position 
with the UN and the Afro-Asian bloc. Because Mobutu usurped power without 
constitutional authority, the UN remained hesitant to officially recognize his regime, 
jeopardizing further aid from the organization. The Eisenhower administration attempted 
to address this concern by pressuring Mobutu to name Ileo prime minister. This placed a 
“fig leaf of a civilian government,” as one historian described it, over a rather obvious 
military dictatorship.15 Ileo was largely what he appeared to be, a crony of Mobutu, 
lacking the “necessary drive and flair” to be prime minister, in ambassador Timberlake’s 
words, “and most unlikely to develop political muscle.”16  Even after Kasavubu and 
Mobutu named Ileo prime minister, UN leaders in the Congo remained hesitant to work 
with the government, instead favoring the Lumumbist faction, whose claims to 
legitimacy was less suspect.17 To briefly sum up, the United States in 1961 concluded 
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that Mobutu was neither capable to govern the country nor worth the political capital to 
support him. 
With Mobutu no longer considered a viable option for prime minister, the State 
Department’s eyes turned towards President Kasavubu, whose outlook and reputation 
appeared sound. Since the beginning of the crisis he had made it clear he wanted “a 
Congolese solution with Western, not Communist help,” and during Mobutu’s coup, his 
presidency had remained the “only unchallenged institution functioning.”18 But by this 
point, Kasavubu had already made it clear that he desired no responsibilities of “real 
power” and was content remaining president.19 With Kalonji and Tshombe attempting to 
secede, the only viable Congolese politician left with any national notoriety was Adoula. 
After surveying the scene, the State Department eventually agreed with Timberlake “that 
Adoula seemed to be emerging as a leader who might be able to obtain some Lumumbist 
support for a moderate government and might well be a more effective Prime Minister 
than Ileo.”20 In short, he was their “best possibility.”21  
Singled out practically by default, Adoula nonetheless possessed the credentials 
the State Department desired. He was “moderate,” “anti-communist,” and willing to work 
closely with the United States.22 Although Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen 
Williams may have overstated the case when he told Rhodesian leaders, “Adoula had 
been America’s choice for this job from the start,” it is clear that the embassy and the 
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CIA had developed a relationship with him before Lumumba’s death.23 Lumumbists 
found Adoula acceptable because he had helped found Lumumba’s political party, the 
Mouvement National Congolais, championed a non-aligned foreign policy, and remained 
unimplicated in Mobutu’s coup. Perhaps most important to the Lumumbists, Adoula was 
genuinely committed to ending Katanga’s secession. These characteristics, coupled with 
his preaching of pan-Africanism and denunciation of colonialism in neighboring Angola, 
garnered him the support of the Afro-Asian bloc. In both the national and international 
arena, Adoula truly was a middle-ground candidate, ideally situated for leading a 
brokered government.24 As Rusk wrote in a memorandum to President Kennedy, “He is 
the strongest and most attractive of the moderate Congolese leaders.”25  
But as Timberlake pointed out, there was one major problem ailing Adoula: “He 
lack[s] broad political support.”26 The decision to empower Adoula reveals an element 
out of line with the liberal values the administration intended to instill in the Congo. Even 
though Adoula ideologically bridged the gap between the moderates in Leopoldville and 
the Lumumbists in Stanleyville, the Kennedy administration and the UN had to work 
hard at “setting up” his government, brokering alliances amongst the political factions in 
the Congo as well as mustering public support.27 In the process of doing so, they 
employed coercive means, such as bribery, blackmail, and threats. These methods 
produced short-term results, but did not afford Adoula genuine political support. Once 
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appointed, this placed the new prime minister in a tenuous position at best. Without the 
political leverage of popular support, he often found himself rendered impotent and at the 
mercy of his patrons. 
Arranging an Adoula premiership took several steps.  The State Department’s 
decision earlier that year to remove the commander of UN operations in the Congo, 
Rajeshwar Dayal, had helped clear the way for a non-Lumumbist prime minister. In a 
public report sent to the Secretary-General in November 1960, Dayal maintained that 
Lumumba was still prime minister, and condemned Mobutu’s dictatorship.28 As 
Ambassador Timberlake noted, “Dayal basically wants [a] Parliament-supported 
government which he can deal [with].”29 The State Department feared Dayal’s 
sympathies towards the Lumumbists, and viewed his belief that the UN should remain 
“neutral” in the Congo’s political affairs as a roadblock to U.S. policy.30 
In a high-level meeting in early March 1961, President Kennedy made clear that 
Dayal needed to be “replaced.”31 Adlai Stevenson, Kennedy’s ambassador to the UN, 
began pressuring Hammarskjold to remove Dayal. Hammarskjold, however, as one 
historian has written, considered Dayal “something of an alter ego for the Secretary-
General,” and did not take kindly to the U.S. “criticizing the lack of neutrality of his 
principal lieutenant in the Congo.”32 Hammarskjold initially refused to remove his “old 
and trusted friend,” arguing to Stevenson “that any action in relation to Dayal that might 
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be construed as bowing to American pressure would be as bad for him and for the UN as 
it would be for the United States itself.”33  
By April, the State Department ordered Stevenson to be “frank” with 
Hammarskjold, and to “remind him strongly that if the Congo falls under Communist 
domination while the UN is sharing major responsibility for the security of the country, 
the results in US public and Congressional opinion are likely to be extremely damaging 
to the UN.”34 The statement to the Secretary-General served as a not-so-subtle reminder 
that the United States funded the bulk of the UN operations in the Congo. Though “the 
Secretary-General did not take kindly to this demarche,” Hammarskjold eventually 
submitted, but not before driving what he believed to be a hard bargain.35 In exchange for 
replacing Dayal, Hammarskjold told the United States it would have to recall Timberlake, 
who had led the charge in lampooning Dayal’s reputation. Dayal submitted a letter of 
resignation in May, Timberlake returned home in June.36 
In reality, removing Dayal had cost the Kennedy administration little. Timberlake, 
a holdover from the previous administration, had fallen out of favor with Kennedy 
because of recent behavior that had bordered on insubordination.37 Kennedy replaced 
Timberlake with Edmund Gullion, a personal friend whose vision for the Third World 
matched that of the president.38 McMurtrie Godley, a capable and resourceful diplomat 
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who served as counselor at the embassy, took over the responsibilities of the ambassador 
until Gullion arrived.  
The only real fallout that occurred from the removal of Dayal was that it had irked 
India, an important leader amongst the non-aligned states whose much-needed soldiers 
were serving in the UN Congo operation. After Dayal’s removal some Indian 
parliamentarians called for the withdrawal of their nation’s combat troops from the 
Congo. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was also offended by the incident, particularly 
the lampooning of Dayal by the West. Rusk flew to New Delhi and resolved the issue by 
telling Nehru that the U.S. would support another Indian to replace Dayal at the UN.39 In 
the meantime, Hammarskjold divvied out Dayal’s former responsibilities amongst several 
UN officials, appointing Sture Linner from Sweden as Officer in Charge of UN 
Operations. As CIA Chief of Station Larry Devlin noted, “The selection of Linner could 
not have been better for the embassy…as he and Mac [Godley] hit it off immediately.”40 
Indeed, Godley cabled the State Department shortly after Linner’s arrival, “We find UN 
policy and that of UN representative here identical.” 41  
Dayal’s resignation coincided with another fortuitous break for the Kennedy 
administration. In late-April, a newly elected government took office in Belgium in 
which Paul-Henri Spaak was named Foreign Minister. Spaak, a veteran diplomat and 
politician, had served as the first Chairman of the General Assembly at the UN and as the 
Secretary General of NATO. Working closely with the United States throughout his 
career had earned him the Presidential Medal of Freedom which Kennedy had awarded 
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him earlier that year. Spaak reinvigorated Belgium’s relationship with the United States 
and the UN, which under the previous government had become at best stale and at worst 
intransigent. As Spaak noted in his memoirs, he met with the U.S. ambassador “several 
times a week and, at times of crisis, several times a day.”42 The U.S. embassy in Belgium 
reported that “with the fresh approach which Spaak is obviously bringing to the Congo 
problem, there seems to be a real opportunity for us to work closely and constructively 
with the new Belgian Government.”43  
The new Belgian foreign minister told the American ambassador in Brussels that  
the best way for Belgium to preserve her economic and other interests…was for her to 
make clear to the Congolese Government that Belgium is not trying to control and fetter 
GOC [Government of Congo] freedom of action but wishes to see a free and independent 
Congo with which Belgium is willing to cooperate and be helpful on terms of equality 
and full recognition of Congolese sovereignty.44  
 
Spaak announced these new objectives while addressing the Atlantic Council in May, 
stating that Belgium wanted “a neutral Congo which would respect Western interests” 
and in which the UN should play “an important part.” 45 In essence, Spaak’s philosophy 
and objectives were more or less in consonance with the policies of the Kennedy 
administration.  
With the recasting of characters in the UN and Belgium, the United States 
launched a well-coordinated campaign in June to pressure every major participant—the 
UN, Belgium, Britain, France, the various political factions in the Congo, and the Union 
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Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK)—to accept and assist in creating a unified 
government under Adoula.46  
Rusk cabled Charles Yost, Ambassador Stevenson’s deputy at the UN, to make 
the case to Hammarskjold that an Adoula government was the only way to “ensure 
success [of the] UN Congo operation.”47 It was the United States’ position, Rusk wrote, 
that the Secretary-General “use his influence towards creation of [a] government of 
moderate character in which members of Lumumba-Gizenga group would be 
represented.”48 Hammarskjold, who had already begun charting a similar course for the 
UN, responded positively. As Yost reported back to Rusk, “On whole I found SYG 
[Secretary-General] thinking along same lines as we are, maneuvering effectively to 
produce as sound and moderate government as is possible under circumstances.”49As 
Devlin noted, “The Secretary-General was determined to have a parliamentary 
government—one that would include Gizenga—in place before the next meeting of the 
UN’s General Assembly in New York.”50  
Hammarskjold hoped a lawful government in the Congo would allow the UN to 
fulfill its mandates, and more importantly, that a government of reconciliation might end 
Katanga’s secession, removing the need for the expensive peacekeeping operation that 
was draining the organization financially. Hammarskjold rarely supported an expedient 
solution at the expense of a tactful one, and therefore like the United States he wanted to 
avoid the creation of a Lumumbist government in the Congo. His interactions with 
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Lumumba as well as his personal aversion to communism caused Hammarskjold to 
support Adoula. Gizenga needed to participate in the new government in order for it to 
appear legitimate in the eyes of the Congolese and the Afro-Asian bloc, but as Yost 
informed Rusk, “[The] UN was playing its cards to attain [a] moderate political 
result…apparently having in mind Adoula emerging as Prime Minister and Gizenga 
having some other post.” 51 
These maneuverings in New York resulted in American diplomats and UN 
officials working in tandem to persuade the decision-makers in Leopoldville that Adoula 
should be prime minister. As Devlin noted, “The Binza Group, in particular, had a vested 
interest in whatever new government emerged because they wanted it to be moderate and, 
ideally, one they could influence.”52 Before returning home, Timberlake warned 
Washington that “Kasavubu, Mobutu, or any other Congolese,” should not be considered 
“in the pocket.”53 Godley and Linner worked on Leopoldville leaders to support Adoula 
as prime minister. Godley soft-peddled the issue, highlighting Ileo’s inabilities and 
“pressing the Leopoldville Congolese to agree, between themselves, on a strong 
formateur (such as Adoula).” According to him, he “never mentioned Adoula by 
name.”54 Meanwhile, Linner, under heavy pressure from Hammarskjold to get a lawful 
government in order, was more “forthright” with the Leopoldville leaders. He told them 
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that naming Adoula prime minister was their best bet for bringing the Stanleyville faction 
back into the fold and regaining international legitimacy.55 
CIA covert operations accompanied the efforts of Godley and Linner. As Devlin 
later wrote, “Linner’s argument coincided with the recommendations of a number of our 
agents and tilted the situation in our direction.”56 Bribes were also used. The White 
House approved “an expenditure of $23,000 in support of particular activities designed to 
strengthen the moderate camp in the Congo.” As McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, explained to the president, “Very much larger sums have been 
spent in the past in the same direction, through the same channels and without 
embarrassment.”57 These means were effective momentarily. The Binza group assented, 
since Adoula would allow them to maintain their hold on the levers of power in the 
government. UN officials also enticed the Lumumbists to participate in the formation of a 
unified government by assuring their protection during the negotiations.58 After 
observing Gizenga over the past few months, the State Department concluded that he was 
“less [of a] threat” than Lumumba, and that as long as he did not end up as prime 
minister, it was comfortable with him and other Lumumbists participating in the new 
government.59  
Persuading Tshombe to participate in the negotiations proved to be the most 
difficult challenge. In attempting to do so the Kennedy administration, and the world, 
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discovered just how obstinate he could be. Since U.S. relations with Katanga were 
strained, the administration urged the UN, Belgium, Britain, and to a lesser extent France, 
to pressure Tshombe to participate in the formation of a new government.60 The State 
Department also exerted what little influence it held over the UMHK by enlisting the help 
of retired Admiral Alan Kirk, who had developed several contacts with the company 
while serving as ambassador to Belgium immediately following World War II.61 
The State Department’s method of choice in order to get Tshombe to negotiate 
was stoking the fire under the Belgian government. State thought that since UMHK was a 
Belgian company, and it was mostly Belgian expatriates aiding Katanga, that the 
government of Belgium could use its authority and leverage over both to enlist 
Tshombe’s participation. This placed Spaak in a tough situation. As he later wrote, “For 
me personally, the Katangan situation was most difficult.”62 On one hand, he was 
concerned about the “lives of some thousand of my compatriots” and the “legitimate” 
Belgian interests in the Congo.63 On the other hand, “He was convinced that those 
Belgians who wanted to hang on in Congo and exercise predominant influence on the 
Congolese Government were following a path which was 100 percent wrong.”64 The 
embassy in Belgium reported to the State Department “insofar as he [Spaak] was 
concerned, he believed strongly that Belgium should cooperate with the UN. In 
particular, he felt that the ‘political advisors’ should be withdrawn as rapidly as possible 
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and the sooner the better.”65 Domestic public opinion, however, hamstrung Spaak’s 
policies, as did his inability to pressure private citizens affiliated with UMHK. As 
company representatives liked to tell him, it was “not their policy to exert pressure on 
political matters.”66 
In July, Rusk ordered his ambassador in Brussels to further pressure the Belgian 
foreign minister on the matter of removing Tshombe’s Belgian advisers in Katanga. The 
State Department believed these individuals were serving as a negative influence on 
Tshombe, contributing to his obstinance. “[It] should be made clear to Spaak,” Rusk 
wrote, “that Belgium [is] not moving fast enough on withdrawals.”67 The State 
Department believed that the withdrawals might “have [an] immediate effect bringing 
Tshombe around,” but at the least “would diminish considerably his independent military 
capability, one of his major sources of power.”68 At the behest of the Americans, the 
British ambassador in Brussels also urged Spaak to “bring all possible pressure to bear on 
Tshombe to cooperate.”69 In the unlikely case that Spaak failed to grasp the seriousness 
of the situation, the typically droll Rusk reiterated to him in grave terms that  
world attention remains focused on [the] problem and that Western relations with [the] 
majority of countries of [the] world will be affected adversely if we appear to be standing 
in the way of national reconciliation in the Congo. The US, for its part, considers that it 
has a heavy stake in the success of the UN effort to bring the contending factions 
together.70  
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Spaak’s lack of success was not due to lack of effort. Relative to the previous 
government he had immensely sped up the withdrawals, and though he lacked control 
over Belgian mercenaries, he declared that the government would “confiscate the 
passport of any Belgian who continued serving with the Katanga gendarmerie.”71 As far 
as getting Tshombe to the negotiating table, he met with UMHK officials and urged them 
to use their “influence with Tshombe to get him to cooperate with Moderates and send 
representatives to Parliament.”72  Because UMHK also had investors in the United 
Kingdom, he “urged British influence be exerted in [the] same sense.”73 Spaak even 
personally cabled Tshombe “indicating why interests of Katanga could best be served 
cooperating with Moderates in Leopoldville and why GOB [Government of Belgium] 
opposed separatism.”74  
Despite facing pressure from every major Western nation as well as the UN and 
the Afro-Asian bloc, Tshombe barely budged. He was especially gifted at palavering, 
deflecting and avoiding any serious commitment to participate in the formation of a 
unified government. Conor Cruise O’Brien, the UN representative stationed in 
Elisabethville, recalled that conversations with Tshombe “were long, frequent and 
exhausting,” and produced “meager and twisted results.”75 Tshombe would say one thing 
in private, and another in public. “His ambivalent and inconsistent attitude,” Spaak 
observed, “was bound to irritate and worry all those who had dealings with him, even his 
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most ardent well-wishers.”76 In short, Tshombe played his hand close to his vest when 
dealing with Western interlocutors, and he played it well, forcing even his archenemy, the 
witty Irish intellectual O’Brien, to note that Tshombe was “quite clever and amusing.”77  
Several elements factored into Tshombe’s unwillingness to participate in the 
formation of a unified government. Ego played a part. Tshombe knew that the 
international climate prevented him from becoming head of the central government, a 
position he desired. Factions within Katangan politics also hardened Tshombe’s resolve. 
Reactionary Katangan politicians such as Godefroid Munongo kept the secessionist spirit 
alive, and pressured Tshombe to do the same.78 A small but loud group of influential 
Westerners also cheered Tshombe on, bolstering his belief that the West might eventually 
come around to his position.79 Tshombe claimed that the UN also discouraged him from 
negotiating, since it appeared that UN officials were interfering in internal politics, 
something the Secretary-General pledged they would not do.80  
But the most significant factor contributing to Tshombe’s intransigence was that 
he, along with many other Katangans, wanted to preserve their affluence. As one 
journalist noted, Katanga’s “revenues were the envy of poorer provinces.”81 Tshombe, 
himself a millionaire, represented the petit-bourgeoisie that had developed in the colony. 
Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, had amenities difficult to find elsewhere in the 
Congo. Lobster arrived by plane, and there was a golf course, which according to one 
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observer, was “one of the best courses in Africa.”82 When Tshombe said, “A unitary form 
of government is not possible in parts of a country differing so greatly from each other,” 
he was not just referring to tribal differences.83  He believed a unified government in a 
federal system would jeopardize the lifestyle to which Katangans had grown accustom. 
Katangans feared that the central government, desperate for cash, would redistribute 
Katanga’s wealth across the poorer provinces, and that rejoining the Congo would invite 
the chaos enveloping the rest of the country into Katanga. As one UMHK official tried to 
explain to Spaak, they were “obsessed with fear that Katanga would become mired in 
Congolese political and economic chaos.”84  
Tshombe was a peculiar specimen to contemporary observers. As Mike Hoare, 
the white South African who commanded Tshombe’s mercenaries, noted, Tshombe was 
“able to understand the African and the European mind at one and the same time.”85 
Tshombe had embraced European culture as a youth. His father had been a successful 
and ambitious entrepreneur, which allowed Tshombe to travel to Belgium when 
Congolese contact with the outside world was practically forbidden by colonial 
authorities. He received an education from American Methodist missionaries, joined the 
Boy Scouts, and conducted business negotiations with Europeans for his father. All of 
which taught him the social cues of Western society.  
Third Worlders interpreted Tshombe’s affability and willingness to work with 
white Westerners as being a “stooge” or a “puppet.” An Indian diplomat summed up this 
widely held opinion when he said, “We knew all about his white advisers. He was not 
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really an African leader. Tshombe had the mentality of a European.”86 Tshombe certainly 
sought out white advisers, but as his friend and biographer, Ian Colvin, wrote, “Once the 
European adviser had offered his information, the decisions of Tshombe took on a 
rounded, ebullient, almost Churchillian form that was peculiarly his own.”87 It was also 
true that Tshombe allied with Western imperialists, but a closer examination reveals that 
he was in cahoots with them only insofar as it served his interests. Allying with UMHK, 
for example, initially benefitted both parties. When the company told him to end the 
secession, he replied in no uncertain terms, “This company will pay dearly for its treason. 
We are all set to blow up every Union Miniere installation in Elisabethville, Kolwezi, and 
Jadotville.”88 Company officials interpreted these threats as “real,” fearing the worst.89   
Tshombe’s reputation as a pawn of Western interests derived largely from his 
own public relations campaign. He embraced and cultivated an image of himself which 
repulsed Third World nationalists to the same degree it excited conservative white 
Westerners. He knew aggrandizing himself as an anti-communist, a willing partner for 
white settlers, and a victim of the UN would garner him support from conservative 
Western quarters. A master of public and personal diplomacy, his lobbying and 
propaganda drew him sympathy from foreign dignitaries. In the United States, Richard 
Nixon, Herbert Hoover, and Barry Goldwater vociferously supported Tshombe.90 His 
most ardent American supporter was Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT), whose activism 
became a nettlesome thorn in the Kennedy administration’s side.  
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As Tshombe worked to avoid the formation of a unified government, his 
adversaries grew impatient, and began to move on without his participation. 
Hammarskjold threatened to cut off UN aid unless a government elected by parliament 
emerged.91 Shortly after Hammarskjold’s demarche, the Leopoldville and Stanleyville 
factions agreed to meet to form a government of unity. Tshombe refused to participate, 
and instead championed the formation of a confederation that would permit Katanga’s 
autonomy. 92 With the opportunity to reach an agreement between the moderates and the 
Lumumbists at stake, the United States and the UN decided they could no longer wait for 
Tshombe to come around. The consulate in Elisabethville felt as if “Katangan leaders 
[were] attempting by every device to split perspective unity of Congo in order to save this 
province from forceful reintegration into central government system. In their desperation 
they [are] becoming [an] active menace to US and Western interests in Africa.” 93 As the 
Americans would soon discover, only the use of force could have persuaded Tshombe to 
participate, an option the UN and the United States were unwilling to entertain at this 
time.94 
The UN arranged for Congolese delegates, minus the Katangans, to convene at 
Lovanium University on July 13 to elect a new government. In an effort to remove any 
suspicion of foreign involvement or foul play during the conference, thus giving the 
impression that whatever government emerged was a legitimate product of the Congolese 
themselves, the conference appeared to be held in total isolation. UN troops sealed off the 
campus. As Roger Hilsman, Kennedy’s Director of the Bureau of Intelligence Research 
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at the State Department, described, “Barbed wire was put up, searchlight towers built, 
soldiers with dogs patrolled the grounds. No money was allowed inside the grounds, not 
even blank checks; no liquor, weapons, or even women were permitted inside and none 
of the legislators were allowed to leave until after an agreement was reached.”95  
But as previously noted, UN officials were pulling for Adoula to be elected prime 
minister. Linner, along with two other UN officials, Robert Gardiner and Mahmoud 
Khiary, worked inside the conference to arrange an Adoula outcome. “Ten days before 
the Government of the Congo was elected,” O’Brien wrote, “[Khiary] showed me, 
written on the back of an envelope, the core of the Government he hoped to see elected: 
Prime Minister, Adoula; Vice-Premiers, Gizenga, Sendwe, Bolikango. It all came true, 
except for Bolikango.”96 Knowing that Kasavubu supported Adoula, Linner “urged 
Kasavubu to visit the conclave, offering to put a helicopter at his disposal.”97  Kasavubu 
did visit, and according to Assistant Secretary of State Williams, “Saved the bacon.”98 
During the conference, American embassy officials were so confident that UN policy 
mirrored U.S. objectives that they later described it as “really a U.S. operation but using 
outstanding U.N. personalities.”99 
The CIA also worked for an Adoula outcome. On the eve of the conference, 
Devlin “met with as many parliamentarians as possible” and “arranged to have the editor 
of the main newspaper review the potential candidates for prime minister,” who 
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concluded, “Adoula was best qualified to head the new government.”100  During the 
conference, the CIA also discovered a way into the Lovanium fortress. Money and the 
guarantee of “shiny American automobiles” arrived for key delegates via the sewers.101  
The Binza group feared a Gizenga outcome as much as the United States, and 
“pressured” (often bullied) the other Congolese delegates to accept a unified government 
under Adoula.102 Mobutu threatened a coup if Gizenga was elected prime minister.103 His 
troops remained armed in Leopoldville, breaking the UN’s security protocol for the 
conference.104  Shortly after that declaration, he threatened to take over the airport, 
jeopardizing the safety of delegates’ return trip, a provision guaranteed by the UN. 
Gizenga formally protested, but to no avail. Godley and Linner did not approve of 
Mobutu’s “blackmail,” but the CIA continued to collude with the Binza group throughout 
the conference.105 Devlin had a radio installed in an automobile belonging to a member of 
the Binza group “to insure communications between us during the meeting.”106  
Aside from several anxious moments in Washington, where it appeared that the 
conference might dissolve or that Gizenga may be named prime minister, the UN and 
CIA efforts prevailed.107 On August 1, 1961, Adoula was named “formateur.” The next 
day, with a vote of confidence from Parliament, Kasavubu named Adoula prime minister. 
Gizenga would serve as Deputy Prime Minister, and Gizenga’s lieutenant, Christophe 
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Gbenye, would serve as Minister of the Interior.108 The United States had succeeded in 
creating a moderate government in the Congo.  
The UN and the United States were elated. Hammarskjold sent a letter to Adoula 
recognizing his appointment as prime minister and informing him that UN aid would “be 
rendered exclusively to your government.”109 The Congo Crisis had weighed heavily on 
Hammarskjold the past year. Operations in the Congo had strained the UN financially 
and created such political discord that the very life of the institution had been 
threatened.110 The Secretary-General believed Adoula’s election signaled that the end of 
the crisis was near. In a letter to the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Hammarskjold wrote, “If 
the solution chosen by unanimous Parliament, as I sincerely hope, proves reasonably 
stable, it would from my point of view be a signal for the beginning of the liquidation of 
the UN operation.” 111   
In Washington, Rusk noted “Adoula’s victory” in passing to the president.112 Walt 
Rostow, ever cheery, better relayed the sense of exuberance in the administration. “There 
is optimism all over town that the Congo situation is on the way toward solution,” he 
wrote Kennedy, “we could be witnessing the most encouraging new development since 
you became President.”113 In an official speech, Undersecretary of State George Ball said 
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that the emergence of the Adoula government was, “An act of faith in the democratic 
process.” He declared, “Its legitimacy is unquestioned.”114  
While the administration celebrated the newly “democratically-elected” 
government in the Congo, the truth was that the United States as opposed to the 
Congolese people had conceived of and created the Adoula government. Adoula would 
not have been empowered as prime minister without the backing of U.S. power. 
Undoubtedly, the execution of American diplomacy was impressive. U.S. policymakers 
overcame significant obstacles by working with many partners, interests, and factions, 
and successfully kept the remainder of the country unified, which appeared to be an 
unlikely possibility when it had inherited the crisis. Such efforts, however, reveal that the 
Adoula government was far from a product of the democratic process as Ball had 
claimed.115 The Americans had colluded with the Binza group, the clique that had 
orchestrated the coup against the first democratically elected prime minister of the 
Congo, Patrice Lumumba. Together they bribed and pressured the other Congolese 
delegates to accept a government of unity.  
As a result, Adoula’s power remained limited. Binza members retained control 
over the vital organs of government, and the United States, which had practically created 
the Adoula government, as the historian Stephen Weissman has written, “Was, in many 
different ways, part of his government.”116 Adoula knew his policies would need 
approval and support from Washington for success, and that the Americans could sway 
the Binza group in his favor, as occurred at Lovanium, or could stand idly by during a 
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coup, as happened to Lumumba.117 To his credit, Adoula did not always fold in the face 
of American power.  He made the most of the entangled relationship by remaining true to 
his nationalist sensibilities. While heeding advice from Washington, he at times charted 
his own path. He knew, even if the Americans did not, that only a speedy end to 
Katanga’s secession would provide him the broad political support necessary for him to 
remain in power. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
BATTLE FOR KATANGA, ROUND 1 
 
Ending the secession provided the only hope for the Adoula government to 
establish itself as legitimate and to begin to tackle the many problems confronting the 
Congo. But the international community was divided over how to achieve this. The 
Central Government of the Congo, the UN, and the Afro-Asian bloc preferred to end the 
secession quickly with military force. Western countries, particularly Britain, Belgium, 
and France opposed military action, and preferred instead a peacefully negotiated 
settlement. Conscious of this North-South division, the Kennedy administration sought to 
chart a middle-of-the-road solution. This decision is a prime example of how Kennedy’s 
political pragmatism could result in a “politics of inadvertence.”1 His “readiness to 
negotiate” coupled with Tshombe’s ability to palaver boxed Kennedy in, narrowed the 
president’s options, and only further undermined JFK’s efforts to create political stability 
and instill liberal values in the Congo.   
Britain and Belgium had been less enthusiastic than the United States and the UN 
about the formation of the Adoula government. Both had reservations about the new 
government’s ability to create stability in the region. Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Paul Henri Spaak was convinced that neither the UN nor the Adoula government had a 
“plan for peaceful political reintegration of Katanga.”2 Even though Spaak “was 
fundamentally and profoundly opposed to the secession,” his “aim was to put an end to it 
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without violence or bloodshed.”3 Spaak feared that if military force was used the 
“situation may deteriorate to [a] point of chaos.”4 The British held similar concerns. As 
one historian has noted, the British believed that “it was more than likely that the new 
regime would get very impatient about Katanga’s continued quasi-independence.”5 
British Foreign Secretary Lord Home feared that reintegrating Katanga with military 
force would spark “a belt of chaos from Angola, through the Congo, Ruanda Burundi to 
Kenya.” “That,” he said, “would be a dreadful prospect.”6 
Adoula’s rhetoric warranted these concerns. Upon being named formateur on 
August 1, he told his fellow parliamentarians that he was “determined in the very near 
future to annul the secession of Katanga.”7 During his first speech as prime minister, he 
described Tshombe and the UMHK as sabotaging the Congo’s independence. “Even if 
Katanga was a tract of land barren and desolate,” Adoula declared, “we would 
nevertheless continue to regard it as an integral part of our country.”8  
Adoula was also under pressure from the Lumumbists, the Binza Group, and the 
Congolese people to end the secession. In fact, an agreement to end the secession was the 
only thing holding the coalition government together. As one scholar has noted, 
Gizenga’s “condition for entering the government was that Adoula should take action 
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against Katanga.”9 Adoula informed Hammarskjold in mid-August “that he was already 
having difficulties with his Cabinet on the Katanga problem and would soon be in danger 
from its more extreme members if nothing could be done about it.”10 The moderates also 
felt “strongly about the Katanga secession.”11 The Binza group, who as one historian 
noted, “Imposed its will on President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister Adoula,” also 
wanted the secession ended.12 So too did the Congolese masses, who attributed the 
country’s dire economic conditions to Katanga’s unwillingness to share profits from its 
lucrative mining operations.  
Journalist David Halberstam, reporting for the New York Times from the Congo, 
recounted a humorous story illustrating the everyday pressures facing Adoula:  
There is a photographer here whose telephone has been unusually busy lately. His 
number is 4600. The business phone of Cyrille Adoula, the new Congolese Premier, is 
4800, and there have been some wrong numbers. Each morning and afternoon there are 
about a dozen phone calls for Mr. Adoula at 4600, and almost without fail the calls are 
alike. A Congolese gets on the phone. Without confirming that he is indeed talking to Mr. 
Adoula, he begins. Anyone in this country is delighted to complete any call. The 
conversation, with increasing excitement, volume and speed, goes like this: ‘Ah, my 
friend Monsieur Adoula. It is very good to talk to with you and I like your Government 
very much, and it is three months since I am paid, and I need the money and I want the 
money.’ The conversations always end in anger. In the Congo if you want to get paid, 
you call the Premier. All problems, it appears are his, and there are a lot of problems.13  
 
Adoula knew that the key to alleviating these pressures centered on ending the 
secession. He asked Hammarskjold to use military force to end the secession quickly.14 
The Secretary-General initially rebuffed Adoula’s call for action. With a coalition 
government in place and Western pressure mounting on Tshombe, Hammarskjold 
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believed that a peaceful settlement would soon be achieved. In early September the 
Secretary-General traveled to the Congo to help broker such a settlement. “He had it 
definitely in mind to try to induce Mr. Tshombe to enter into talks with Mr. Adoula,” UN 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ralph Bunche later wrote. “He knew that if this 
could be achieved it might well relieve the Assembly of the necessity of extensive and 
poisonous debate on the subject of the Congo, which would do neither the Congo nor the 
UN any good.”15  
Though Adoula’s plea for action failed to resonate with the Secretary-General, it 
caught the attention of Dr. Conor Cruise O’Brien, the Irish scholar-activist who was 
serving as the UN representative in Elisabethville. After witnessing Tshombe’s ability to 
deliberate endlessly, O’Brien was convinced that only a UN offensive would force 
Tshombe to concede.16 As an Irishman, O’Brien arrived in the Congo sympathetic to the 
anti-colonialist position.17  Interpreting the February Security-Council resolution loosely, 
he availed himself of the opportunity to end the secession when the Adoula government 
asked the UN to “expel all foreign civil and military advisers” and serve arrest warrants 
to several of Tshombe’s ministers.18 As one contemporary observer accurately wrote, 
O’Brien was  
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suddenly in a position of great power at a crucial juncture in the affairs of Africa and of 
what remained of the British Empire he detested so much, with an international force 
(which incidentally contained Irish and Indian detachments) at his disposal, this 
entertaining and bookish man had an opportunity to turn his theories and his dreams into 
action…Ireland’s woes were to be avenged in Central Africa.19  
 
On September 12, 1961, O’Brien launched “Operation Morthor” (“Morthor” 
being the Hindi word for “smash”).20 Halberstam was embedded in Elisabethville during 
the offensive. He reported that “fierce fighting,” some “hand-to-hand,” had quickly 
turned “Elisabethville into a nightmare city.”21 Katangan forces easily repelled UN 
soldiers, and operation Morthor came to a halt. As Halberstam observed, the fighting had 
not been the only dizzying predicament: “It is a curious war in many respects. Essentially 
it is a war being fought by Africans against Westerners and Asians [Indians]. Yet the 
Africans are led by white officers—who expound a bitter, die-hard colonialist ideology—
and the white men and Asians are being applauded in this fight by many in Africa.”22 
What Halberstam had identified (albeit with a “curious” twist typical of events in the 
Congo during this period) was the North-South dimension of the crisis.  
The vituperative onslaught by Western conservatives against the UN in response 
to the offensive best exemplified this tension. One British MP called O’Brien “a blood-
thirsty Dublin corner boy,” while another made a wildly fictitious charge “that more 
Africans were killed as the result of the United Nations operation in Katanga than were 
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killed throughout the whole of the Congo during the whole history of Belgian rule 
there.”23 Sir Roy Welensky, the white conservative prime minister of neighboring 
Rhodesia, described the attack as “the law of the jungle—the right of the biggest to 
impose his will on the smallest.”24 Even the American Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT) 
called O’Brien “a lying Irish playboy,” and argued that the UN’s policy in the Congo had 
been determined by Third World nationalists such as Prime Minister Nehru of India who 
were “preparing the way, step by step, for a Communist takeover in the Congo.”25  
The harshest criticism came from Belgium, whose expatriates had been directly 
affected by the fighting. Rajeshwar Dayal noted that, “Libre Belgique described the 
events as ‘a premeditated crime’ and the Dernière Heure likened [the UN’s] actions to 
those of the Nazis.”26 Spaak, speaking before the UN, described the operation as “a bid to 
hunt down the white man.”27 He wrote in his memoirs, “After I had finished, a good 
many people came up to me to say that they had not heard a European speak out so 
clearly and vigorously for a long time against the accusations—which had become a sort 
of ritual exercise—leveled against the former colonial Powers.” 28  
Sensitive to this battle between the global South and North, the Kennedy 
administration publicly supported the UN while privately working for a cease-fire. Even 
though the administration desired an end to the secession, it believed the risks were too 
great to continue the offensive. The administration shared the fear of its European allies 
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that the fighting “might start [a] chain of events” in the Congo and then in central Africa, 
which the UN “could not control.”29  
The Kennedy administration also believed it was necessary to preserve Katanga 
and its leaders. It was concerned that the “political upheaval in Katanga would seriously 
endanger [the] possibility [of] Katanga making [the] desired economic contribution to 
[the] Congo.” It also envisioned Katangan leaders “playing a legitimate role” in the 
government. In particular, the administration believed “Tshombe could provide [a] 
conservative counterweight needed in [the] Adoula government,” and it desired a course 
of action that would “induce Tshombe’s cooperation,” rather than one that would 
“destroy him.”30 The State Department thus concluded that even though “Tshombe has 
never shown serious interest returning Katanga to [the] Congo,” no military action should 
be used until “all peaceful means toward meaningful reconciliation have been 
exhausted.”31  
President Kennedy thus expressed his “dismay” about the offensive to the 
Secretary-General, and ordered Gullion to “press” Hammarskjold “as strongly as is 
necessary to make certain he accepts and follows through on” a cease-fire.32 While 
Kennedy believed that the United States could not let the UN “get licked,” he disagreed 
with others in his administration who argued that the UN should be allowed more time to 
remove the mercenaries. He ordered the release of a press statement “urging a cease-
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fire,” notifying Hammarskjold only after the fact.33 Later that day Rusk sent a cable to 
Hammarskjold assuring him that the United States did not want the “UN pushed out of or 
defeated in Katanga,” but insisting that the UN must accept a cease-fire and “create [a] 
basis for constructive talks with Tshombe.” 34  
The demarches from Washington irked Hammarskjold. Though he too had 
desired a peaceful settlement, he understood that the pressures on Adoula to end the 
secession threatened the viability of maintaining a moderate government in the Congo. 
Hammarskjold believed his Western friends failed to comprehend just how delicate 
Adoula’s situation was. He confided in Bunche that “the main reason for complete 
misunderstanding of UN action is a complete lack of knowledge of the Congo situation 
and of what would have been unavoidable in case of failure to respond as we did.”35  
The Secretary-General tried to explain to the Americans the pressures being faced 
by Adoula. He told Gullion that the “UN action [was] unquestionably on behalf [of the] 
moderates,” and that if the “UN had not acted in Katanga Adoula would have been under 
tremendous pressure from [the] Gizingists.”36 Bunche reiterated this point to Gullion, 
stressing “that if Katanga [was] not brought under control this would increase pressure on 
Adoula to [the] point where there would be [a] real danger of [a] Gizenga take-over.”37 
Hammarskjold told the Americans that Adoula was the “most purposeful, energetic and 
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capable African he knew with [the] possible exception [of the] Nigerian Prime Minister,” 
but that his political survival nonetheless required ending the secession.38 
The Secretary-General doubted his efforts had persuaded the Americans just how 
“difficult” the situation was for Adoula.39 Bunche shared with the administration a top-
secret cable Hammarskjold had sent just before boarding the flight that would crash, 
taking the Secretary-General’s life. It stated that “strong action in Katanga was necessary 
to avert civil war.”40 Though it would take the Americans over a year to arrive at that 
same conclusion, they had, by late-September, come to better understand the “pressures” 
facing Adoula.41 This was in no small part due to the arrival of Ambassador Gullion, who 
shared Hammarskjold’s confidence in Adoula.42  
Adoula knew that with the death of Hammarskjold he had lost an important ally.43 
He feared that his recent behavior of colluding with O’Brien to use the UN force to end 
the secession might had cost him American support. He told Gullion that he considered 
the United States one of his “few friends,” and disingenuously asserted that, “He had 
never asked [the] UN to undertake war in Katanga.”44 Gullion allayed any of Adoula’s 
fears of being abandoned and acknowledged the “great pressure” he was under.45 It had 
become common knowledge that “the followers of Vice Premier Antoine Gizenga…have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 15 September 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 214-216.   
39 Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 18 September 
1961, FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 228-229; Editorial Note, FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 226-227.   
40 Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 18 September 
1961, FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 228-229.   
41 Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State to the, 18 September 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 229-231.   
42 See for example, Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 13 
September 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 209-212.   
43 Kalb, The Congo Cables, 303. 
44 Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State to the, 18 September 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 229-231.   
45 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo, 20 September 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 232-233.   
 
	  
79 
been clamoring for Mr. Tshombe’s head.”46 As a New York Times story reported, “The 
U.N.’s setback placed the Adoula moderates under immediate pressure from the Soviet-
supported Gizenga extremists to send the Central Government army into the field against 
Katanga to accomplish what the U.N. failed to do.”47 Knowing that Mobutu’s forces were 
more or less ineffectual, Gullion informed Adoula that the United States realized he 
might have to allow the Central Government’s army to “let off steam” by invading 
Katanga.48 After two battalions unsuccessfully attempted to invade the province, an 
informal armistice took place between the two governments.49 
In the aftermath of the conflict in September, George Ball, who would soon 
replace Bowles as Undersecretary of State, drew up a new plan to end the secession.50 In 
it, Ball identified Tshombe as “the basic problem.” 51 “So long as he feels in control of 
the military situation in the Katanga,” Ball wrote, “Tshombe will be unwilling to 
negotiate for anything but the partition of the Congo.”52 Thus, Ball concluded that U.S. 
policy “must therefore be directed most immediately to destroying Tshombe’s 
assurances.”53  
Whereas previously the United States had relied on Western allies to pressure 
Tshombe into negotiations, Ball, dubbed by Kennedy as “Commander-in-Chief for 
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Congo Affairs,”54 proposed that the United States take the lead. The United States, Ball 
wrote, “Must immediately build up UN fighting power to the point where Tshombe will 
realize he cannot win,” and also “strike at those essential elements of Tshombe’s 
strength,” particularly “the white population and Belgian mining interests which wish to 
maintain an essentially colonial control in the Katanga.”55  In particular, the purpose of 
bolstering UN forces was to “make such a show of overwhelming strength as to persuade 
Tshombe without the need to employ that strength for anything other than brief local 
actions.” “Beefing up” the UN, Ball also argued, would “demonstrate to Adoula that he is 
receiving the support necessary to enable him to take a moderate line” and display to the 
Afro-Asian bloc “that we mean what we say where colonial interests are involved.” 56  
The philosophy guiding Ball’s new plan was purely Achesonian, relying on a 
“preponderance of power” from which to negotiate.57 The flaw in this philosophy, 
however, quickly became apparent. Escalation could easily turn into action if the 
opponent called the bluff. As Ball conceded, pursuing the new policy would raise the 
stakes to such a height that the United States and the UN would be unable to back down 
in the face of opposition. “If the UN fails to end the Katanga secession,” Ball argued, “it 
will mean the failure of Adoula’s policy of moderation,” “shatter Afro-Asian faith in the 
UN,” and likely “precipitate a civil war.”58 Even though Ball did not wish the UN to 
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“undertake protracted military operations,” relying upon a preponderance of power in 
order to negotiate helped clear the way for further military action between the UN and 
Katanga.59 
Building up UN forces would also take time, consequently providing the 
secession a longer lease on life. Some within the administration questioned the logic of 
letting the secession continue. Tshombe after all had immediately re-entrenched himself 
and displayed no sign of willingness to negotiate. Samuel Belk, a National Security 
Council staffer, represented several opinions in the administration when he wrote, “The 
time has come when we must be prepared to see a violation of the cease-fire by 
Tshombe’s forces; possibly followed by some blood-letting.”60 Others, including the 
president, wondered if in the meantime Adoula was up to the task of staving off civil war 
with the Lumumbists.61 Gullion, whom the president trusted, persistently reassured 
Washington that Adoula could handle the “Gizenga menace.”62 
Before the end of September 1961, the State Department had begun implementing 
Ball’s new plan by shoring up European support. “Top priority instructions” were sent to 
“London, Paris and Brussels, directing…ambassadors to set forth the U.S. position at the 
highest level.”63 Persuading European allies to strengthen the UN was no easy task in the 
wake of the recent UN offensive. Citizens in those countries who disapproved of the 
UN’s actions may not have been in the majority, but they nonetheless had expressed their 
vehemence loudly. As O’Brien wrote in his memoirs, “When Katanga is hurt, money 
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screams, and money has powerful lungs.”64 He recalled that, “The reaction of ‘Press and 
public opinion’ (in the West) to our action was an ear-splitting and almost universal howl 
of execration.”65 With a little old-fashioned footwork and personal diplomacy, the 
Americans successfully persuaded the Europeans to accept this new course of action.66 
Kennedy then took the steps to beef up the UN force. Funds for the UN Congo 
operation were drying up quickly due to its size and scale, but also because some 
members (including Belgium, France, and the Soviet Union) were refusing to pay their 
dues to protest the operation.67 Rusk devised a plan that would financially sustain the 
Congo operation through 1963. The United States would buy a $100 million bond from 
the UN, while other member states would buy a bond matching that amount.68 Though 
Kennedy ultimately prevailed on this initiative, the fight with Congress to allocate the 
money had been contentious. Indeed, the administration’s Congo policy was now spilling 
into domestic politics. Those who opposed the Congo operation joined forces with those 
who had already opposed the UN on principle. It had required, as special counsel to the 
president Theodore Sorenson noted, “Considerable White House help” to pass.69 One 
historian has even claimed that it was “the President’s toughest foreign policy fight on 
Capitol Hill.”70  
 The administration’s plan also faced challenges from the Afro-Asian bloc. 
Hammarskjold’s death spurred a new demand for UN action in Katanga. The Afro-Asian 
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bloc blamed the Secretary-General’s death on Western “neocolonialists.”71 Furthermore, 
Hammarskjold’s death conjured up the memory of Lumumba, whose own death had 
inspired the first round of fighting. A newspaper in Addis Abba, the capital of Ethiopia, 
expressed sentiments which could be found throughout the Third World: “Lumumba 
dedicated his life to the freedom of his country and the unity of the Congolese people, 
and Hammarskjoeld [d]evoted his life to the cause of world peace and the service of 
humanity. Who, therefore, is going to pay for the death of these heroes?”72 Unable to 
quell these opinions, the United States voted with the Afro-Asian bloc to pass a UN 
resolution on November 24 authorizing the new Secretary-General, U Thant, to use force 
to end Katanga’s secession. The administration still desired to avoid a fight, but hoped 
the resolution would give credence to its threats against Tshombe. 
But to the dismay of the administration the resolution quickly unleashed a second 
round of fighting. Tshombe had interpreted the resolution as a declaration of war, and on 
December 3 his gendarmes fired upon UN troops in Elizabethville.73 Since September, 
UN forces had been reinforced with additional troops and airpower as per Ball’s plan. 
They responded with a counter-attack, placing Elizabethville under siege. “All night and 
all day,” Halberstam reported from Elizabethville, “the only sound apart from the 
explosions of mortars and the drum-fire of machine guns has been the whine of the sirens 
on the Red Cross ambulances.”74 UN jets roared overhead, and rockets rained down.75 
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The confines of the city and occasional undisciplined nature of the troops resulted in 
ferocious fighting—strafed civilians, shelled hospitals, and a cathedral that came under 
fire.76  
The United States stood firmly by the UN during the attack. Rusk argued that not 
supporting the UN “would destroy for good the image of the US as a supporter of the 
UN’s collective efforts and would open the door to communism in Central Africa by 
destroying all possibility for continued moderate control in Leopoldville.”77 Even though 
the administration did not want to “crush” Tshombe, by this point and time it did not 
mind “breaking Tshombe’s teeth.”78 It hoped that the offensive would force him “to talk 
in good faith” with Adoula about ending the secession.79 The administration, however, 
failed to explain this position to the public. The fighting, more intense than in September, 
had captured the headlines. As one historian has noted, the American public was 
“puzzled” as to why the UN, an organization dedicated to procuring international peace, 
was attacking a self-avowed anti-communist.80 The December 22 issue of Time 
magazine, for example, featured Tshombe on its cover and carried a story sympathetic to 
his position.81 
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American conservatives availed themselves of the opportunity to exploit these 
ironies. Max Yergan, the African-American communist-turned-reactionary, helped 
organize the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters. On December 
14 the committee published an open letter in the New York Times titled “Katanga is the 
Hungary of 1961.” It portrayed Tshombe as pro-West, anti-communist, and the only hope 
for preserving “law, order and decency.”82 Signatures on the letter included many famous 
conservatives such as William F. Buckley and Senator Everett Dirksen. Barry Goldwater, 
Richard Nixon, Herbert Hoover as well as the Young Americans for Freedom, the 
Committee of One Million, and the John Birch Society also supported Tshombe.83 The 
harshest criticism, however, came from the president’s own party. Senator Dodd, a 
liberal-Democrat who had just returned from visiting Katanga, told the New York Times, 
“These policies will not foster unity in the Congo, but chaos. They will not foster 
reconciliation, but division. They will not foster freedom, but will, if pursued to their 
logical conclusion, turn the Congo over to Communist imperialism.”84 Dodd’s lambasts 
were just one more salvo against the administration in what the New Republic had 
described as “Dodd’s private war.”85   
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Responding to this criticism, the president dispatched Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs George McGhee to neutralize congressional dissent.86 Ball also delivered 
a speech explaining the logic behind the administration’s Congo policy, and John 
McCone, Director of the CIA, persuaded President Eisenhower to issue a statement of 
support.87 After the fighting had ended, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
G. Mennen Williams and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Carl 
Rowan denounced Katanga’s “propaganda machine” and attempted to have Michel 
Struelens, Tshombe’s stateside publicist in New York, removed from the country.88 
These post-facto maneuvers, however, did little to sway public opinion.  
Across the Atlantic there was even greater outrage.89 Jules Cousin, administrative 
director of UMHK, returned his Medal of Freedom that was awarded to him in 1946 “for 
Katanga’s vital contribution of uranium for the atomic bomb” to President Kennedy. The 
executive of the vast mining complex said he had witnessed UN troops “killing and 
wounding blindly…even in hospitals.”90 Conservative Europeans bent on maintaining a 
sphere of influence in Africa argued that only Tshombe could preserve political and 
economic stability in the region. As one member of the Conservative Party argued in the 
British House of Commons, “It is quite obvious that…the United Nations policy is 
bringing chaos and bloodshed to a part of the Congo where previously there was law and 
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87 
order.”91 These critics warned that if the UN operation was successful, a radical black 
African nationalism would spill south from the Congo into mineral-rich white-ruled 
African countries like Rhodesia and South Africa. To their minds, whites would 
inevitably be hunted down and the Soviets would avail themselves of this opportunity to 
expand into a region once dominated by the West. The reported atrocities committed by 
Ethiopian soldiers serving in the UN against white Katangans as well as the deaths of 
numerous citizens fueled these fears.92 
Members of the Conservative Party in Britain, however, were more concerned 
about the United States than the UN.93 For British Conservatives who had already been 
weary of the Kennedy administration’s anti-colonial rhetoric, U.S. support of the UN 
during this second round of fighting caused real alarm.94 As one British editorial noted, 
“We seem to be back at the situation of the Suez crisis: France and Britain on one side, 
the United States and the United Nations apparently on the other.”95 Evoking Suez meant 
more than just remembering a disagreement; to British Conservatives in particular the 
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event represented the usurpation of part of the British Empire by the United States. 
Indeed, some right-wing MPs argued that the American “copper lobby” was guiding the 
creation of the Kennedy administration’s policies. One Conservative MP even chided a 
Socialist MP for not discussing “Transatlantic copper interests and certain elements on 
Wall Street” while “discussing the great financial interests who may be interested in these 
affairs.”96 
This dissent did not alter the administration’s support for the UN action, though it 
did make it difficult for the United States to openly collaborate with European 
governments. While Spaak and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan publicly 
denounced the UN offensive, their governments quietly worked with the Americans to 
draw up plans for a peaceful settlement. By this point in time, Britain and Belgium had 
accepted the American position that “the Adoula government must be kept from 
collapsing” and had “drafted a possible basis of negotiations between Adoula and 
Tshombe.”97 The United States coordinated another big push, similar to the one behind 
Lovanium, to bring Adoula and Tshombe together. On December 13 Kennedy and Rusk 
laid out the plan: “Our Western friends should use their influence with Tshombe…while 
we worked on Adoula, then Bunche might get the two parties together.”98 The hope was 
that both parties could be persuaded “to accept the Belgian-British document as a basis 
for agreement.”99  
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In what one historian has aptly described as activating the “old-boy network,” the 
administration also worked to pressure Tshombe. Bundy asked his friend Admiral Alan 
Kirk to lobby on behalf of the administration to UMHK officials.100  Kirk, who 
represented “several large Belgian corporate interests,” contacted the president of UMHK 
and asked him “to use every possible pressure available to persuade Tshombe to agree 
to…meet Adoula.”101 Kirk reported back to Bundy that “this he readily agreed to do—
without any hesitation.”102 The fact that the UN offensive threatened UMHK facilities 
helps explain why company officials desired to obtain a cease-fire. Indeed, by December 
14, UN troops backed by air power overran Tshombe’s forces. Tshombe cabled the 
Kennedy administration requesting a cease-fire as UN jets strafed targets near his house: 
“I confirm my desire to negotiate with Mr. Adoula the various aspects of this problem. I 
request your good offices as a broadminded and Christian man for the purpose of 
appointing a capable negotiator and putting a stop immediately to this useless 
bloodshed.”103  
The Kennedy administration welcomed Tshombe’s plea for a cease-fire.104 
Kasavubu and Adoula, however, did not. This caught the administration off guard. It had 
assumed that after placing all that diplomatic, military, and congressional effort into 
getting Tshombe to come to the table, that Kasavubu and Adoula would accede to U.S. 
plans. But both men were convinced that Tshombe could not be negotiated with, and saw 
the cease-fire as a missed opportunity to end the secession once and for all. Kasavubu 
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was “at first obdurate” about the idea.105 He cabled Kennedy that “only complete 
application of [the] Security Council resolution could eliminate foreign influence and 
mercenaries which are [the] actual cause of disorders and troubles in the Congo,” and that 
he “should like very much to see United States support to [the] United Nations continue 
in accordance with the wishes of the Congolese peoples for reestablishment of order and 
legality.”106  
The president responded to Kasavubu by telling him “that the forthcoming talks 
between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshombe will help bring peace and order to the 
Congo.”107 After this statement from Kennedy, Gullion also worked on Kasavubu. He 
argued that the “US had made [an] enormous decision in favor of [the] Congo with 
considerable strain on our alliances,” and that “as head of state he [was] responsible for 
[the] integrity of [the] state.”108 Gullion, a Kentuckian who framed the Congo Crisis in 
terms of the American Civil War, told Kasavubu, “It was up to him to act like 
Lincoln.”109 Kasavubu appreciated being likened to Lincoln, and soon after agreed that 
the cease-fire should be accepted.   
Adoula on the other hand, was not persuaded as easily. When rumors of a cease-
fire arose, the prime minister pleaded with Gullion “that [the] US refrain from any move 
for [a] cease-fire in [the] Katanga operations and that it discourage other powers from 
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doing so.”110 Adoula tried to argue that a “cease-fire would turn [the] Congo over to [the] 
East,” and more importantly that it “would plunge [the] country into full crisis. His 
[government] was already severely tried and would surely fall.”111 Adoula was in fact 
placating Gizenga in eastern Congo when Tshombe’s request for a cease-fire arrived in 
Washington.112 Even so, the State Department expected a speedy reply from Adoula and 
did not exclude the possibility that he was “stalling while military operations continue in 
Elisabethville.”113 U Thant, who was also not keen on ending the operations, continued 
the offensive. He ordered an airstrike against UMHK facilities where Katangan forces 
were garrisoned.114  
Kennedy’s patience was wearing thin. On December 17 he told Ball, “I believe it 
vital that Adoula be obliged to respond immediately to cease-fire telegram.”115 Later that 
day, Bundy cabled Ball: “President desirous proceed cease-fire and negotiations as 
rapidly as possible. Do not let GOC [Government of Congo] delay us.”116 This pressure 
from the president translated into a two-hour conference in which Gullion spoke in the 
starkest of terms to Adoula. “I told Adoula,” Gullion said, “that if he did not go to the 
meeting US continued support could not be promised.”117 The prime minister relented 
and agreed to meet Tshombe at an abandoned airfield in Kitona.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Embassy in France, 13 December 1961, FRUS 
1961-1963, XX: 307-308. 
111 Ibid.  
112 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela, 16 December 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 320-321. 
113 Ibid.; Telegram from Ball to Leopoldville, 15 December 1961, Box 28, NSF, JFKL. 
114 Telegram from Bundy to Kennedy, 18 December 1961, Box 28, NSF, JFKL; Namikas, 339. 
115 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia, 17 December 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 322, n1. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State, 18 December 1961, 
FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 325-327. 
 
	  
92 
While the Department officially wanted the negotiations to “be worked out by 
[the] Congolese themselves,” Rusk nevertheless reminded Gullion that it was of 
“paramount importance” that the negotiations reach “some agreement.”118 “In view [of 
the] special responsibility and relationship we have assumed toward Congo, and Kitona 
in particular,” Rusk wrote, “we have [a] major stake in [the] outcome [of the] 
negotiations.”119 The administration feared that if the negotiations broke down it would 
“only favor [the] extremists and would lead [the] whole country into chaos.”120  
Gullion’s task was difficult. Neither party wanted to be there. Days before the 
meeting, Tshombe attempted to undermine Adoula’s position by arguing to Rusk that 
Adoula’s neutralism made the Congo susceptible to a “communist influx.”121 Rusk told 
Gullion to stress to Adoula that the United States “expects him to demonstrate his 
statesmanship and leadership by seizing this opportunity [to] unify [the] Congo without 
further bloodshed.”122 Rusk was more forthright in the message he wanted stressed to 
Tshombe: “Choice for Tshombe is cooperate with Adoula or go into oblivion.”123 
Delegates nevertheless took to storming out of the negotiations, bags in hand, no sooner 
to be ushered back in by Gullion or the UN mediator, Bunche. As at Lovanium, the 
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Americans and UN officials (which again included Robert Gardiner and Mahmoud 
Khiary) intensively worked the corridors.124  
The negotiations concluded at 2:30 a.m. on December 21 with the signing of the 
Kitona accords.125 Tshombe agreed to end the secession by recognizing the Central 
Government’s authority over all parts of the Congo and pledging to respect the UN 
resolutions.126 Gullion feared, however, that the “arduous marathon” of negotiations had 
been for naught.127 “The biggest monkey wrench,” Gullion warned, was Tshombe’s claim 
that he had not been fully empowered to negotiate on behalf of his government.128 
Gullion believed Tshombe would seek to obtain a repudiation of the agreements by 
telling his government that the UN and United States had “coerced” him into signing 
them.129 In Washington, the Kitona accords were nonetheless seen as another 
breakthrough. Celebrations were quickly muted, however, when Gullion’s warnings came 
to pass. As soon as Tshombe returned to Katanga he renounced the negotiations and re-
entrenched himself.130 
Failing to end the secession only brought more problems for Adoula. Many 
Congolese questioned whether he was capable of bringing an end to the secession. 
Furthermore, being occupied by the secession left him little time to focus on the many 
other problems confronting the Congo, especially the faltering economy. As economic 
conditions worsened and the secession continued, Adoula’s political base, tenuous to 
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begin with, began disintegrating. More and more Congolese turned towards the 
Lumumbists who promised to make good on the failed promises of independence. 
Meanwhile the Kennedy administration remained committed to Ball’s plan to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement. Adoula on the other hand, convinced by Tshombe’s actions at 
Kitona, had already decided that his own future, as well as that of his country, depended 
upon ending the secession with military force. Until that opportunity arose, he would be 
forced to adopt repressive policies as well as rely more heavily upon aid from the United 
States in order to stay in power. Before his death in September, Hammarskjold correctly 
predicted that large amounts of American economic aid “would mean the kiss of death” 
for the Adoula government.131 Indeed, the open relationship between the Central 
Government and the United States was partly responsible for igniting the Lumumbist 
revolution that was about to break out. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
BATTLE FOR KATANGA, ROUND 2 
 
The Kennedy administration remained committed to ending the secession through 
the peaceful means of negotiations even in the aftermath of the failed Kitona accords. It 
did, however, employ a new strategy designed by Undersecretary of State George Ball to 
increase the pressure on Tshombe and make him more amenable to negotiate in earnest. 
Ball’s plan consisted of employing economic sanctions against Katanga and having 
European governments, Tshombe’s only possible allies, make clear to the rebellious 
provincial president that his political survival was dependent upon participating in a 
unified Congo.1 Implementing this plan proved to be a challenge for the administration. 
European allies, the UN, and Adoula opposed Ball’s strategy. British and Belgian 
officials believed placing too much pressure on Tshombe would lead to a third round of 
fighting, a scenario both governments wished to avoid since anti-American and anti-UN 
sentiments were running high amongst their constituents. Adoula and the UN were also 
facing the potential loss of public support, but in their case needed Katanga to reintegrate 
quickly in order to fulfill their promises and maintain legitimacy. 
Kennedy’s political pragmatism naturally led him to pursue a middle course 
between these extremes. Lawrence Freedman, who has extensively studied Kennedy’s 
decision-making in foreign policy, has said that Kennedy often sought to “keep options 
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open for as long as possible” and “play for time.” Freedman also notes that Kennedy 
believed that the realities of the Cold War made it necessary to avoid a fight whenever 
possible, since even the smallest military conflict could potentially escalate into an 
apocalyptic showdown between the superpowers.2 This logic succeeded during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, perhaps saving humanity. But applying the same calculus to the Congo 
produced disastrous results for the United States, the Adoula government, and most of all, 
the Congolese people. The middle-ground Kennedy sought did not exist. The time for 
decisive action had arrived. Putting off the decision to reintegrate Katanga by force set 
U.S. policy adrift, and lent to the rise of a repressive government in the Congo instead of 
one guided by liberal principles. 
As soon as the fighting ended in December, Adoula’s political base began to 
disintegrate, as many Congolese questioned whether he was capable of ending the 
secession. The Kennedy administration was forced to pursue “all possible measures to 
strengthen Adoula politically” so that he would be able to “resist nationalist extremist 
pressures” that were demanding the prime minister use military force to reunite Katanga.3 
This U.S. assistance included $15 million in financial aid (approximately $113 million in 
2011 dollars), supply of transport planes, and training of the army.4 “The CIA station in 
Leopoldville,” as one historian has noted, “was given the green light to neutralize 
Adoula’s adversaries, either by buying them off or by purging them.”5 Larry Devlin, CIA 
Station Chief in the Congo, later wrote, “We were compelled to step up our political 
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action operations.” “Around this time,” he recalled, “I was handling twenty-two agents 
and/or collaborators.”6   
Adoula’s complicity in these policies is best exemplified by the arrest of Antoine 
Gizenga, Lumumba’s former deputy prime minister, who had joined Adoula’s 
government at Lovanium on the condition that Adoula end the secession of Katanga. 
After UN forces had been halted in December before fully defeating Tshombe, Gizenga 
returned to Stanleyville to lead a revolution to take control of the Central Government. 
The Congolese Parliament passed a resolution demanding Gizenga return to the capital, 
but Gizenga ignored it, openly defying the authority of the government.7 The Kennedy 
administration wanted Gizenga dealt with before Adoula’s scheduled visit to the United 
States in early February 1962. The administration was coordinating Adoula’s trip to help 
raise congressional support for the president’s $100 million bond proposal to fund UN 
operations in the Congo. Gizenga’s defiance undermined both the UN’s and 
administration’s position that supporting Adoula provided the best opportunity to unify 
the country and prevent a communist takeover. Dealing with Gizenga “is most important 
to his stature in [the] US,” Rusk noted, “and will be helpful to him as well as to [the] 
Dep[artment] in dealing with Congressional and press questions.”8 For Adoula, removing 
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the alleged “communist” Gizenga was an opportunity to endear himself to the United 
States while protecting his own political flank at home.9  
Because the Afro-Asian bloc was closely monitoring what became referred to as 
“the Gizenga affair,” the State Department told Adoula that whatever decision he made 
concerning the deputy prime minister, “It is essential it be his[,] and utmost precaution 
[must be] taken [to] avoid any impression of U.S. participation.”10 When Gullion asked 
Adoula, “Could he assure me that Gizenga was and would continue to be excluded from 
public life and would be punished,” Adoula said, “There was no question about this.”11 
Parliamentarian immunity, though, prevented Gizenga’s arrest. Adoula knew that 
attempting to lift this immunity would open “Pandora’s box,” allowing chaos to ensue as 
“Parliament degenerated into vendettas in which everyone tried to lift each other’s 
immunities.”12 Adoula also knew no harm could come to Gizenga, even the 
announcement of a prolonged jail sentence might “make a Lumumba out of him.”13 The 
State Department agreed, noting that if the deputy prime minister became a martyr it 
would have the “most unfortunate repercussions,” jeopardizing not only the balance of 
moderate politics in the Congo, but also the United States’ relationship with the Afro-
Asian bloc.14  
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Gizenga ended up providing Adoula a way out of this difficult situation. He 
allowed troops loyal to him to clash with Central Government forces. Adoula accused 
Gizenga of fomenting civil war.15 Parliament agreed, and censured the deputy prime 
minister with a vote of 67 to 1.16 A fellow Lumumbist declared that Gizenga was “no 
longer a nationalist.”17 Adoula requested that the UN return Gizenga to Leopoldville 
under its mandates to “preserve law and order in [the] Congo…and…to use force if 
necessary to prevent civil war.”18 The UN obliged, and Gizenga was placed under house 
arrest. While Adoula was in New York assuring UN members that no harm would come 
to the former deputy prime minister, he approved orders to have Gizenga secretly 
imprisoned on a small island off the coast. Adoula received a 76 to 10 vote of confidence 
from Parliament for his handling of the affair.19  
With Gizenga temporarily removed from the scene, Adoula set off for 
Washington. Most of Adoula’s time in the U.S. capital was spent discussing the 
retraining of the national army.20 As Kennedy noted during Adoula’s visit, it would be 
“highly desirable” to have “a faithful and efficient force which could take over at the time 
when the United Nations pull out.”21 The administration believed that an effective 
military force was the surest way to protect the Central Government against leftist 
dissent. It also believed bolstering Adoula’s forces would expedite the reintegration of 
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Katanga by causing Tshombe to negotiate in good faith.22 The administration, though, 
was hesitant to bolster the Congo’s armed forces carte blanche. “It is of utmost 
importance,” Rusk wrote, “that Adoula not be tempted to overreach himself in 
expectation of more US and UN support than can be furnished.” The prime minister had 
already impressed upon the president that “it might be better to consider liberating 
Katanga by a continuation and intensification of the Government’s own police action.”23 
The State Department preferred Adoula assume a more “statesmanlike approach,” a 
“conciliatory attitude” that would accept the efforts made by Tshombe to reintegrate and 
“avoid giving Katangan extremists excuses for urging non-implementation.”24 Rusk 
wanted to make clear to Adoula that he was “not in [the] driver’s seat.”25  
In order to achieve this, the State Department devised a strategy that used military 
aid as a carrot to lure Adoula towards negotiations with Tshombe. This allowed the 
administration to influence the Central Government, which was in desperate need of 
military assistance. The American strategy resulted in the piecemeal delivery of military 
aid. The first U.S. mission to assess the needs of the Central Government’s army, for 
example, would not be sent until July 1962.26 This ongoing process aggravated the 
tensions that existed between Adoula and the United States concerning U.S. policies 
toward the crisis at large. 
Adoula knew that ending the secession quickly provided the only real hope of 
securing his government against leftist dissent. Drawn-out solutions to deal with Katanga 
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would only undermine his position at home. Adoula continued to deliver this message 
while in the United States. “Ever since my government was formed,” he declared in front 
of the UN General Assembly in New York City, “it has proclaimed its firm 
determination, its unswerving intention, to end the Katangese secession and all other 
attempts at diversion.” The secession had to be ended, Adoula declared, “Whatever the 
consequences, by whatever means.”27 He continued to advocate this position in 
Washington. “The Katanga question,” Adoula told Kennedy, “is the essential question for 
the Congolese.”28 Adoula knew the Americans would be the ultimate arbiters of the 
matter and that they and their allies wanted a peaceful solution. He told them, however, 
that they must “take into account the time factor.”29 “One must not create too much 
impatience,” he continued, “among those who are seeking for a rapid resolution of the 
conflict.”30 He told them that Tshombe had taken these considerations into account and 
was in fact “playing for time hoping that the circumstances will allow him to reach for 
some solution which would preserve Katangan separatism.”31 Tshombe, he warned, 
“Cannot be trusted.”32 
The UN also believed that Tshombe was trying to delay any serious negotiations, 
knowing that time was on his side. UN officials tried to convince the Americans that 
more immediate and forceful action was needed to end the secession. They told the 
administration that even with the U.S. bond the present level of expenditure on UN 
operations in the Congo could not be maintained after the end of 1962 and that “Tshombe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Address by the Prime Minister of the Congo (Adoula) before the U.N. General Assembly, 2 
February 1962, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, 830-834. 
28 Memorandum of Conversation, 5 February 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 374-378. 
29 Ibid.   
30 Ibid.   
31 Ibid.   
32 Ibid.   
 
	  
102 
is undoubtedly playing on this fact.”33 Because of this, U Thant told the Americans that 
the UN must comply with Security Council resolutions that called for the removal of 
Tshombe’s mercenaries and that it was planning to expand its presence in Katanga to 
hasten this process.34 
The Americans brushed aside these pleas, and informed the Secretary-General 
that the United States did not want a “third round” and “that the U.S. Government would 
not condone troop movement outside of Elisabethville if there was the slightest chance 
that they would result in renewed fighting.”35 They “strongly urged” the UN to show the 
“greatest patience on this point and allow time for other pressures, financial and political, 
which are being exerted on Tshombe, to take effect.”36 Thant demurred, and 
acknowledged that he could not move his troops “without an airlift…which only the 
USAF [United States Air Force] can perform.”37  
The Americans ignored these warnings from Adoula and the UN that Tshombe 
was vying for time because the leadership at the State Department—Rusk and Ball—
believed that Tshombe was a “moderate capable [of] being influenced by good advice to 
follow [the] Kitona outline toward [a] reintegrated Congo.”38 They believed that if 
Tshombe had really been “fooling” them, “such insincerity should have been apparent by 
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now.” 39 “It is vital to our interests,” Rusk stated, “that [the] Kitona agreement be 
implemented.”40 From the perspective of the United States, “a renewal of fighting would 
be interpreted as a collapse of the Kitona agreement, which had been a major effort of the 
administration, and that the whole issue of a fighting UN, which had so deeply divided 
U.S. and Western opinion would again be reopened with dangerous, if not fatal, effects 
on the bond issue.”41  
The Kennedy administration’s public support of the UN during the last round of 
fighting had made the United States immensely unpopular in Europe. “The fires of anti-
Americanism,” Ball noted, were “burning with a gem-like flame.”42 Furthermore, 
“serious differences”  arose over the strategy the Americans now proposed to their 
European counterparts.43 The Americans promised to keep Adoula on the “right track and 
on his feet” if the British, Belgians, and French worked on persuading Tshombe to 
reintegrate.44 In particular, the Americans wanted the Europeans to help limit Tshombe’s 
economic resources and to deliver the message that “if he stalls on negotiations with 
Adoula, his economic and financial position will only deteriorate.”45 The State 
Department developed a plan to put economic pressure on Tshombe, which, as Rusk 
noted, “May appear to Katanga secessionists to be sanctions,” but were “in fact [a] series 
of measures necessary to achieve economic integration which would necessarily 
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accompany implementation [of a] political settlement on [the] basis [of the] Kitona 
accord.”46  
The State Department knew it would need the help of UMHK to implement its 
plan. The Americans believed UMHK officials could sway Tshombe to end the 
secession, and if need be, cut off any company revenues funding his rebellion. Enlisting 
UMHK’s help, however, would not be easy. State Department officials had strongly 
criticized the company during the last round of fighting. The Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Public Affairs had implied that the UMHK was supporting “a clever big-
money campaign to convince Americans that they ought to support Katanga’s 
secession.”47 Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams made similar accusations 
in a speech reviewing U.S. policy in the Congo.48 Company officials categorically denied 
these comments and accused the administration of “doing everything possible to make 
cooperation by UMHK difficult if not impossible.”49 
In an effort to make amends with the company, Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs William McGhee suggested on television that neither of these comments 
represented the official view of the State Department.50 Ball wanted it made 
“emphatically clear” that “it isn’t in our long-range interest to run European business out 
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of the Katanga.” 51 He sought to “get word” to UMHK that “we were going to do what we 
could to help them keep their operations going in Elizabethville and the Katanga; that we 
thought it important that they remain and flourish there; but that of course their continued 
prosperity would depend upon a peaceful Congo which could only be secured through a 
reintegration of the Katanga.”52 As Rusk further pointed out, U.S. support of the 
company would be on the condition that it “be prepared [to] collaborate with [the] UN 
and central government.”53  
It became obvious to the Americans that the only real chance of persuading 
UMHK to join their effort was if Britain and Belgium persuaded the company to do so.54 
Britain and Belgium, however, were so adamant about preventing another round of 
fighting that they themselves found the American strategy unacceptable. The British were 
even calling on the Americans “to get UN troops out.”55 At the heart of European fears 
was that “too much pressure” might lead to the “destruction” of Tshombe and in turn the 
“collapse” of the local government in Katanga.56  
Both allies tried to impress upon the Americans that Tshombe was his own man 
and “would not agree to terms he didn’t like.”57 The British told the Americans that they 
“doubted economic pressure on Katanga would have much effect” and that there was a 
limit “to which threats, shows of force and forms of pressure will achieve their objectives 
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if applied to Tshombe at [the] present time.”58 Rusk directly asked Lord Home, “who 
[can] be expected to have influence on Tshombe?”; the Foreign Secretary replied, “No 
one.”59  The Belgians also “strongly disagreed” that UMHK was the “key to Katanga 
integration.”60 Spaak told the Americans that he considered Tshombe “undependable and 
unreliable” and that “he may be stalling for time in hope eventually he can establish some 
form of independent or semi-independent state perhaps within some form of federation 
with Northern Rhodesia and others.”61  
Catching wind that the Americans were seeking to mobilize his allies against him, 
Tshombe took the initiative and proposed a meeting with Adoula.62 “This small step,” 
Devlin recalled, “raised the hopes of Secretary Rusk and the Washington and European 
factions that favored a peaceful solution.”63 As one historian has noted, “Tshombe had 
calculated correctly that a positive attitude toward talks with Adoula would appeal to the 
United States and diminish the pressure for strong UN action to implement the Security 
Council resolutions and remove the remaining mercenaries in Katanga.”64  
Tshombe was being informed by Michel Struelens, his lobbyist in the United 
States, that due to opposition in the U.S. Senate and elsewhere in the states, that he 
should continue to stall and play for time.65 Spaak warned the Americans that “Tshombe 
has great confidence in what Struelens cables him” and that if the administration was 
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“unable to curb Struelens’ activities all the other efforts Belgium and the United States 
are making to bring about Katanga reintegration through an Adoula-Tshombe meeting 
may be nullified.”66 Adoula’s cabinet members were puzzled as to why the Americans 
permitted Struelens, a foreigner, to conduct activities in the United States that 
undermined the administration’s policies while at the same time the administration had 
pressed them to silence Gizenga, a member of Parliament. Rusk awkwardly explained to 
Adoula that Struelens’ activities did not violate U.S. law due to the “long US tradition of 
freedom [of] speech.”67  
The Americans nonetheless hoped that Tshombe’s willingness to negotiate would 
lead to a success tantamount to Lovanium. They requested that Robert Gardiner and 
Mahmoud Khiary serve as UN mediators between Adoula and Tshombe, remembering 
how both had been “useful catalysts in these palavers vide Kitona and Lovanium.”68 The 
State Department also drew up a position paper for Adoula that focused on the “nuts and 
bolts measures of integration.”69 Even though Adoula told Gullion he would “negotiate 
hard” and “was prepared to listen to anything Tshombe had to say,” he admitted that his 
“heart ‘did not exactly flutter’ at [the] anticipation of positive results.”70  
Tshombe and Adoula met in Leopoldville on March 18. By the end of the month 
the talks had reached an impasse, and soon after they dissolved.71 News of the failed 
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negotiations did not go over well in Washington. The State Department believed if the 
talks were not reconvened the Soviets and Afro-Asian bloc would demand UN action to 
forcefully reintegrate Katanga. “This,” Ball wrote, would place the “UN in [the] middle 
of [a] contest between supporters [of] radical action and Western members who will be 
unable agree to [the] use of UN forces for this purpose. The Congo, the US, and the UN 
can only suffer severe damage in the process.” 72  
Meanwhile Adoula’s political power was eroding, and he became desperate to end 
the secession. He told Gullion that he had “failed his mandate from [the] Lovanium 
Parliament and his relations with [the] West may be responsible.”73 Because of this, the 
prime minister feared a Parliamentary reprimand, possibly even censure.74 Adoula’s 
frustration stemmed from the fact, Gullion wrote, that “no one has been able [to] tell 
Adoula how or when unification could be accomplished without force.”75 Adoula 
believed that Tshombe was “playing for bankruptcy of [the] UN and on recognition out 
of pure apathy of de facto independence of Katanga.”76 Furthermore, despite the UN 
Security Council resolutions and European diplomatic pressures, Tshombe continued 
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bolstering his forces.77 Adoula told the Americans that this could not continue and that he 
had to do something “even if he had to turn to Satan himself.”78  
Adoula allowed rumors to circulate that he was planning to visit Moscow that 
May. He also indicated that he would call upon the Afro-Asian bloc to end the secession 
with force or even attempt to end it himself with Central Government forces. It is likely 
that Adoula was only attempting to goad the Americans into action, but doubts lingered 
in his mind as to how committed the United States really was to ending the secession. 
Adoula began to believe that the cease-fire in December and the ensuing Kitona 
agreement, both of which prevented the destruction of Tshombe without achieving the 
reintegration of Katanga, had merely been orchestrated by the United States to get 
“Tshombe off the hook.”79 In short, Adoula was losing faith in the Americans. He told 
Gullion that the “US and UN (which he considers as one) have no longer the will, the 
strategy, nor the means to help him unify [the] Congo.”80 In frustration he even told the 
ambassador that the “US and UN were in final analysis aiding Tshombe.”81 Even 
members of the Binza group were expressing “disappointment” with the United States 
and the UN for failing to support the Central Government. 82   
Gardiner tried to temper Adoula’s comments to the Americans by telling them 
that “Adoula feels he is on [a] rock with Tshombe and [the] tide is rising; Tshombe has a 
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boat and he doesn’t.”83 But even Adoula’s most ardent American supporter, Gullion, 
described the prime minister’s actions as “rash.” 84 The fact that Adoula threatened the 
use of tactics that had led to the assassination of Lumumba nonetheless reveals the level 
of desperation he felt. 
The State Department was not pleased by Adoula’s antics and seemingly 
“extremist” solutions.85 While the Americans believed Adoula represented “a centripetal 
force in [the] Congo, working for [a] result which is in US interest, whereas centrifugal 
forces which would be set in motion by Katanga separatism would only profit those who 
are hoping this fly-wheel will break up,”86 Ball and Rusk questioned the sincerity of his 
efforts in the last round of negotiations knowing that he had been bent on ending the 
secession by force.87 The State Department wanted to get Adoula “back on the rails” to 
prevent any “further rash steps which could exacerbate [an] already difficult situation.”88 
It was time to flash a sign of support to get the prime minister in line with U.S. policy.89 
The United States Information Services, the division of the State Department 
responsible for public diplomacy, increased its “publicity operation” to deflect 
Lumumbist criticism and shore up support for Adoula.90 The Congo Parliament also 
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voted on May 7 to strip Gizenga of his parliamentary immunity.91 Considering that the 
United States had been “in on” Gizenga’s arrest, it would not be a stretch of the 
imagination to assume the Americans played some role in this maneuver as well.92 The 
most decisive action on Adoula’s psyche, however, was a personal letter from the 
president assuring the prime minister of American support.93  
While the letter lifted Adoula’s spirits, he continued to press the Americans for a 
specific date by which results from the negotiations could be expected. He warned that 
“these talks could not continue much longer without general disintegration of his 
position” and that while he was not a “fool” under Communist influence (he had put to 
rest any rumors of visiting Moscow after receiving the letter from Kennedy), 
prolongation of the talks would likely result in “positive actions and disagreeable 
surprises,” which the Americans interpreted as the intervention of the Afro-Asian bloc or 
the Soviet Union.94 Adoula promised that he “was going to keep trying to save [the] 
country but warned he might be powerless [to] prevent disaster if efforts [to] reintegrate 
Katanga [were] not successful.” 95  
The display of American support nonetheless reinvigorated Adoula, and he agreed 
to reconvene the talks with Tshombe on May 24. On June 26, Tshombe walked away 
from the negotiations unwilling to sign a joint communiqué with Adoula highlighting the 
“progress” made. Tshombe flaunted his defiance by orchestrating a celebration of 
Katanga’s Independence Day on July 10. The administration publicly condemned the 
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event, stating that it was “in violation of the spirit and purpose” of the recent 
negotiations.96 A week later Tshombe staged a mass demonstration surrounding a UN 
roadblock in Elisabethville. Thousands of Katangan women and children stood screaming 
at the UN troops, taunting them, and eventually attacking them with rocks. The UN 
troops drove the mobs back with tear gas and clubs. The Katangan government attempted 
to frame the event as an act of UN aggression.97 Rusk privately told a columnist of the 
New York Times that the Secretary-General “wasn’t too wrong when he referred to 
Tshombe and his group as clowns.”98  
Adding insult to injury, it had come to light that that Tshombe had been 
attempting to create an alliance with Lumumbist politicians.99 The rebellious provincial 
president believed he could create a coalition with Lumumbists who charged that Adoula 
was being “teleguided by the United States.”100 A member of the Binza group told the 
Americans that Tshombe had “bought out the Senate.”101 This information was especially 
concerning since the CIA had already noted “a sharp drop” in parliamentary support due 
to the prolongation of the secession.102  
Tshombe’s actions, coupled with a stern warning from the Binza group that the 
Adoula government would be “overthrown” unless new pressures were placed on 
Tshombe, had finally convinced Rusk and Ball that the pressure had to be increased on 
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Tshombe in order to obtain his cooperation.103 Rusk finally conceded, “Just being 
impatient with clowns is not good enough.”104 Ball agreed, believing the recent series of 
events demonstrated “Tshombe’s complete intransigence.”105  
Rusk and Ball now wanted a plan with “a specific solution around which [the] 
UN, our principal allies and US public opinion can rally.” They believed the best way to 
stop this dangerous “drift” caused by U.S. policy was to increase economic pressures on 
Tshombe.106 Both statesmen, however, still wanted to avoid the possibility of a fight.107 A 
CIA report had argued that a military conflict with Katanga would “likely bring about 
conditions of such disorder that the prospects for unity and an orderly political and 
economic development of the Congo would be further reduced.”108 “With everything else 
on our plate,” Rusk wrote, “we do not need protracted guerilla fighting in [the] 
Congo.”109    
Undersecretary of State McGhee was appointed in early August to draft a course 
of action along the lines of what Ball and Rusk had proposed. McGhee’s plan would 
ostensibly become known as the “Thant Plan.” The State Department knew that if it was 
officially presented as a “U.S. Plan” world opinion would “kill it in a hurry.”110 In his 
memoirs, McGhee recalls that whenever he discussed the plan with Thant, the Secretary-
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General would smile and say, “You mean, the so-called U Thant Plan.”111 The plan 
proposed imposing economic sanctions against Katanga if Tshombe did not accept terms 
outlined in the Kitona agreement. The main threat centered on a boycott by all nations of 
Katangan copper. Persuading the UMHK to divert its funds away from Tshombe and into 
the Central Government was another significant aspect of the plan. “Plain fact is,” 
McGhee wrote, “that income of UMHK subsidizes Tshombe’s secession and 
intransience.” 112  
The Belgians endorsed the plan; the British on the other hand, did not. Lord 
Home, the British Foreign Secretary, called it a “profound mistake.”113  Since late April 
British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan had said, “The U.K. could not tolerate another 
military action.”114 He admitted to the president that this posed “quite a dilemma,” 
because even he knew that “if Tshombe believes we would not use force, he would be 
under no pressure and would just stall.”115  The prime minister’s quandary did not get far 
with the president. Kennedy was irate about Britain’s lack of cooperation.116 The 
administration believed that Tshombe would only take the plan seriously if the West 
stood united behind it. Despite this setback, the Americans pressed forward by revealing 
the plan to Thant and Adoula. Neither were overjoyed by it, but they both supported it 
knowing that they were in no position to challenge the United States—the UN’s and 
Adoula’s fiscal patron. Indeed, Adoula was informed, “Increased Western aid, subject to 
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controls, would be given if he accepted [the] proposal and [a] re-unified Congo 
resulted.”117  
After reviewing the draft, Thant said he was “becoming uncertain and even 
doubtful of [the] determination behind [the] current attempt to find [a] peaceful Congo 
settlement.”118 Adoula shared these sentiments. After Tshombe’s acts of defiance in July, 
Adoula wrote an emotional plea to the president:  
The disappointments which I am unceasingly confronted with in this affair have 
considerably affected my morale. My political opponents are profiting from them in order 
to propagandize against the Government to the extent that the population more and more 
is losing confidence. For my part, I am becoming pessimistic, if not desperate. I wonder 
if it would not even be preferable to abdicate my duties if a solution is not forthcoming in 
the next month.119  
 
Adoula concluded by imploring, “Believe me, my dear President.”120 
 The faltering economy only added to the mounting political pressures confronting 
Adoula. Charges from the Lumumbists and the Afro-Asian bloc that the secession was 
affecting the viability of the Congo rang true. “Tshombe’s miserable policy,” an editorial 
in Addis Abba, the capital of Ethiopia, declared, “has also caused the Congo to lag 
behind its equals, for we are all aware how far it is behind those countries which obtained 
their independence when it achieved its own freedom.”121 In early May, Williams 
reported from the Congo that “scatteration” of U.S. aid prevented it from reaching sectors 
of the economy most in need. He suggested that the United States supply additional funds 
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for “education, roads, transport, and private capital investment” and place more U.S. 
personnel at the disposal of the UN’s civil operations.122  
By late May, the Director of the African Department at the International 
Monetary Fund reported “a grave financial crisis in the Congo far more serious than had 
been previously reported.”123 The IMF suggested the United States provide $55 million in 
aid over the next four months to limit the crisis.124 By June, Rusk had come to the 
conclusion that “economic stabilization in the Congo is inseparable from a political 
solution.”125 Williams agreed, pointing out that his own informal poll amongst 
politicians, professional men, students, and others throughout Congo indicated that many 
believed resolving the Katanga secession was the “key to all other problems.”126 As a 
result of these new concerns, the Thant Plan was delivered to Tshombe on August 24, 
who was given ten days to respond before economic sanction against Katanga went into 
effect. Tshombe accepted the terms of the Thant Plan on September 3.127 
 Meanwhile, Adoula could not fathom another round of negotiations as his country 
was disintegrating economically. The prime minister believed Tshombe had accepted the 
conditions of the Thant Plan just as he had accepted the Kitona agreement, with no 
intention of following through. To appease Adoula, who at this point saw force as the 
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only option capable of ending the secession, the State Department delivered another 
round of aid. Eight million dollars for import financing and non-combative military 
equipment consisting of 20 jeeps, 25 radio sets, and 15,000 C rations arrived for the 
Central Government’s use. 128 On September 10, the UN sent letters to Adoula and 
Tshombe urging them to take steps towards national reconciliation.129 Tshombe ignored 
the request.  
 Having watched Tshombe’s defiance and unwillingness to negotiate in good faith, 
a group in the State Department referred to as the “Africanists”—Gullion, Williams, and 
Bowles—had grown sympathetic to Adoula’s position. In late August and early 
September they had begun arguing that only a show of force would motivate Tshombe to 
negotiate. They pressed Rusk and Ball to bolster the UN forces, even though such an 
action risked the outbreak of fighting. Gullion, in particular, led the charge. He wrote 
Rusk that “there is no good putting forth this plan if we are not prepared to accept its 
implications and back it up” and that time was now working against the U.S. goal of 
maintaining a moderate government in the Congo.130 Gullion argued that it was the “use 
of force indecisively which has permitted [the] situation to spin out so dangerously.”131 
“Of course we all abhor [the] possibility of further bloodshed,” Gullion wrote Rusk, “but 
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collapse of [the] UN plan because nations fail to take steps in a time of less risk may well 
cause blood to flow later.”132  
Rusk and Ball, who were still unwilling to risk the possibility of war, chastised 
their colleagues for portraying the situation in such stark terms. “It is not the purpose of 
the UN,” Rusk wrote Gullion, “to reintegrate Katanga by military force or to wage a 
Carthaginian effort to destroy Tshombe.”133 It was Rusk’s position that if the present 
attempt did not succeed at reintegrating Katanga then “we must be prepared for 
reexamination of situation with a view to developing new tactical possibilities of securing 
peace in Congo and withdrawal of UNOC [UN Operations in the Congo] without 
creating chaos or seriously disturbing relations with our allies or with Afro-Asian 
Bloc.”134 In short, Rusk concluded that a military solution would open up a “tortuous 
path” with a “most unpromising answer at [the] end of [the] road.”135 Ball also thought 
“Gullion’s wires were hysterical.”136 He felt that the Africanists lacked “a single tough-
minded fellow,” and were producing a lot of “mush” on a problem that was “way over-
due.”137  
Rusk decided it would be best to send McGhee to the Congo to “review the 
situation,” in part because the secretary and the president distrusted Gullion’s and 
Williams’ opinions, but also because the administration was under pressure from “US 
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right-wing support for Tshombe” to investigate the Africanists’ claims.138 As principal 
author of the Thant Plan, Rusk also wanted McGhee to assist in the mediations between 
Adoula and Tshombe. Once in the Congo, McGhee’s reports ended up confirming the 
Africanists’ portrayal of the situation. McGhee’s meetings with Adoula were dominated 
by requests for “military goods,” while his meetings with Tshombe were rife with threats, 
including the “possibility of another Algeria” if an economic boycott was enacted.139 
McGhee’s overall evaluation was that there was “no firm basis for assurance” that 
the Thant Plan could be accomplished. Informing this opinion was the undersecretary’s 
realization that the UMHK could not influence Tshombe as the department had 
previously believed, and that to a certain extent, the company remained hostage to the 
Katangan government, lest its defiance bring destruction to its mining operations.140 
McGhee’s recommendation was to “prepare a contingency plan involving stronger 
measures in support of Adoula to be applied in the event we are forced to conclude that 
Adoula and Tshombe cannot work out their differences by agreement and carry out the 
Plan.”141 The McGhee mission helped to legitimatize the Africanists’ position, and 
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created some momentum within the administration to end the secession even if it meant 
risking war. 
The Soviet Union’s attempt to place nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962, 
however, halted this momentum. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy 
sought to avoid any bold diplomatic maneuvers that might spark another confrontation 
between the superpowers. He told his advisers, “With the recent developments in 
Cuba…there could not be any consideration at this time of military action in the Congo 
on the part of the United Nations forces.”142 Furthermore, Kennedy felt compelled to 
display his gratitude for British and Belgian support during the United States’ recent 
showdown with the Soviet Union by lessening the pressure on both allies to support 
economic sanctions against Katanga (a policy both countries had opposed).143 
 The consequences of these decisions were devastating for the Adoula 
government. As the Central Government appeared incapable of ending the secession, 
rebellion spread once again in the province of Kasai, and a new opposition party was 
founded in the province of Kivu, the Mouvement de Resistance Congolais, whose raison 
d’être was to overthrow the Adoula government.144 Adoula’s decisions to arrest 
Christophe Gbenye (one of Gizenga’s lieutenants who had served as Adoula’s minister of 
the interior but who had recently rejoined the Lumumbists), and to declare a state of 
emergency in Leopoldville, which by de facto prorogued Parliament and prevented their 
issuing of censures against members of his government, did little to curb dissent.145 The 
crumbling economy, which rebellious Congolese attributed to the secession of Katanga 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Memorandum of Conversation, 31 October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, XX: 641-643. 
143 Devlin, 202; Kalb, 358.  
144 Namikas, 363. 
145 Kalb, 330; Weissman, 200-201. 
 
	  
121 
and the UN’s inability to apply economic sanctions, fueled resistance movements. 
Meanwhile, Tshombe continued to bolster his forces by creating an air force with planes 
from South Africa.146    
 By November, unrest had spread across the Congo. Adoula’s situation had 
become perilous.  Lumumbist pressure forced Adoula to grant amnesty to Gbenye and 
allow parliament to reconvene.147 Lumumbists were also calling for the release of 
Gizenga. Adoula’s tactics had broken apart the coalition upon which his government had 
been formed at Lovanium.148  As one historian has noted, of the 23 ministers who left 
Adoula’s cabinet in 1962, 15 were Lumumbists.149 The Binza group again warned the 
United States that the Adoula government was about to fall.150 On November 25, Adoula 
barely escaped a vote of no confidence. CIA money had likely been used to “rent” 
parliamentarians to prevent it from passing.151  
Adoula was completely exasperated. Gullion reported that the prime minister was 
“in a sad state at present.”152 Fatigue had set in, and Adoula’s attempt to keep up a “bold 
front” was “unconvincing.”153 Driven to tears during a conversation with the American 
ambassador he said, “He had never been so discouraged as at present.”154 “He had been 
idiotically patient sticking with [the] UN,” he continued in an emotional outpouring, and 
“went on to say that [the] US must bear heavy responsibility for [the current] state of 
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affairs since [the] US [was] dominant in [the] UN. [The] UN had been brought into [the] 
Congo at US suggestion and [the] US controlled [the] tempo of its actions; now he was 
having to pay for all the delays which had been imposed upon him.”155 “In a way,” 
Gullion reported, “he is pleased to see matters come to a head even if it means personal 
reverse.”156 Adoula was again seriously contemplating resigning.157 
Gullion was blunt with his colleagues in Washington, “Failure to solve Katanga 
will mean the end of an Adoula authority which is already becoming shadowy.”158 Doubt 
spread amongst members of the Central Government that the United States and UN were 
committed to ending the secession.159 Adoula told Gullion, “Survival of his policies 
required…visible proof that [the] US and UN were going to end Katanga secession or let 
him do it.”160 The Afro-Asian bloc also shared the Central Government’s doubts. U.S. 
Representative to the UN Adlai Stevenson cabled Rusk on November 26 that since the 
UN had refused to take “effective action” against Katanga the Afro-Asian bloc had “for 
some time believed that UN presence in [the] Congo…has in fact been serving to protect 
Tshombe.”161 The Secretary-General, feeling the brunt of Afro-Asian pressure, was also 
losing patience with the Americans. Stevenson warned Rusk, “There remain probably no 
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more than 2 or 3 weeks to convince him [Thant] and [the] Africans that Belgium and 
[the] U.S. really mean business.”162  
Even Ball, who believed Adoula had not done his part to procure a peaceful 
reconciliation, now conceded, “We must recognize that position of the present 
government in Leopoldville, and Adoula specifically, is so eroded that it cannot take 
actions required as long as Parliament remains millstone around his neck.”163 With the 
fall of the Adoula government appearing imminent, Kennedy issued a joint statement 
with Spaak threatening “severe economic measures” against Katanga in a “very short 
time.”164 In the next few days, U.S. planes also transported 3,800 Indonesian troops to the 
Congo to bolster UN forces.165  
Kennedy asked his advisers for a re-examination of U.S. policy.166 Their 
memorandum delivered to the president on December 13 concluded, “The basic 
assumption of our present Congo policy…has turned out to be wrong.”167 They argued 
that the administration had erred in believing that Tshombe would reintegrate Katanga 
“by persuasion and diplomacy backed up by threats of economic action.”168 
Underpinning these arguments, however, was the conclusion that the administration had 
not been “building an effective Central Government in Leopoldville.”169 “A largely 
irresponsible Parliament and a flabby administration,” Kennedy’s advisers wrote, “are not 
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good enough as a political framework.”170 In this way, the administration shifted part of 
the blame onto Adoula. The memorandum noted, “Adoula is the best leader on the 
horizon, but we should be helping to develop other political leadership.”171 This was the 
beginning of the end for Adoula. He had become a scapegoat to both the Americans and 
Lumumbists for the recent setbacks. The United States would soon abandon him in favor 
of a more “effective” government less accountable to parliament.  
Roger Hilsman, head of the Intelligence and Research Bureau at the State 
Department, outlined the possible alternatives for U.S. policy at this juncture. “The real 
choices,” Hilsman reported, “are only two: (1) forced integration or (2) 
disengagement.”172 Out of those two choices, it was deemed that only “forced 
integration” was acceptable. As Kennedy’s advisers explained to him, “Because United 
States and UN policy have for all practical purposes been indistinguishable, the 
Organization's failure in the Congo would be a major failure of this Administration's 
policy and would seriously undermine the peacekeeping role of the United Nations.”173  
Kennedy’s political pragmatism—“Avoid getting boxed into a corner; keep 
options open for as long as possible; maintain lines of communication to opponents as 
well as to friends.”—had disastrous results in the Congo.174 As the memorandum to the 
president outlined, everything had come to a head:  
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For there is growing evidence of serious deterioration in the Congo—the danger of flare-
ups in local fighting, the growing Afro-Asian pressure for forceful UN measures, the 
Secretary-General's strong desire for a minerals embargo, the continuing financial drain 
on the UN, the almost certain withdrawal of a big Indian contingent at the end of March, 
the instability and administrative flabbiness of the Adoula Government, and the latent 
threat of Soviet bloc military assistance to the Central Government if a continuation of 
Katanga's secession were to make moderate politics impossible in Leopoldville.175  
 
Negotiating had left Kennedy with the only option he had wished to avoid. It was clear 
that the United States could no longer “bluff” about a show of force.176  
Kennedy continued to follow his political rules—“When the time comes to strike, 
be prepared to strike hard.”177 In a National Security Council meeting on December 17 
the president said he wanted “no fight if we can’t win.”178 The Joints Chiefs of Staff, who 
approved of a military intervention, reported that the UN forces would need additional air 
power in order to defeat Katangan forces.179 While several countries volunteered fighter 
aircraft, one of the Joint Chiefs explained why the fighter aircraft should come from the 
United States: “What we had was a political, rather than a military, problem in the use of 
force…The military part of the job could be done by any force. It was the political part 
that required U.S. force.” 180 Ball clarified this position to the president:  
Needless to say, the presence of U.S. forces—or even the clear knowledge that U.S. 
forces were available for this purpose—would be a significant pressure on Tshombe and 
his associates. Tshombe could interpret this decision in no other way than as proof that 
any resistance on his part to the UN…would be met by a devastating counter blow.181  
 
Thant prevented the injection of U.S. combat forces (even amidst strong 
American pressure).182 Nevertheless, the administration continued the effort to “show 
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Tshombe we mean business.”183 The United States took immediate steps to bolster UN 
forces in Elisabethville and secured four million dollars to facilitate a “rapid buildup” of 
Central Government forces.184 The Defense Department also dispatched Major General 
L.W. Truman (a cousin of the former president) to assess the capabilities of military 
forces in the Congo.185 Adoula was ecstatic about the visit of General Truman, which he 
considered “indispensable” since it “was a visible demonstration of USA desire to help 
resolve Congo problems.”186 Katangans, Lumumbists, and the Soviets decried the visit as 
a brazen act of American intervention.187 “The announcement of the Truman mission,” as 
one scholar has written, “touched off a demonstration of some 100 Katangan students, 
African and European, against the American consulate in Elisabethville.”188  
Thant took advantage of the American volte-face, and used the opportunity to 
employ economic sanctions against Katanga. The British and Belgians also fell into line. 
Lord Home vocally protested the UN’s actions, but did not act to stop them. Meanwhile, 
Spaak declared Tshombe a “rebel.”189  
Tshombe knew the political winds had shifted against him. Even though the 
Americans tried to assure Tshombe that they did not want to destroy him and only sought 
“to bring his province back into the Congo under his own leadership,” Tshombe 
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nonetheless felt isolated.190 In desperation, on December 19 he declared that he would 
“resort to a ‘scorched earth’ policy rather than accept reintegration by force.”191 On 
December 28, tensions between UN troops and Katangan gendarmes boiled over into 
hostilities.192 UN generals had contingency plans for just the occasion. They launched 
“Operation Grand Slam” when Tshombe’s forces failed to allow UN troops to move 
freely throughout Elisabethville. As Rusk noted, the “outbreak of shooting caught 
everyone by surprise.”193 UN troops quickly overran Katangan forces at Elisabethville. 
Tshombe fled across the Congo-Rhodesian border to Salisbury.   
On January 1, Tshombe returned to Katanga and requested a cease-fire. Thant 
refused to negotiate with Tshombe, saying that he saw “no need for further 
discussions.”194 The Americans and their European allies scolded the Secretary-General 
for his comments. Not only did they want to prevent the destruction of Tshombe, but 
from their perspective, driving him back to the negotiating table had been the purpose for 
the show of force. The Americans told the Secretary-General to halt the offensive so that 
negotiations could be resumed between Adoula and Tshombe.195 Thant reluctantly agreed 
and cabled UN forces to hold their positions. Gardiner, however, who was head of UN 
operations in the Congo, declared, “We are not going to make the mistake this time of 
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stopping short,” and continued the UN advance into Jadotville, where the UMHK’s 
headquarters were located.196  
The Americans believed the UN was in “disarray” and that the Secretary-General 
had lost control of his forces in the field.197 The West feared that if the UN continued its 
advance that Tshombe might implement his “scorched earth” policy, destroying the 
mines, factories, and power plants needed to rebuild the country’s economy.198 Gardiner 
nevertheless continued his advance to Kolwezi, and soon afterwards defeated Tshombe. 
Thant defended Gardiner’s decisions, arguing that UN commanders had made battlefield 
decisions which were in accordance with good military practice” and had contributed to 
the “remarkable success.”199 
On January 14 Tshombe declared that he and his ministers were “ready to 
proclaim to the world that the Katanga secession is ended.”200 Throughout the crisis, 
American policymakers had viewed the Katanga secession in terms of their own North-
South war. Now that the secession had ended, their goal was to pursue a “Lincolnesque 
solution,” rather than “the two decades of ‘reconstruction’ which followed his death.” 
Gullion in particular wanted to prevent the creation of a “Mason-Dixon line” with “all 
KATS [Katangans] on one side of [the] line and all ANC [The Central Government’s 
army] on [the] other.” 201 The Americans impressed upon Adoula that their mission had 
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“not been aimed at destroying Tshombe,” but rather at the “incorporation of South 
Katanga under its own leadership into a federal Congo.”202 While the Americans made it 
clear that Tshombe would not get a “free ride back to Katanga power,” they urged Adoula 
to grant Tshombe amnesty.203 In his New Year address, Adoula, with heavy consultation 
from the State Department, drew upon words from Lincoln’s second inaugural: “With 
malice toward none.”204 
Meanwhile, Tshombe sought to make peace with the Americans. He told the 
American consul in Elisabethville that he sought the basis for a “good relationship” with 
the United States and “wished [to] make clear [that the] past was definitely buried as far 
as he [is] concerned.” He admitted that the “US had won and he had lost.” “He now 
wished,” the consul reported, “to cooperate with the US in the development of Katanga 
and the Congo,” in particular to “concentrate on economic development” and “attracting 
foreign investment.” The consul informed Tshombe that while American policymakers 
believed “his policy had been in error,” the United States had not been “moved by rancor 
or desire for retribution.” To the Americans, this war had strictly been waged in 
Clausewitzian terms, “politics by other means.” Now that it was over it was believed that 
Tshombe could help in the reconstruction of the nation by serving as a powerful ally to 
reunite Katanga, helping to restore the economy, and preventing the spread of leftist 
movements. 205  
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Adoula did not share the Americans’ desire to make amends with Tshombe. 
Though he granted Tshombe amnesty, he did not offer him a position in the government. 
Tshombe calculated that the Adoula government would fail to resolve the economic and 
political problems facing the Congo, and decided to wait in Spain until the opportunity 
arrived to replace Adoula as prime minister. Meanwhile, his mercenaries took refuge in 
Angola. Tshombe lurking about in Europe compounded the problems hanging over 
Adoula’s head. As Gullion correctly observed, “So long as Tshombe lives, Katanga 
separatism is not dead.”206  
In Washington, the administration was elated about the end of the secession. The 
president commended his advisers: “A little sense of pride…is in order.”207 McGhee 
wrote the president, “You were firm in your determination that the Katanga secession be 
ended. At the same time you sought to prove to the world that every possible peaceful 
means of solution was tried before forceful means were applied.” McGhee’s comments 
only describe half the story. The president had been “firm” in his determination to end the 
secession, but McGhee’s remark that the president had pursued “every possible peaceful 
means” was a euphemism for the administration’s inability to commit to a plan of action. 
Indecisiveness rather than firmness had been the hallmark of Kennedy’s foreign policy in 
the Congo during 1962.208  
From Leopoldville, as Devlin wrote, it appeared that “fate rather than careful 
planning in Washington eventually resolved the Katanga problem.”209  But it was not fate. 
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Actions by Adoula, the UN, and the Afro-Asian bloc contributed to the end of the 
secession. They knew only force would persuade Tshombe to reintegrate. Even though 
Adoula had been handcuffed to the Americans, dragged behind their policies until he was 
mentally, physically, and politically spent, his persistence to end the secession by force 
prevailed. The actions of UN officials, especially those who courageously ignored the 
administration’s demarches to halt the offensive, were also important. The UN too had 
been handcuffed to U.S. policy via “generous” funding from the United States, but had 
nonetheless overcome American dithering.210 The support for Adoula from the Afro-
Asian bloc and the Africanist faction in the State Department also kept the possibility for 
a show of force viable.  
Unfortunately, ending the secession did not result in creating the basis for a 
sustainable moderate government as the administration had supposed. Kennedy’s 
indecisiveness—his pursuit of a “pragmatic” solution—had already doomed the future of 
the Congo. The prolongation of the secession resulted in an economic crisis and the 
implementation of repressive policies against the Lumumbists. Both of these factors 
generated a new radical fervor amongst the Congolese, which in turn inspired further 
repressive responses by the Americans. The administration’s determination to hold a vital 
center in the Congo set loose a pair of countervailing forces—reactionary and radical—
generating a vortex in which the country would be torn asunder.  
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Adoula would soon discover that his decision to partner with the Americans had 
made him partially responsible for this new outbreak of chaos.  Even though Adoula had 
challenged Kennedy’s indecisiveness to end the secession, he had nonetheless colluded 
with the Americans to crack down on the Lumumbists. Doing so made him appear to be 
an American lackey, and ultimately impeded his ability to resolve the problems now 
facing his nation. Many Congolese blamed Adoula for his inability to end the secession 
quickly and resolve the economic problems plaguing the nation. Adoula’s perceived 
“incompetency” coupled with his “cozy” relationship with the Americans served to 
harden Lumumbists’ resolve, unifying them and legitimizing their ideology for a Congo 
free from foreign control.  
At the same time, the Americans blamed Adoula for his inability to hold the 
center in domestic politics. Adoula had become an unviable political option in both the 
eyes of the Congolese and the Americans. Both had come to think of him as 
“incompetent.” His rejection by the Americans was of particular consequence. It paved 
the way for Tshombe to become prime minister, and Mobutu to become dictator. Thus, it 
was at this crossroads in 1962 that the likelihood of establishing a national government 
based on liberal principles faded from the realm of possibility. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
NATION-BUILDING 
 
“Now that the UN Congo force has established its freedom of movement 
throughout Katanga, plans need urgently to be worked out for…establishing the further 
‘nation-building’ programs that will be necessary to get the Congo off the world’s crises 
agenda,” Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote President Kennedy on January 24, 1963.1 
This was the moment the Kennedy administration had long awaited. U.S. intervention in 
the Congo under its watch had been motivated by more than keeping the Cold War out of 
Africa or preventing Katanga from seceding, two tasks it had now achieved. The real 
impetus driving U.S. foreign policy in the Congo was “nation-building,” and more 
specifically, the ideology of American liberalism from which that concept derived. The 
United States wanted to prove to newly emerging nations on the African continent, as 
well as the Third World at large, that democracy and capitalism, rather than communism, 
could overcome the problems caused by colonial underdevelopment. At the beginning of 
1963, the Kennedy administration viewed the Congo not only as “the centerpiece in a 
new American approach to Africa in the increasingly vital Cold War struggle,” as the 
historian John Kent noted, but also as the centerpiece in a new American approach to the 
anti-colonial struggle occurring across the Global South.2  
The task before the United States was enormous. During his inaugural address in 
August 1961, Cyrille Adoula had described economic conditions in the Congo as 
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“catastrophic.” By 1963, the situation had degenerated further. Preoccupied by the 
secession of Katanga, the Central Government and its Western allies had neglected the 
economy and the problems caused by colonial underdevelopment. Capital flight, the 
absence of a managerial class, a deteriorating transportation network, a decreasing tax 
base, increasing expenditures, and lack of government oversight resulted in rampant 
inflation, high unemployment, and widespread corruption. Even the UN civilian 
operation, which had brought in hundreds of administrators and technicians from around 
the globe, had made little progress in halting the economic decay. Between 1959 and 
1964 the gross domestic product declined by eight percent.3  
The plummeting standard of living caused widespread disaffection with the 
Central Government.  Many Congolese had expected independence to improve their lot 
in life. As one individual remarked in 1962, “Before Independence, we dreamed that it 
would bring us masses of marvelous things. All of that was to descend upon us from the 
sky…Deliverance and salvation…But here it is more than two years that we have been 
waiting, and nothing has come…On the contrary, our life is more difficult, we are more 
poor than before.”4 As a result, many Congolese lost faith in the national government, 
placing their hopes in local politics and/or leftist politicians who assured the masses that 
their socialist agendas could deliver on the unfulfilled promises of independence. 
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In order to preserve the Central Government’s authority, and prevent the Congo 
from fragmenting along class lines, Adoula would have to right the economy. Believing 
that the problems of colonial underdevelopment were too big for the Congo to overcome 
alone, he was convinced that the path toward development required a partnership with the 
West, particularly with the United States. By 1963, Adoula no longer viewed the 
Americans through rose-colored glasses. They had frustrated his attempt to end the 
secession quickly, which had weakened him politically by making him unpopular 
amongst the Congolese people. Being forced to rely on American support and policies to 
stay in power further alienated him from leftist and even moderate politicians who came 
to view his “coalition” government as a front for the United States and the Binza group. 
Nevertheless, Adoula knew that the Kennedy administration shared his goal of 
transforming the Congo into a viable nation-state.  
Rusk designated Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland to head a small 
group to visit the Congo, assess the assistance needed for “the nation-building phase,” 
and develop a plan to coordinate the delivery of this aid between the Government of the 
Congo, the UN, Belgium, and the United States.5 Cleveland was an appropriate choice 
for the assignment given that he was considered an expert in development economics 
(having left the Deanship of the Maxwell School of Public Affairs at Syracuse to join the 
administration) and had served as an administrator during the delivery of aid to Europe, 
China, and Southeast Asia after World War II.6   
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Cleveland spent thirteen days (January 31 to February 12) traveling the Congo 
and consulting with Congolese, British, Belgian, and UN officials. Upon returning home 
he submitted a report to Rusk totaling over one hundred pages (not including eight 
annexes). According to Cleveland, there were three key obstacles as the country entered 
the so-called nation-building phase. The first was an “underdeveloped political system,” 
which prevented Adoula from procuring popular support and taking any “rigorous 
actions” as prime minister. The second was the expensive yet ineffectual national army, 
the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), which lacked discipline and loyalty. The third 
was uncontrolled government spending, which Cleveland argued was the major cause of 
inflation in the country. “More than external aid,” Cleveland concluded, “success of a 
nation-building effort in the Congo depends on developing the administrative fiber to 
tame the national army, get the fiscal system under control, and construct a political 
system featuring a strong executive.”7 
Summarizing the options for the president, Rusk stated that “the central problem 
of concern we can do something about are the retraining of the Armee Nationale 
Congolaise (ANC) and the provision of technical and economic aid as part of a vigorous 
program of financial and economic stabilization.” In total, Cleveland estimated that the 
Government of the Congo would need $175 million to function the next year, and 
suggested that the United States should contribute $80 million of this through PL 480 (the 
“Food for Peace” program), grants for import assistance, and loans. So that the United 
States would not be overburdened by its financial commitment to the Congo, Rusk told 
the president that it would be necessary to create an aid consortium under the “UN 
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umbrella”—a plan designed to use the UN as a “cover” to deliver Western aid in order to 
prevent direct competition between the United States and the Soviet Union from 
occurring in the Congo (i.e., “keeping the Cold War out”)—in which Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, West Germany, the European Economic Community, as well as others would 
contribute. While Rusk noted that fiscal reform would fall on the shoulders of Adoula, 
who would have to be “courageous” in carrying out an austerity program, he told the 
president that the United States would seek “to get maximum leverage from our 
assistance and to exercise direct U.S. leadership to see that the necessary steps are taken 
by the Congolese and by the United Nations.”8 
Two problems ultimately undermined the administration’s efforts to build a 
democratic and prosperous Congo via Cleveland’s plan. First, by focusing on inflation 
instead of colonial underdevelopment, Cleveland was treating the symptoms rather than 
the cause of the economic crisis. Cleveland acknowledged that colonial 
underdevelopment was a problem in the Congo. Portions of his report read as if they had 
been lifted from FDR’s New Deal. He recommended, for example, the “launching of a 
public works program to reduce unemployment” and to “rehabilitate the vital 
transportation network.” He also discussed the need for a better education system, noting 
that there were only 400 high school graduates in 1962 and that “90% of all the 
Congolese children who start in school soon fall back into illiteracy.” It is curious then 
why Cleveland ultimately recommended implementing an austerity program that would 
undermine the Central Government’s ability to address these structural problems. 
Secondly, emphasizing the role of a strong army served to undermine the 
administration’s goal of creating a democratic society. When a political problem arose as 
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a result of the poor economic conditions, for example, the administration often relied on 
the army rather than Parliament to provide a solution, helping to clear the way for the rise 
of a military dictator.9 
More plainly, Cleveland’s report exemplified the administration’s hubris, 
believing it could transform a nation into a democratic and capitalist society. In this way, 
the administration approached nation-building in the Congo with an optimism akin to 
which FDR approached the New Deal and Woodrow Wilson approached the League of 
Nations. In the face of what appeared to be insurmountable problems, their optimism 
sprang from the exceptionalist creed of American liberalism, that the United States could 
fulfill, in the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “An obligation to deal with poverty, 
repression and injustice ‘everywhere in the world.’” “[It] is an old idea,” Schlesinger 
noted, “rekindled by Woodrow Wilson in 1917-1920 and enlarged by World War II into 
a kind of global New Dealism.”10 The Kennedy administration believed it could solve the 
Congo “paradox,” and even concluded that “on balance, the Congo is going the way of 
free choice and not coercion,” that 
it does seem that in spite of the absence of trained people, the vacuum of effective 
government, the laborious and inefficient administration, the distorted educational 
system, the lack of communications; in spite of too much army, too little civil 
government and practically no experience in politics; in spite of the fact the government 
spends 5 francs for every franc it collects in revenue, and depends on external aid for 
approximately 50% of its imports—despite all these undoubted facts…confidence in the 
nation’s future…is justified. The Congo will get from here to there—from the seemingly 
impossible conditions in which it finds itself to the conditions which are possible in a 
couple of decades—with intensive education and a strong government.11  
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Optimism should not be frowned upon, but it appears to have caused the Kennedy 
administration to underestimate the problems confronting the Congo to its own detriment, 
and to that of the Congolese people.  
In addition to Cleveland’s mission, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs G. Mennen Williams also visited the Congo during February as part of a high-
profile three-week tour across the African continent. The main purpose of Williams’ trip 
was to signal U.S. commitment to the development of the Congo now that the 
secessionist crisis had ended. His speeches also attempted to convey to the Congolese 
that the United States understood the source of their frustrations. “For almost three years 
the Congolese people have endured much suffering and privation, while political 
divisions and turmoil were obscuring the promise of its independence,” Williams said in 
a speech in Leopoldville. “The United States,” he said, “is ready to help the Congo in the 
development work it will have to undertake. In cooperation with the United Nations…we 
are prepared to help the Congo as it emerges from the political struggle toward an era of 
economic and social development.” He reiterated the administration’s belief that the 
Congo would make “an important contribution of African and world progress and 
stability” once it was “on the road of future progress and prosperity.”12 
Williams’ official report, submitted to Rusk on March 7 after visiting the Congo, 
shared Cleveland’s optimism for the country, underscoring that “the Congo is a 
potentially rich country and, given massive aid and technical assistance for the next two 
years or so, can become self-sustaining.” But also like Cleveland’s report, Williams’ 
recommendations appeared to undermine the administration’s stated objective to promote 
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“free choice” and a democratic society. Williams was convinced, for example, that “the 
record of the Congolese Parliament is one of dangerous irresponsibility and 
incompetence” and that “so long as Parliament remains in session, the continuation of 
moderate government and Western presence in the Congo is constantly endangered.”13  
Williams’ accusations were not entirely unwarranted. While traveling in the 
Congo he had witnessed how Parliament’s decisions had led to the starvation of part of 
the population of Leopoldville and helped fuel tribal hatred when a petty political dispute 
prevented the delivery of food throughout the city.14 But rather than propose a political 
solution to solve these types of problems, Williams underscored the need for a stronger 
military, emphasizing the possibility of public disorder, and with scant evidence, the 
possibility “of a Bloc-oriented government, and Soviet intervention.” Like Cleveland, 
Williams recommended the implementation of the Greene Plan, which had been proposed 
by Col. Michael J. L. Greene after a trip to the Congo in July 1962. Greene recommended 
a reduced but more effective army of 25,000 soldiers that would be trained by a 
multinational program.15 
Williams also emphasized the need for the United States to take a multi-lateral 
approach in assisting the Congo. He was clearly in tune with the reality that American 
public support for nation-building in the Congo was dwindling. As he wrote to Rusk, the 
end of Katanga’s secession “led to a public and Congressional impression that the Congo 
problem is now solved.” Even if this “misunderstanding” could be addressed, Williams 
pointed out, there would still be difficulties enlisting congressional support “not only 
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from those whose primary concern is with aid programs generally, but also from those 
Congressmen who evidenced a great interest in the Katanga issue and who considered 
Tshombe the most reliable bastion against communism in central Africa.”16  
Indeed, in early 1963 Republicans adopted Democratic Senator Thomas Dodd’s 
criticism of the administration’s handling of the Congo Crisis as they challenged the 
allocation of funds for foreign aid in the president’s proposed budget to Congress. Such 
criticism was compounded by the influential journalist Arthur Krock of the New York 
Times, who continued to lambast the administration’s Congo policy in his weekly 
column, and Michel Struelens, Tshombe’s publicist, who continued his work in New 
York City.17 Williams therefore recommended, “Making every effort to get Belgium and 
other countries to increase their share of this aid.” While it was generally accepted that 
the United States would still have to make a substantial contribution, the hope was to 
approach nation-building in the Congo multi-nationally and perhaps even to persuade 
Belgium to take the lead in delivering technical assistance.18  
Even though Spaak was pleasantly surprised to learn that the United States for 
once wanted Belgium to take the lead in something in regards to the Congo, enlisting 
Belgian support, as well as that from other Western countries, proved to be no easy task. 
The defeat of Tshombe had upset many Europeans, especially those in the financial 
sector. While the Kennedy administration was eventually able to procure a verbal 
commitment from Belgium to assist in implementing the Greene Plan, the settlement of 
pending legal disputes over financial claims between Belgium and its former colony 
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(officially referred to as the contentieux) prevented the immediate delivery of any such 
assistance. Adoula, for his part, sought a quick rapprochement with Belgium. On 
February 20, he made a conciliatory gesture by traveling to Elisabethville, the capital of 
Katanga, in order to meet with business and community leaders. He then traveled to 
Brussels to confer with Spaak in person. While Spaak appreciated Adoula’s effort to 
rehabilitate relations between the two countries, no quick solution existed to resolve the 
contentieux, and the matter dragged out for over a year.19 
Seeking rapprochement with Belgium also cost Adoula credibility with African 
nationalists. The State Department reported in a memorandum to Bundy that “although 
the trip to Belgium was most successful from the international point of view, Adoula is 
now accused by the opposition not only of being an American stooge but what is more 
serious being a Belgian one.”20 Similarly, Adoula’s remark at the end of his trip to 
Brussels, “You need us, and we need you,” as well as the announcement of a multi-
million dollar U.S. aid package in the form of agricultural products which occurred about 
the same time signaled to Kwame Nkrumah, the Prime Minister of Ghana and a key 
leader of the Pan-African movement, that Adoula “was becoming controlled by the 
American and Belgian ambassadors”; that both countries were seeking to “maintain 
stooges in charge of the administration throughout the country” in order to “secure 
economic domination.”21 While this loss of sympathy from African nationalists probably 
did not cost Adoula in terms of foreign assistance, it did cost him politically. His growing 
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reliance on the West drew charges that he was part of neo-colonialist plot, and 
strengthened his opposition within the country, the Lumumbists, making his position, 
according to the State Department, “At best shaky.”22  
Adoula, however, probably felt as if he had had little choice but to rely upon 
Western aid. Ties with the communist bloc had long been severed, and bi-lateral aid from 
African countries or the soon-to-be created Organization of African Unity would not 
come close to meeting the level of assistance needed to right the economy.23 
Furthermore, a beleaguered UN, which the Congo Crisis had nearly destroyed because of 
Soviet opposition in 1960, had taken the life of its Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, 
and had now placed on the verge of bankruptcy, was raring to pull out. 
Secretary-General U Thant was under great pressure from the Soviet Union and 
the UN’s Congo Advisory Committee to withdraw UN troops.24 Brian Urquhart, the head 
UN representative in the Congo, believed that the United Nations had achieved its 
objectives and that by March 1963 “the prospects in the Congo seemed encouraging for 
the first time since 1960.”25 That same month, the UN brigade from India, which was 
considered “the mainstay of the Congo force in terms of fighting capability and 
discipline,” began withdrawing, and the UN notified the United States that it would cut 
its forces from 13,360 to 6,000 by July 1.26 “Urgent appeals to stay on,” Urquhart noted, 
“were received from many quarters which had, in the past, been consistently critical of 
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our efforts.”27 Indeed, UN troops were unquestionably the most reliable military force in 
the country, and many in the West considered them an important source for stability.  
The Kennedy administration in particular viewed an extension of the UN 
commitment necessary “to hold the country together.”28 The Joint Chiefs of Staff said 
that a minimum of 8,000 UN troops would be required in order to achieve this. As 
discussed above, both Cleveland and Williams recommended that UN forces stay until 
the ANC could be retrained and reorganized. Consequently, the Kennedy administration 
persistently lobbied U Thant to keep UN forces in the Congo. It tried to persuade the UN 
that it had not achieved its objectives, arguing specifically that Tshombe, who still had 
8,000 armed gendarmerie at his disposal and was “still hankering after secession.”29 
Indeed, rumors were swirling that one of Tshombe’s chief mercenaries, Jean Schramm, 
“was telling his European acquaintances that he and his friends would be back in force in 
Elisabethville after the departure of the UN.”30 By late March the UN itself was 
becoming concerned about a “possible fourth round in Katanga in [the] making.”31 
Though U Thant remained “highly dubious about the continued financial drain on the 
UN,” this information helped persuade him to keep UN troops in the Congo until the 
summer of 1964.32  
In the meantime, Adoula was losing domestic support. The high unemployment, 
rampant inflation, and widespread famine across the country made him an easy target for 
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political opponents. When Parliament reconvened in March, the House elected officers 
opposed to Adoula. Washington became so concerned about Adoula’s ability to stay in 
power that they wondered if he would choose “military paternalism over continued 
legality.”33  
On March 27, 1963 Kennedy met with his advisers in the Cabinet Room of the 
White House to discuss the situation. Ambassador Edmund Gullion told the president that 
Adoula’s political position was weak: “The question of whether Adoula can make the 
necessary accommodations with his opposition to survive remains open.” Explaining how 
this situation had come to pass, Gullion put his finger on the heart of the matter: “Local 
pocketbook issues have been much more important in working against Adoula than the 
end of secession has been in working for him.” “It is very important,” Gullion 
recommended, “that the U.S. give aid rapidly now in order to help overcome the 
economic problems, and thus save Adoula.”  Gullion reiterated, “There are no 
alternatives to keeping Adoula or someone close to him in power. We have examined 
them all, and none are appealing.”34  
Even during this dire situation, Kennedy’s experts remained optimistic, assuring 
the president that because of the potential of the Congo the country would be fine in one 
to two years. Robert West, the U.S. AID representative in Leopoldville, who had first 
come to the Congo as an MIT researcher in 1959 and was a professor of economics at the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, told the president that though 
exports from the country were now less than $200 million in two years it “should reach 
$450 million a year.” West also noted that he agreed with Gullion that “the need for aid 
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to permit industries to get up to full capacity was clear,” but he emphasized that “when 
they did, the country could be self-sufficient.”35  
Gullion, who had been in the minority before in urging the president to move 
more quickly to end the secession, did not share the optimism of his colleagues. On April 
6 he sent a memorandum to the president stating that it was “doubtful that as much as $75 
million to match our contribution will be forthcoming from other donors.”36 In an effort 
to limit criticism from the Soviet Union that the Congo had become an American client-
state and to improve the likelihood of gaining congressional approval for the requested 
funds, the administration had continued to adhere to the UN model used during Katanga’s 
secession that limited the United States from contributing more than 50% of the funds for 
the Congo (in this case an estimated $150 million dollars). Gullion also began to question 
Adoula’s ability to govern. In late March the ambassador reported that “in addition to 
showing the erosion of his own political position,” Adoula “also has shown signs of 
physical exhaustion.”37  
Indeed, Adoula needed support. The floundering economy strengthened his 
political enemies. Many in Parliament were demanding Antoine Gizenga, one of 
Lumumba’s former lieutenants, be released from prison. The administration pressured 
Adoula to forbid Gizenga’s return, but Adoula pointed out that because of the Congo’s 
constitution “there was no legal way he could prevent Gizenga from returning to [the] 
Congo.” Adoula took the opportunity to remind the administration of how his own 
previous requests that the United States deport Michel Struelens, Tshombe’s publicist in 
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New York, had been denied. “This was [the] type of problem which was a price paid for 
democratic institutions,” he told Gullion.38  
Other problems arose for Adoula as well. Tshombe was still lurking in the 
political shadows, plotting his return to the Congo. On April 6, Rusk warned the 
president that “there are disturbing reports of the continued presence of Tshombe’s 
mercenaries and military equipment in Northern Rhodesia and Angola.”39 That same 
month, a raid by the Central Government on an apartment owned by Tshombe revealed 
plans for Katanga to secede again once UN forces had departed. Captured documents 
specifically showed payments to mercenaries and lists of equipment, including planes (a 
particularly effective weapon in the Congo).40 Gullion also reported that Tshombe had 
“secretly consulted with Portuguese authorities in Angola” on the matter.41 
In light of the various forces mounting against Adoula, Gullion recommended that 
the administration continue to “press him to carry out measures we have already urged on 
him to unify the country, improve internal security, curb inflation, fight unemployment, 
and check corruption,” but also “help him in the formation of a new political party, the 
unification of the labor movement and the creation of a loyal and effective propaganda 
apparatus and the development of public works projects.”42 The administration seemed 
content to focus on political issues, specifically those related to keeping Adoula in power, 
rather than solving economic problems. The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) spread 
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propaganda via radio, films, and pamphlets that supported Adoula, and explained that 
solutions to the economic problems would take time to go into effect.43 “If necessary,” 
Gullion recommended, “we should support the Adoula Government in taking strong 
measures to deal with an irresponsible Parliament.”44  
The prime minister also worked to improve his situation. On April 17 he widened 
the composition of his government to include more members from the Abako and 
Conakat political parties. Abako played a leading role in organizing the independence 
movement, and it now controlled the urban areas of Leopoldville that had been in unrest 
throughout periods of Adoula’s rule. Conakat was formerly headed by Tshombe, and 
consisted of representatives from Katanga, whose help Adoula needed to reintegrate the 
province and remove the possibility of a second secession. Unfortunately for Adoula, 
neither the Americans’ “propaganda apparatus” nor his effort to make a more inclusive 
government (which still excluded leftists associated with Gizenga or Lumumba) did little 
to improve his situation. On April 20, Parliament passed a vote of no confidence.  
Adoula’s inability to govern as well as perceptions that he was a Western stooge 
were also causing the Congo to fragment politically. By May, there were twenty-five 
political parties represented on average by four members of Parliament per party.45 Re-
provincialization also contributed to this fragmentation. By June 30 twenty-one provinces 
replaced the original six. Adoula hoped the creation of additional provinces would force 
provincial leaders to rely on the Central Government, as traditional bases of support 
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would be divided.46 The plan backfired. Re-provincialization both diffused the Central 
Government’s authority and created numerous territorial disputes, which the Central 
Government now had to arbitrate.47  
By May the Kennedy administration had come to the realization that its policies 
were making little headway and if anything the situation was backsliding towards chaos.  
Williams wrote Rusk on May 13 admitting that “the Congolese economy is today in 
greater need of urgent stabilization measures than at the time of the Cleveland Mission in 
February.” He reported that inflation continued, predicting an injection of 1 billion francs 
($20 million) each month, and that foreign exchange controls had not improved, 
estimating a balance of payments deficit of $60 to $80 million for 1963. Williams also 
reported that the administration’s efforts to obtain increased aid from Europe had failed. 
They were far from their goal of raising $75 million, and were still trying to persuade 
Belgium to increase its commitment from $5 million as well as obtain another $30 
million from the United Kingdom, Germany, the European Economic Community, and 
other countries. In the midst of this growing economic turmoil, Williams worried that the 
Congolese Parliament, which had “proven more unruly than useful,” would “continue to 
pose a threat to the stability of the executive branch as long as it is in session.”48 After the 
vote of no confidence in April, the Kennedy administration sought to create a national 
party that would assist Adoula in consolidating his power.  The CIA helped fund the 
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creation of the Rassemblement des Démocrates du Congo (RADECO), but it too failed to 
achieve political unity.49 
The administration responded to these setbacks by seeking to strengthen the army. 
Having failed to occur under the aegis of the UN, the United States pressed Adoula to 
request bi-lateral assistance to expedite the reorganization and modernization of the 
ANC. On May 12, Adoula sent a letter to U Thant notifying him that the Congo was 
requesting direct assistance from the United States, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Israel, 
and Italy for help on this matter.50 Comments made by Rusk at a press conference only a 
few weeks prior now appeared hollow:  
I believe the events there have underlined the basic wisdom of the decision made by 
President Eisenhower not to let that particular country be caught up in a bilateral 
engagement between the two great power blocs in the so-called cold war but to put that 
problem into the hands of the United Nations, in order to keep that kind of conflict out of 
Africa and to give the Congolese a chance to work out their own future.51  
Ironically, another consequence of the decision to overhaul the ANC bi-laterally 
was that General Joseph Mobutu’s position in Congolese politics would increase 
immensely, even though he had been one of the main reasons why UN attempts to 
modernize the ANC had failed.52 Concerned about losing influence over his soldiers, he 
had sought to prevent interaction between UN advisers and the army. He urged instead 
that technical assistance be limited to equipment. While the Kennedy administration was 
aware of Mobutu’s role in preventing the UN’s reorganization of the ANC, it had 
recently been impressed by his “prompt and courageous action” in quelling a mutiny by 
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the Leopoldville police on May 3. As Williams pointed out, breaking up the mutiny in the 
capital city showed some sign of strength from the Adoula government.53 
 Later that month Mobutu toured American military installations for two weeks as 
a guest of the U.S. Army. At that point no bilateral agreement had been signed between 
the United States and the Congo, and Belgium and Israel had been the only other 
countries to pledge some sort of assistance. At the end of his tour, Mobutu met with 
Kennedy on May 31 to discuss the details concerning U.S. military assistance to the 
Congo. In general, it was concluded that the United States would assist in training the 
officer corps and would provide matériel such as trucks and radios. When pressed by the 
president if he “could maintain order after the UN’s departure,” Mobutu replied without 
hesitation “that he could if he could get U.S. military aid immediately.”54  
Towards the end of their conversation, the president and Mobutu moved out into 
the White House Rose Garden for pictures. Kennedy used the opportunity to woo 
Mobutu, telling him in earshot of the press, “General, if it hadn’t been for you, the whole 
thing would have collapsed and the Communists would have taken over.” Mobutu also 
wanted to send a message to the president albeit in an eccentric fashion the world would 
soon grow accustom to.  He told Kennedy that he “personally wanted to take parachute 
training for four weeks at Fort Benning and for two weeks at the Special Warfare School 
at Fort Bragg.” When the president asked him whether he thought he could be gone from 
the Congo for such a length time, Mobutu replied that he had had the opportunity to 
receive similar training from France, but that he “wished to come to the US instead,” and 
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that “after all he had been in the United States already for a couple of weeks.”55 Mobutu 
wanted to make clear that he had thrown his chips in with the Americans, and more 
importantly, to reassure the president that he would be a strong ally, someone who could 
maintain power even while abroad (an opportune moment to be deposed).  
The scene of Kennedy and Mobutu in the Rose Garden should not be construed as 
the United States choosing Mobutu to lead the Congo, as is a commonly asserted. While 
it indicates his increasing role in the Congo, it did not symbolize a new relationship 
between him and the United States. The Kennedy administration was not convinced 
Mobutu could deliver on his promise to cooperate in reorganizing and modernizing the 
ANC. Indeed, once back in the Congo Mobutu returned to his old ways, requesting 
programs of modernization while obstructing the ones focused on retraining. His failure 
to integrate the Katangan gendarmerie into the ANC during that summer, an issue that 
had then been lingering on for over half a year, also remained a serious point of 
contention.56  
By June 30, the fourth anniversary of the Congo’s independence, the situation had 
improved little under Adoula’s rule. Adoula addressed the obvious in his Independence 
Day speech: “The return of South Katanga in the Republic has not eliminated our 
problems as if by magic.” “All the immense tasks that await us,” he went on to say, “will 
nonetheless not prevent us from pursuing an avant-garde African politics.” Aware that 
the West was looking to decrease its commitment to his country, Adoula used his speech 
as an opportunity to reach out for additional support. He had always viewed himself as a 
Pan-Africanist, and he knew that the future of the Congo would depend on its interactions 
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with the rest of the continent. He made clear that the Congo “rejected political 
isolationism” and “remains open to all currents of trade.”57   
By mid-July, the UN had spent $37 million on civilian operations in the Congo 
since 1960, with an additional $19 million budgeted for the remainder of 1963. The total 
commitment of $56 million as well as 1,149 full time specialists ranging from 
meteorologists, social workers, and postal service experts, according to a UN press 
release, “Surpassed anything ever undertaken by the United Nations or its specialized 
agencies in a single country.”58 This report was part of a larger reassessment of the UN’s 
commitment in the Congo. UN officials knew the organization could not continue to 
divert such a large portion of its resources to that country alone. Secretary-General U 
Thant wanted the January 1 troop removal followed up by a yearlong phase out of the 
civilian operation.59   
The United States’ own reassessment of the economic situation in May led to a re-
vamped austerity program. On July 20 the United States suspended new grants to finance 
imports and public works “in an effort to force far-reaching fiscal and economic 
reforms.” While other categories of aid remained, such as the Food for Peace program 
and contributions to the UN Congo fund for technical assistance, the two categories being 
cut accounted for about half the American aid program that had “totaled about 
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$73,000,000 in the year to June 30.” The hope was that halting this aid would pressure 
Adoula to take “steps that would make such aid effective,” such as “other monetary and 
foreign-exchange controls,” and “reduction in the budget deficit,” which was viewed as 
“the major cause of the runaway inflation.” Other Western countries including Belgium, 
Britain, West Germany, and Canada followed the United States’ lead in reducing aid.60 
While the intent of the austerity program was to get the Congo’s economy and 
government back on track, focusing on government expenditures instead of addressing 
the problems caused by colonial underdevelopment exacerbated an already reeling 
economy. Specifically, suspending this aid prevented “improvements to roads, bridges, 
airports and public buildings,” the infrastructure desperately needed to get the economy 
moving again. Similarly, cutting down grants in finance imports to $20,000,000 in order 
to meet an estimated $60,000,000 worth of needs, did little to help create an effective tax-
base that could have been used to permanently replace those funds.61  
Whatever hopes the Congolese people held in the United States to transform their 
country into a prosperous and democratic nation began to slip away once the austerity 
program took effect. On August 3, 1963, Albert Loumanza, a member of the Congolese 
parliament, sent a letter to President Kennedy explaining the hardships confronting the 
150,000 constituents he represented. Even though the people in his district were “very 
hardworking,” he wrote the president, they nonetheless found “it very difficult to cope 
with the cost of food, clothing, schooling, travel and housing.” Loumanza went on to 
explain how the problems caused by colonial underdevelopment created this situation in 
which many Congolese “no longer have any way of acquiring the necessary money to 
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pay for their basic needs.” “With the departure of the vast number of Europeans after the 
Congo accepted a badly prepared-for independence,” he explained, “the peasants, due to 
the neglect of the merchants, have no way to sell their agricultural, fishery and other 
alimentary products.” “As a result of the foregoing,” he continued, “schooling has 
become non-existent for numerous children whose parents no longer have the means to 
keep them in school.”62 
Loumanza wrote the president that his constituents “unceasingly request me to 
serve as their direct and lawful intermediary with a great nation that could help them 
solve their unhappy financial difficulties,” that they “have been studying the extent of aid 
given by the United States to underdeveloped countries during the past several years,” 
and were “well aware, as is the rest of the world, of your great qualities as a Chief of 
State.” “Your exalted name,” Loumanza wrote, “is known even to the simple peasants in 
the interior of our country.” Because of this, Loumanza appealed to the president for 
help. First for those living in his district, and if the president was unable to provide that, 
perhaps he would consider “a direct, personal and private request” to provide him and his 
family with 10,000,000 francs. “Government subsidies,” he explained, “do not begin to 
cover our needs.” They could not return the infrastructure in which products were 
delivered to market, or a school system that had been closed for nearly three years he 
explained. Loumanza’s conclusions reflected the fears, doubts, concerns, and desperation 
felt by many Congolese at this time: “We see at present absolutely no possibility for us to 
improve our present situation, which seems only to be growing worse—much to the 
detriment of any progress as regards to our own interests and those of our children.”63 
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By the time Loumanza’s letter arrived in Washington, the Kennedy administration 
was itself debating what the future of U.S. aid to the Congo would look like. “The 
fundamental question on which policy clarification will be sought,” Williams wrote Rusk 
on August 13, “is the question of the role of the US in the Congo over the next one to two 
years.” While “the US plays a leading role in Congolese affairs,” and “American funds, 
personnel, and prestige have been heavily committed in the Congo,” there was, Williams 
wrote to Rusk, “A basic question as to the desirability of increasing our commitment and 
influence.” Despite the fact many in the administration believed that “the degree of 
success which had been achieved to date can be very largely ascribed to the great effort 
the US has made,” many also accepted that “the Congo continues to be plagued with 
serious difficulties,” and were afraid these problems—“Rampant tribalism, the division of 
the country into 21 provincettes, a nearly runaway inflation, a costly defense 
establishment which contributes little to law and order, a central government with little 
authority in outlying areas, an incompetent bureaucracy”—would “all contribute to a 
situation which can again easily become a matter of profound international concern.”64 
The last thing anyone wanted was a second international crisis like that of the Katanga 
secession.  
The dilemma facing the administration was how to disengage from the Congo 
while preventing such a crisis from occurring.  Some, such as Williams, argued that, 
“Belgium should take primary responsibility and play a leading role in the rehabilitation 
in the Congo.” “With its large economic stake in the Congo and approximately 30,000 
Belgian nationals there, not to mention the moral obligation of helping assure the future 
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of its former colony,” Williams wrote to Rusk, “Belgium should be expected to provide a 
large proportion of the technicians and aid which the Congo desperately needs.” Others, 
such as Ambassador Gullion, had “considerable doubt” about the future role of Belgium 
in the Congo. Gullion believed that Belgium would “defend its financial interests in the 
Congo,” at the expense of pursuing “policies which will be in the best interest of the US 
in this important part of Africa,” and that “an increase of Belgian influence, in place of 
US and the UN, could involve real strains on Belgian-Congo relations and on Adoula’s 
ability to manage radical policy elements.” Additionally, Gullion believed, as did others 
in the administration, that it was the United States, guided by American liberalism, which 
held the solutions to these problems. Belgium rule, they knew, had led to these problems 
in the first place.65 
But in light of political and economic solutions that seemed to be failing, and with 
“storm clouds ahead on the Congo horizon,” the solution that became seen as the most 
viable was creating a stronger military. Even those who believed American nation-
building could still succeed conceded that more time was needed, and that creating and 
maintaining a strong military presence in the Congo would provide stability until those 
policies could take effect. The Kennedy administration took the first step down this 
slippery slope when it decided that retaining the UN forces in the Congo was necessary. 
“At least until the army retraining program is well under way,” Williams argued.66 On 
August 22, Adoula requested U Thant extend the stay of UN troops through the first half 
of 1964.67 On September 16, Thant denied Adoula’s request, informing him that the UN 
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did not have the needed funds (no less than $25 million) to permit the UN force to stay 
six months past December 31.68  
Anticipating that the UN might deny Adoula’s request, the administration had 
already begun making preparations for the president himself to lobby for an extension 
during his visit to the UN to address the General Assembly on September 20.69 Upon 
arriving in New York, Kennedy met privately with Secretary-General Thant and Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Ralph Bunche urging them to support an extension of UN 
troops. Behind the scenes, Cleveland and Charles Yost, Adlai Stevenson’s deputy, 
worked to compose a resolution that would provide funding for the continuation of the 
military and civilian operations.70 The pinnacle of this effort occurred during President 
Kennedy’s address to the General Assembly, “I believe this Assembly should do what is 
necessary to preserve the gains already made [in the Congo] and to protect the new nation 
in its struggle for progress.” “Let us complete what we have started,” he declared.71  
Kennedy’s appeal, as well as the behind-the-scenes efforts of his staff, paid off. 
On October 18 the General Assembly approved Adoula’s request for the UN troops to 
remain in the Congo through June 1964. It is ironic, however, that the administration 
used Kennedy’s speech, which was supposed to be celebrating both U.S. and UN nation-
building efforts, to request an extension of military forces in the Congo. It was an 
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admission of sorts that their efforts to transform that country into a viable nation-state had 
failed. Likewise, Kennedy’s words, “That people must be free to choose their own future, 
without discrimination or dictation, without coercion or subversion,” appear hollow in 
light of the fact that the speech was motivated politically to procure a military solution in 
the Congo, a course leading away from a path of development and towards a military 
dictatorship. The ostensible commitment to the “pursuit of peace,” which President 
Kennedy waxed poetic about during his address, was in regards to the Congo, a farce.72 
In early October, Kennedy met with Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri-Spaak 
at the White House to discuss the progress of the ANC retraining program. The Kennedy 
administration was not convinced that the program was proceeding quickly enough. 
Spaak told the president that “until now progress had been slow but there were better 
prospects for the future.” George Ball, Acting Secretary of State while Rusk was 
traveling abroad, also informed the president that UN troops would be staying on for the 
first six months of 1964. While the president was “glad” to hear this, Spaak warned him 
that the “Adoula Government is weak and the administration is bad.” Speaking frankly, 
Spaak told the president that, “In his view a democratic parliamentary system is not the 
best one for the Congo at the present.” “It is hard for Adoula to take decisions,” Spaak 
told the president, and that if the Congo Parliament gave “full powers to Adoula” it 
“would enable him to govern more effectively.”73  
The next week Adoula traveled to Washington to discuss the ANC re-training 
program as well as the economic reforms his government was trying to implement. 
Adoula impressed upon the president that the army needed matériel, and assured him that 
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the Congo government would “apply all our efforts to be ready when the UN departs.” 
“The paramount problem,” Adoula told the president, “was bringing about the economic 
recovery of the country.” While in Washington Adoula also met with representatives 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who wanted to develop a monetary reform 
program that could be started the following month. Adoula believed, however, that 
sending “people back to growing crops” was more important than monetary reform. He 
told the president that the only way this could occur was if the infrastructure was 
improved, particularly the roads. “If the interior could be reached, then cash crops could 
move,” Adoula said. Otherwise, the people of the Congo, he said, “Would revert to a very 
low level of subsistence agriculture.” Adoula warned, “The rural people had to see an 
improvement in their standard of living, and commodities and consumer goods had to be 
available to them.” Before leaving, Adoula thanked the president for the aid the United 
States was providing, and told him that “even though some propaganda circles may 
attempt to distort the nature of American aid and make it appear that the US is trying to 
establish its rule over the Congo, the people understand that the assistance comes from 
the American people.”74 
Adoula recognized the economic problems confronting his country better than the 
Western experts clamoring for austerity. He knew economic recovery required massive 
foreign assistance in order to put the infrastructure in place to get the economy moving 
again, a message he tried to impress upon the president during their meeting. Adoula 
struggled, however, to convey his vision for the Congo, or the steps necessary to achieve 
it, to the Congolese people who meanwhile were growing impatient with his government 
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as the economy continued to tank. This hindered his ability to overcome the perception 
that U.S. aid was buying control over his government, which to a certain extent was true. 
Unable to acquire the vast fortune needed to overcome the problem of colonial 
underdevelopment, the deepening economic crisis continued to lead to the fragmentation 
of the country, dividing it along class cleavages whose origins could be traced back to the 
maldistribution of the colonial government. Wealthy provinces moved to protect their 
assets, as they had done shortly after independence in 1960. Rumors of secession stirred 
once again in Katanga, where production of copper had risen by 5 percent from 1962, and 
production of cobalt had risen by 20 percent compared to pre-independence numbers. 
The province of Kasai essentially withdrew from the nation as well by selling its steady 
production of industrial diamonds on the black market.75 More dramatically, a wave of 
revolutions broke out across the poorer agricultural-based provinces where the effects of 
the economic crisis were most severe. Led by Lumumbists, whose namesake had been 
assassinated by the Belgians for pursuing genuine independence (i.e., a Congo free from 
foreign influence), the revolutions sought a “deuxième independence” (a “second 
independence”), delivering on the failed promises of its first: better pay, improved 
housing, free education, and most importantly, freedom from foreign control.76 
The first of these revolutions occurred in the western province of Kwilu, which 
had once been a major producer of palm oil, but now was plagued by increasing costs of 
living, unemployment, and government corruption. In July 1963, Pierre Mulele arrived in 
the province to lead a peasant revolt. At the time of independence, Mulele had helped 
found the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), a party politically left of Lumumba’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Kent, 162-163, 173. 
76 Fox et al., "'The Second Independence': A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," 78-
109. 
 
	  
162 
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC). When Lumumba was overthrown, Mulele fled 
the country, eventually arriving in China where he studied Mao’s strategy of guerrilla 
warfare. The Central Government discovered his training camps in September.77  
The next month, while Adoula was in Washington, opposition leaders from the 
eastern provinces of the Congo gathered across the river from Leopoldville in the 
(formerly French) Republic of Congo’s capital Brazzaville, which had just witnessed the 
coup of its Western-leaning president, Fulbert Youlou. From there they announced the 
creation of the Conseil national de liberation (CNL), an umbrella organization to 
coordinate the revolutions in the east committed to the overthrow of the Adoula 
government. They declared Christophe Gbenye their leader, and their army, the Armée 
Populaire de Libération (nicknamed the “simbas”), was led by Gaston Soumaliot, 
Nicolas Olenga, and Laurent Kabila, and was especially active in the impoverished 
provinces of Orientale and Kivu.78 Orientale’s economy suffered from the decline of 
cotton growth that had dwindled since independence. Kivu, as the historian John Kent 
has written, experienced harsher conditions:  
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In 1959 the province was estimated to have over a million livestock, primarily pigs, but 
in the following three years four-fifths had been lost, with the production of milk reduced 
by the same amount…The story of vegetable production was even more depressing, as 
before independence 12,000 tons of potatoes and 23,000 tons of other fresh vegetables 
were produced which supported some 15,000 small farmers. By 1963, the collapse of 
organized purchasing and the failure to maintain vehicles and a viable transport system 
had virtually eliminated the market and reduced production to nothing more than that for 
local consumption. Fishing on Lake Kivu had also failed to bring in a small fraction of 
the pre-independence catch in both the modern and traditional sectors.79 
 
At this same time, leftist leaders in Brazzaville who supported the CNL, and the 
overthrow of the Adoula government, which they viewed as hostile to their own leftist 
political system, demanded higher wages for laborers in Leopoldville since the 
economies of two cities were intertwined due to their close proximity (about two miles). 
These demands helped set-off strikes in Leopoldville, where two-thirds of the population 
was unemployed and labor unions, which had expected Adoula to be more receptive to 
their demands as a former labor leader had become exasperated with the Central 
Government’s inability to rein in the ruinous economy. A mutiny in the ANC, which 
occurred about this same time across the country in the city of Luluabourg, further 
indicated that Adoula had lost control of the country.80 
When everything seemed to indicate that leftists would overthrow Adoula, a twist 
of events typical in the Congo took place. The right-wing Binza group used the outbreak 
of protests as an opportunity to assume power. Members of the group had become 
disappointed with Adoula due to the fact that his efforts to create political unity had 
caused him to disperse patronage that had traditionally been awarded to them.81 
Furthermore, the Binza group had interpreted Adoula’s inability to secure an aid package 
in Washington as a signal that the United States had given up backing the prime 
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minister.82 Upon Adoula’s return to the Congo, members of his cabinet presented him 
with a “state of exception” decree. It imposed martial law and placed a triumvirate in 
charge of the Congo. In effect, Defense Minister Jerome Anany would rule. Kasavubu 
signed the decree on October 21. Shortly after, Anany arrested the labor leaders 
responsible for the strike and expelled Soviet bloc embassies that were suspected of 
abetting the strikers. While “none of the moves seem to be directed against Adoula,” a 
memorandum from the State Department to McGeorge Bundy noted, “The trend of 
events leaves Adoula on the sidelines with the initiative and control in other hands.”83 
Many in the Kennedy administration had been frustrated at one time or another 
with Adoula as prime minister, but the idea of supporting a “strong man” in Anany 
gained little support. The administration did not doubt Anany would be “vigorous” and 
“decisive” in his decision-making (qualities it longed for in Adoula), or that he would be 
“well-disposed toward the U.S.” It was concerned, however, by his overall ability to 
govern, which Ambassador Gullion believed would be “obscurantist, arbitrary, primitive, 
totalitarian, willful and [garble—irresponsible?],” as well as what supporting Anany 
would do to the United States’ image in the Third World. As Gullion noted, supporting 
Anany “would make short work of [the] non-alignment policy,” an image the United 
States had taken great care to cultivate.84 Since the United States intervened in 1960, the 
goal had been ostensibly to keep the Cold War out of the Congo, and under the Kennedy 
administration in particular, to use the intervention as an opportunity to gain support from 
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non-aligned countries. The State Department warned Bundy that the arrest of the labor 
leaders as well as the expulsion of the Soviet bloc embassies “will tend to identify the 
Congolese Government with the West and thus make it a target for criticism from the 
more ‘neutralist’ of the Afro-Asian countries.”85 
As a result of these concerns, the Kennedy administration opted to continue 
supporting Adoula, concluding that “despite [his] faults, we have [a] credible 
international figure.”86 Ball ordered Gullion to reassure Adoula and the Binza group that 
the United States’ “attitude toward Adoula has not changed.”87 McMurtrie Godley, the 
former Counselor at the embassy who was now serving stateside as Director of the Office 
of Central African Affairs at the State Department, also traveled to the Congo to reiterate 
this message. During Godley’s meetings on November 2 and 3, the Congolese leaders 
professed to believe that the United States had decided the Adoula government was a 
“lost cause” and that it “was proceeding to transfer its support to an opposition group led 
by jailed labor leaders.” Mobutu, Godley noted, appeared to be the “most worried” of the 
leaders, all of who were suffering from an “acute case of jitters.” According to Godley, 
they had even “dreamed up” that the United States might be planning an operation similar 
to the “coup d’état in Vietnam” in which only a couple days prior Ngo Dinh Diem, the 
U.S.-backed president, was assassinated.88  
After these meetings with Godley, Gullion met with Adoula and three key 
members of the Binza Group, Mobutu, Minister of Justice Justin Bomboko, and Victor 
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Nendaka, head of the Sureté (the secret police). Gullion tried to dispel any “suspicion” 
that the United States had given up on the Adoula government, and especially what he 
called “hallucinations” about “U.S. intrigue with labor leaders.” He assured them that the 
United States supported an Adoula-led Congo government, referring to the “US stake of 
350 million dollars in [the] Congo.” Attempting to correct any confused signals sent by 
the administration about U.S. support for Adoula, he told them that it “had recently 
furnished to Adoula material for his forthcoming speech citing aid he could expect from 
US.”89 Gullion had previously shown them “a clipping on the attitudes of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee showing an inverse relation between foreign aid and 
dictatorial acts,” and explained to them that “aid to the Congo could be jeopardized” if 
such a government arose.90 Furthermore, he pointed out “that while US citizens could 
understand closing of parliament and reasons for state of exception (in view [of] threat to 
state),” they “should realize what kind of people we were; that principal support up to 
now for US policies in support of UN and Adoula came from just those sources which 
extreme dictatorial action could alienate.”91  
At the end of their meeting the spokesman for the group, Bomboko, reiterated 
“their continuing firm solidarity with Adoula,” as well as their commitment to the 
constitution and elections. Gullion reported that between him and Godley, they had 
successfully let the Binza group know it could not take the United States “for granted,” 
and that they had increased the Binza Group’s “understanding of their dependence on 
Adoula or rather on Adoula’s reputation in [the] outside world.” Gullion did note, 
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however, that “despite [the] group’s renewed conviction that they need Adoula, they have 
never shown less concern for him than in last few weeks.”92 As the historian Lise 
Namikas has eloquently written:  
The events of November completely undermined any credibility Adoula still enjoyed at 
home or abroad. To the Congolese leftists, the ascendency of the Binza group meant that 
Adoula would never be free to respond to their demands. Without any pretensions of a 
non-aligned foreign policy, African and communist states were no longer inclined to try 
and seek any improvement in relations with Leopoldville. Instead, when the opposition 
movement began to pick up force, radical African states came to their aid. The central 
government now turned to an even greater reliance on the United States.93 
 
The loss of Adoula politically signaled the failure of U.S. nation-building in the 
Congo. Despite the amount of energy, expertise, and resources the administration poured 
into the Congo, it proved unable to right the economy and establish a democratic 
government built around a moderate politician. Rather than initially accept the blame the 
administration pointed to the limits of Adoula, who in its words failed to deal with 
“Bantu politics.”94 Adoula certainly had his flaws. He proved unable to convey his vision 
for the Congo to the Congolese people, and convince them that working with the United 
States was a joint effort in state-building rather than a neo-colonialist plot. But ultimately 
it was the failure to right the economy that rendered Adoula impotent. Without a 
moderate politician in power, and with the Central Government now more than ever 
before forced to rely on support from the United States to survive, a vicious cycle was 
unleashed in the Congo that perpetuated the agendas of both revolutionaries and 
reactionaries. As charges of neo-colonialism rang true, the Lumumbist-led revolutions 
spread. Their success ultimately led the United States to abandon its plan to create a 
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liberal society in the Congo, opting instead to support a strong executive that would keep 
the Congo within the West’s orbit. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  
THE RISE OF MOBUTU 
 
By the fall of 1963, the failure of the Kennedy administration’s liberal aspirations 
had helped set the Congo on a leftist course. Unable to right the economy, and having 
denied Adoula the opportunity to be an equal partner in the state-building process, the 
United States had inadvertently legitimized the call by Congolese leftists for a “second 
independence,” one which sought to make good on the failed promises of its first 
independence for an improved standard of living, and most importantly, freedom from 
foreign control. In short, Kennedy had left Johnson in an unenviable situation, one with 
little opportunity for keeping the Congo within a Western sphere of influence without 
undermining the liberal values that had motivated U.S. intervention to begin with. 
Johnson feared the overthrow of the Central Government would lead to the fragmentation 
of the Congo, possibly creating a seedbed for communism in the heart of Africa. Such an 
event would signify the defeat of nearly four years of U.S. policy that had sought to keep 
the country unified. Like Kennedy, Johnson also feared such an outcome would end the 
West’s access to the Congo’s mineral resources.1  
To ensure these fears did not materialize, the Johnson administration set aside 
aspirations for creating a prosperous and democratic Congo, and focused instead on 
pursuing the policies of his late predecessor of securing a strong executive and 
strengthening the army. The hope was that by doing so the administration could create a 
stable and unified Congo under leadership friendly to the West, which would allow the 
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United States to divest itself of what it deemed a hopeless situation. This course of action 
signaled not only the failure of liberal aspirations, but also provided the opportunity for 
what the historian Frederick Cooper has described as a “gate-keeper” to emerge in the 
Congo; someone who could extend government authority across the nation, gaining 
control over, and guaranteeing access to, the country’s natural resources.2 The United 
States’ willingness to partner with a “gate-keeper” laid bare the underpinnings of 
American ideology, above all else a commitment to capitalism.3  
By the time the dust had settled in the aftermath of President Kennedy’s 
assassination in November 1963, the situation had deteriorated quite drastically in the 
Congo. Widespread disaffection with Adoula and the Central Government helped the 
Lumumbist-led rebellions gain popularity and spread across the country during the first-
half of 1964. Adoula’s inability to provide an improved standard of living for the 
Congolese people as well as his seemingly open collusion with the United States to 
implement what many deemed to be reactionary policies against Lumumbists, which 
extended back to the imprisonment of Antoine Gizenga in January 1962 up to the more 
recent exclusion of Lumumbists from the “broadening” of his government in April 1963, 
had made him extremely unpopular. Similarly, the “state of emergency” during which the 
right-wing Binza group temporarily seized power may have prevented the downfall of the 
Central Government, but further alienated it from the Congolese masses. “Like Spanish 
moss,” the CIA accurately described in February 1964, “the present Congo Government 
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has its roots in the air, not in the Congolese hinterland,” and Adoula, it continued, “has no 
personal political following.”4 
The Johnson administration was most concerned about the growing popularity of 
Pierre Mulele, who was leading a Maoist-inspired revolution in the western province of 
Kwilu. Mulele had spent the fall of 1963 politically educating and training in the art of 
guerrilla warfare a cadre of Congolese schoolteachers, nurses, clerks, and disaffected 
teenagers known as jeunesse. In January 1964 Mulele launched his rebellion, attacking 
foreign missionaries and palm oil production centers owned by the multinational 
conglomerate Unilever. Armed with machetes, axes, arrows, and lances, his victories 
over UN forces and the Central Government’s army, the Armée Nationale Congolaise 
(ANC), in January and February, caused his reputation to take on mythical proportions, 
inspiring rumors that those who fought for him were protected from bullets by magic.  
Aware of Mulele’s training in China, the Johnson administration labeled him a 
“communist” and moved quickly to end his rebellion. At the “request” of the Congolese 
government, the United States dispatched Lieutenant Colonel William A. Dodds, a 
counter-insurgency expert who served as an advisor to the Congolese Government and an 
observer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were keeping a close eye on the situation. In 
violation of the UN resolution the United States had helped pass in February 1961 that 
forbade the deployment of foreign military personnel not under UN command, the CIA 
arranged for mercenary Cuban exiles to pilot T-6 aircraft armed with .30 caliber machine 
guns and air-to-ground rockets against Mulele’s forces. The introduction of airpower had 
the desired effect in terms of military success. Meanwhile, Mulele had difficultly 
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extending his rebellion beyond the boundaries of the Kwilu province. The fact that social 
class and ethnic identity were intertwined in the Congo hindered the spread of his class-
based revolution. By the end of February the rebellion in Kwilu had been largely 
suppressed, even though Mulele, with a $10,000 reward on his head, evaded capture until 
1968.5 
As the rebellion in the west was winding down, the rebellion in the east was just 
getting under way. Led by Christophe Gbenye, Gaston Soumaliot, Nicolas Olenga, and 
Laurent Kabila, the Conseil national de liberation (CNL) had used the sanctuary it found 
in Brazzaville in October 1963 as an occasion to seek additional international support.  
Though they acquired little munitions or matériel, by January 1964 they received 
permission from Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi (three nations affiliated with communist 
China) to set up camps along the eastern border of the Congo from which they could 
stage their assault.6 While Western intelligence confirmed that little material support was 
actually making it to the Congo, the growth of revolutionary activity led the Johnson 
administration to conclude that the country was “destined for continued crisis.”7 In 
February 1964 the CIA reported, “Even assuming that rough standards of security can be 
maintained for a time, it is difficult to see any satisfactory solution for the West in the 
Congo, even with heavy Western financial contributions and strong Western diplomatic 
backing of the central government.”8 
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During April, Soumialot and Kabila led the CNL’s army, the Armée Populaire de 
Libération (PLA or “simbas”), into what had recently been the Kivu province. Re-
provincialization, the decline in prices of agricultural products, and recent flooding of 
Lake Tanganyika had made conditions in the province ripe for revolution. Before 
launching his attack Soumialot spread leaflets into the region highlighting the ineptness 
of the Central Government. This resulted in some Congolese joining his ranks, including 
workers from a local sugar refinery owned by the Belgian company, Sucrerie et raffinerie 
de l’Afrique Central.9 The PLA’s victories in the province attracted international 
attention and were cheered on by Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, and most notably, China.10 “If 
we can take the Congo,” Mao Zedong purportedly said that April, “we can have all of 
Africa.”11 
The Johnson administration became especially concerned by the sudden outbreak 
of international support for the CNL. The last thing it wanted was a second international 
crisis similar to the Katanga secession. On April 9 a special high-level interdepartmental 
group created to deal with counterinsurgency met to examine the situation in the Congo 
as well as the growing internal security problem in the rest of Africa. In attendance were 
Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, CIA Director John McCone, NSC Staff 
member Michael Forrestal (the son of former Secretary of Defense James Forrestal), 
AID Deputy Administrator William Gaud, and a representative for Joint Chief of 
Staff Chairman General Maxwell Taylor. The group recommended providing “direct US 
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assistance to African internal security forces (police and military).”12 In late-April, 
President Johnson followed this advice by upgrading the U.S.-supplied air force in the 
Congo. Six T-28 fighter aircraft, six H-21 helicopters, and ten C-47 transport planes, 
would be sent to replace the T-6s.13 
On May 15, the CNL took the city of Uvira, an important crossroads into 
Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi, and into Tanzania across Lake Tanganyika. Soumialot 
established his headquarters there, and named himself head of the government in eastern 
Congo. Shortly thereafter the rebellion spread southward into the province of North 
Katanga. The ANC prevented Soumialot from taking Bukavu, the capital of Kivu, but 
were ambushed in the village of Luberika on May 30. The rebels killed the ANC 
commander, and Central Government soldiers fled back to Bukavu or across the border 
into Rwanda. The ANC “completely caved in,” Lt. Col. Dodd reported back to 
Washington.14 On June 15, the president was informed that “militarily the Congo army 
(ANC) has been almost a complete failure in the Kivu rebellion; well armed troops are 
being routed by Pygmies carrying spears and machetes.” General Mobutu, the ANC’s 
leader, was described as “vain and lazy.”15 Intelligence from the State Department 
confirmed that the ANC had no one to blame but itself, reporting that there was “no real 
evidence of foreign intervention or supply” to the Lumumbists from places like Algeria, 
Egypt, Sudan, and China.16  
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The ambush at Luberika finally persuaded Mobutu that foreign experts were 
needed to train the ANC. Under the direction of the United States, the Israelis began 
training two ANC battalions, the Italians began training an air force, and the Belgians 
provided an additional 80 officers, bringing their total contribution up to 200. The United 
States also sent “mobile training teams,” and in addition to the aircraft it had previously 
committed arranged for the transfer of four armored vehicles.17 But the situation did not 
improve overnight for the Central Government. The CIA reported to the president on 
June 12 that “the Congo, on the eve of its fifth year of independence, seems headed at a 
minimum for a period of increasing instability and possibly a total breakdown of 
governmental authority.”18 While the CIA pointed out that “the immediately pressing 
problem is military,” it argued that the “long-term solutions for the security problem must 
be political.”19 A few days later the president received a memorandum from the National 
Security Council (NSC) stating that Adoula, who was once deemed by the Americans to 
be the “best possibility” to serve as prime minister, was now “completely indecisive and 
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incapable of action.”20 With Adoula “at the low point of his power and prestige” the 
Johnson administration decided to abandon him.21 
The United States had steadfastly supported Adoula between August 1961 and 
July 1964.  Ensuring Adoula’s election to power at the Lovanium conference had 
arguably been the Kennedy administration’s greatest achievement. During the period of 
Adoula’s rule, as one scholar has noted,  “The United States pumped $178.6 million of 
economic aid into the Congo.”22 Adoula was also supported by the CIA through 
propaganda, the “renting” of members of parliament, and the creation of a nation-wide 
party, Rassemblement de Démocrates du Congo (RADECO). Of course this aid did not 
have the desired effect. Many Congolese were aware that the “regime was largely 
supported by American financial aid,” which made it difficult for Adoula to overcome 
charges that he was an American lackey or neo-colonial stooge.23 The fact that he 
employed repressive policies against Lumumbists further reinforced this image, and 
worked against him while trying to expand whatever little grass roots base he had to 
begin with. Being unable to establish a popularly elected government with Adoula at its 
head further signified the failure of U.S. nation-building in the Congo. 
The Johnson administration believed what was now needed most was a 
government with popular support. “Adoula—who with UN and US help has kept the 
Congo in the Western camp for three years—has many virtues, including the rare one of 
honesty,” the CIA noted, “but he has no popular following, and only now is making tepid 
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moves to promote a national political party.”24 Certainly Adoula was not the only person 
to blame for his failure to garner popular support. Had he been treated as an equal partner 
by the Kennedy administration both he and U.S. nation-building plans in the Congo 
might have been successful. If Kennedy, for example, had listened to Adoula’s 
recommendation to end the Katanga secession quickly instead of letting it drag out for 
over two and a half years, Adoula might have gained the popularity that thereafter eluded 
him. Similarly, if Kennedy had followed Adoula’s recommendation to focus on the 
problems caused by colonial underdevelopment to resolve the economic crisis rather than 
implement an austerity program, than perhaps the worst aspects of the crisis could have 
been mitigated and the Lumumbists would have attracted fewer supporters. Without this 
American support, though, Adoula’s government stood little chance of survival. Adoula’s 
willingness to become bedfellows with the Americans cost him more than he had 
anticipated. As Stephen Weissman has insightfully written, “The American government 
not only supported Adoula; it was, in many different ways, part of his government. It was 
very directly involved in his successes and failures. [original emphasis]”25 
With the failure of the Adoula regime and the country on course for further 
disaster “some hitherto unacceptable alternatives” became “more palatable” for the 
United States.26 American eyes turned towards Moise Tshombe to lead the Central 
Government. Tshombe was the former leader of Katanga’s secession that the United 
States had opposed between 1960 and 1963. Since his defeat, he had been plotting his 
return while in a self-imposed exile in Spain. As the State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR) noted, he established himself as “a lodestone for those 
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with grievances against the Adoula regime,” and “attracted a mélange of political 
supporters, ranging from members of the ragtag CNL to the politically respectable 
ABAKO.” “These politicians,” INR noted, “sense in Tshombe a new political winner.”27 
A new political group emerged, the African Democratic Committee (CDA), which 
included members of the Binza group. The CDA pressured President Kasavubu to 
appoint Tshombe as prime minister.28 The Binza group did not trust Tshombe, but unable 
to salvage the situation themselves, saw an opportunity to exploit Tshombe’s unbridled 
quest for power. Their ploy was to support Tshombe’s return, which would pit their two 
enemies (Tshombe and the Lumumbists) against each other.  They hoped that the two 
would exhaust their resources on each other, possibly paving the way for a member of the 
Binza group to take power.29 
The United States also found Tshombe to be an appealing candidate to lead the 
Congo. First and foremost, he appeared to have a wide range of political support in the 
country. The Johnson administration also believed a Tshombe premiership would draw in 
Belgian support and help the United States to unburden itself of the crisis. As the CIA 
noted, “Brussels…has helped him in the past, and may do so again.”30 The Americans 
were now convinced that only Belgium could right the economy and help create stability 
in the country. As the CIA reported, the “vast Belgian business interests and the tens of 
thousands of Belgians who are presently in the country still form the backbone of the 
Congo’s economy.” Even through the crisis, the report continued, “Most of the large 
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Belgian commercial enterprises in the Congo have continued to prosper.”31 With 
Tshombe as prime minister, the Americans believed the pending legal disputes over 
financial claims between Belgium and its former colony, officially referred to as the 
contentieux, would be settled. This in itself was one of the major issues preventing 
Belgian aid. Additionally, with the UN forces scheduled to withdraw at the end of June, 
the Johnson administration believed Tshombe might be able to enlist Belgian military 
assistance, as well as his own 3,000 gendarmes and white mercenaries.32 
Sensing that the time had arrived for his return, Tshombe indicated in a press 
interview on June 10 in Paris that he was “ready to return,” stating, “I cannot allow my 
country, with its natural resources and its economic potential, continue, badly led, to slide 
into chaos and anarchy.”33 Tshombe arrived in Leopoldville on June 26. Mobutu greeted 
him at the prime minister’s residence allegedly saying, “You, Tshombe, are the only 
solution.”34 On July 6 Kasavubu asked Tshombe to form a new government.  
A clever politician in his own right, Tshombe was aware that the Binza group and 
President Kasavubu considered him a political rival. He distanced himself from both, and 
instead relied on many of his former advisers that had served him during the secession, 
including Godefroid Munongo, his chief lieutenant.35 Combined, Tshombe and Munongo 
controlled 8 out of 18 posts in the cabinet, and rather than rely on the ANC which was 
controlled by Mobutu, the new prime minister preferred using forces loyal personally to 
him.36 Tshombe arranged for the return of approximately 3,000 Katangan gendarmes, and 
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reestablished contact with the South African mercenary, Major “Mad” Mike Hoare, who 
had fought for him during the secession.37 As Undersecretary of State Harriman pointed 
out to Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, 
Tshombe’s exclusion of “many ambitious politicians from his government, especially the 
Binza group” has resulted in “growing political opposition with the Binza group, 
particularly General Mobutu, and President Kasavubu.” Harriman warned of a possible 
“coup by the Binza group or Mobutu.”38 Indeed, by late July rumors were already 
swirling in the Congo that a possible “Mobutu/Anti-Tshombe coup was brewing.”39  
Nor did the arrival of Tshombe as prime minister immediately put the United 
States at ease over the Congo. Lumumbists’ victories continued throughout July. The 
Johnson administration arranged for four C-130s with 56 parachutists from Fort Bragg, as 
well as three to five B-26s to be sent to the Congo by August.40 The increased air attacks, 
however, did not always produce the desired effect. As one rebel in the eastern city of 
Uvira declared to a journalist, “Look, we are a people who fight for liberty with spears 
and clubs. You, the powerful Americans, are crushing us with bombs and planes. God 
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will judge you! God will punish you.”41 Shortly after this incident the rebels began taking 
Westerners hostage in retaliation for, and protection from, air raids.42  
On August 5, PLA forces under the leadership of Olenga defeated the ANC to 
take control of Stanleyville, the capital of the Orientale province and the third largest city 
in the country. Soumialot took the American Consul, Michael Hoyt, hostage, and 
established the CNL’s headquarters in the U.S. consulate.43 Meanwhile, Olenga gathered 
American and European hostages from amongst the approximately 1,500 foreigners in 
the city.44 On September 5 CNL leaders established the People’s Republic of the Congo 
(PRC), an alternate government dedicated to overthrowing the Tshombe regime. They 
declared Stanleyville (the birthplace of Lumumba) as the new capital, and named Gbenye 
president, Soumialot as defense minister, and Thomas Kanza as foreign minister.45  
Despite this disastrous event for the Central Government and the United States as 
well as reports that over one-sixth of the Congo was in rebel hands, President Johnson did 
not want to increase American involvement in the Congo.46 Johnson did not share the 
same level of interest in Africa as his predecessor, and he found the Congo being forced 
onto his agenda at the same time as the Gulf of Tonkin incident in Vietnam.47 In an NSC 
meeting held on August 11, Johnson made it clear that “direct American involvement in 
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the Congo should be considered only as an extreme last resort.” He accepted his advisers’ 
recommendations to pressure European allies to take the lead on the matter. Rusk told the 
president, “The job can be done on a small scale if done now, and it should be put 
squarely to the Europeans as their responsibility.” Soon after, presidential pressure to 
send troops to the Congo was applied via Harriman on Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.48 Spaak told Harriman that public opinion in his country 
would not tolerate a Belgian-led military intervention. He was willing, however, to 
arrange for the return of Col. Frederic Vandewalle, and other “technical advisers” (i.e., 
mercenaries), to the Congo. (Vandewalle had previously served Tshombe as a military 
adviser during the secession.) The United States helped foot the bill and arrange 
transportation for the mercenary force.49    
 With the arrival of the mercenaries, Tshombe’s forces had put the rebels on their 
heels by October. This turn of events proved bittersweet for the Johnson administration. 
The American press had increased coverage of events in the Congo, and there were 
reports that the Lumumbists were torturing white hostages in Stanleyville in response to 
the Central Government’s victories.50 U.S. officials were concerned about the possibility 
of further repercussions if Central Government forces advanced on Stanleyville. There 
was little evidence that Tshombe’s forces were capable of carrying out a rescue 
operation. In August, Tshombe had requested that the United States “send three parachute 
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battalions to Congo…to retake and hold Stanleyville, Albertville, and Uvira.”51 By mid-
October, the Johnson administration began contemplating such a mission in order to 
rescue the hostages. 
The Johnson administration knew that conducting such a rescue operation would 
incense African nationalists across the continent. Furthermore, it wanted to avoid 
committing American combat troops in the Congo.52 “Looking beyond the immediate 
military problem and the problem of our hostages,” William Brubeck, a member of the 
NSC staff, wrote the president on November 9:  
Our aim is to avoid the US again being involved so deeply in the Congo. We are trying to 
get the other Africans to take over the Congo problem politically; we are trying to get the 
Belgians to take responsibility, with the US limited to a supporting role, in helping the 
Congo; we want to withdraw our military assistance and leave it to the Belgians; we want 
to pressure Tshombe to make a sensible political compromise among the forces in the 
Congo, and not get stuck propping up Tshombe in an authoritarian regime without any 
power base in the realities of the Congo.53 
Because of these concerns, when the United States decided to carry out a rescue 
operation it spun it as a “humanitarian” mission. This was somewhat disingenuous. The 
primary objective of what was labeled operation Dragon Rouge was to rescue hostages, 
but it was carefully coordinated with Central Government forces and CIA paramilitary 
operatives to break the back of the Lumumbist insurrection. Thus, when U.S. planes 
dropped 320 Belgian paratroopers over Stanleyville before dawn on November 24 to free 
the hostages, Central Government troops and CIA operatives simultaneously converged 
on rebel positions. On November 26, a similar though smaller operation, Dragon Noir, 
took the city of Paulis (approximately 250 miles north-east of Stanleyville), rescuing 
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more hostages and depriving the rebels of another key base. Both operations concluded 
by the end of the month having evacuated 2,000 foreigners.54  
World reaction to Dragon Rouge was, as a CIA memorandum noted, divided 
“ideologically along both North-South and East-West lines.”55 Besides the expected 
protests from the Soviet Union and China, many parts of the Third World erupted in 
anger. They viewed the operation as a neocolonial action, seeking to thwart the genuine 
independence sought by Congolese nationalists. U.S. embassies came under attack or 
were defaced in Nairobi, Prague, and Moscow. Thousands more rallied in protest in 
Belgrade and China. In Cairo, demonstrators burned to the ground a library that had been 
built as a memorial to President Kennedy.56 Ahmed Ben Bella, President of Algeria, 
referred to the operation as a “crime.”57 President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, also 
denounced it, and Che Guevara of Cuba condemned the operation before the General 
Assembly at the UN.58 All three of those leaders’ nations responded by sending aid to the 
rebels through Uganda, Sudan, and Tanzania, which bordered the Congo and 
sympathized with the Lumumbist cause. Guevara, desirous to be at the forefront of the 
world revolution, led a force of approximately 100 Afro-Cubans into the Congo.59  
The recently formed Organization of African Unity (OAU) was particularly 
incensed, and did not allow Tshombe to participate with other African heads of state at its 
upcoming summit. The OAU felt betrayed because Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of 
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Kenya, had been mediating talks in Nairobi on behalf of the organization between Kanza, 
the Foreign Minister of the PRC, and U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, William Attwood. The 
OAU accused the United States of negotiating in bad faith. While the Johnson 
administration denied this, saying it had been most concerned about the well-being of the 
hostages, there is evidence to suggest that the NSC did not believe the rebels were 
capable of negotiating, and continued the talks only in order to keep tabs on the safety of 
the hostages “as the trap closes in Stanleyville.”60 
Carl Rowan, an African-American journalist who directed the U.S. Information 
Agency, led the Johnson administration’s attempt “to generate understanding and 
sympathy for the operation.” Rowan’s agency produced 360 newscasts in 38 languages 
for the Voice of America, distributed 5,000 prints of photographs taken from the rescue 
operation, and even produced a 40-page booklet and a 15-minute television program, all 
of which sought to highlight rebel “atrocities.”61 The media blitz did little to dissuade 
those convinced of a Belgo-American plot to control the Congo. The protests and pledges 
of support to the Lumumbists breathed new life into the crisis.  
In January 1965 Robert Komer, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, became Johnson’s new point man on the Congo. Komer sought to replace what 
he had judged to be “ad hoc” policymaking with a “systematic and coordinated 
approach.”62 His goal was “to disengage somewhat from the Congo and get it off the 
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crisis list, while still keeping our legitimate friends in power.” 63 He feared, however, that 
a Lumumbist counter-offensive was looming. “I very much fear that we’re in the eye of 
the storm over the Congo,” he wrote in mid-January. “The present deceptive lull strikes 
me as most likely a buildup period, during which those aiding the rebels are preparing a 
major counteroffensive to retake Congo Orientale.”64 Komer’s concerns about a 
counteroffensive were based on intelligence reports that described Stanleyville as an 
“isolated, dead city,” surrounded by 6,000 rebels, where the economy had become 
“paralyzed,” and Central Government forces were “guilty of serious excesses against the 
Stanleyville population, including robbery, rape, murder and beatings.”65 
His plan, as he explained to Johnson, was to “get some kind of a political 
umbrella erected over the Congo, to help forestall a rebel counter-offensive and to protect 
us against military overcommitment [sic].”66 Specifically, he believed using the OAU 
would provide “an African way to reach an African solution of an African problem.” “If 
it only gets underway,” he wrote Bundy, “we can disengage discreetly behind its cover, 
and with a fairly good chance of retaining in Leo[pold]ville a government which serves 
US and Belgian interests. It may or may not include Tshombe, but at the moment he’s 
still front runner.”67 If this was not achieved, he believed the United States would either 
be “sucked into another war, or have to retreat ignominiously.”68 
 It should be noted that even though Komer’s plan relied on finding a political 
solution, he increased military measures and attempted to apply economic sanctions 
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against the Lumumbists. “It seems to me that we must exhaust every resource to forestall 
resumptions of a rebel offensive,” he wrote in January. He suggested threatening 
countries supporting the rebels (particularly Algeria and Egypt) with the discontinuation 
of U.S. aid. “I am not suggesting that our Embassies should use this as an official line,” 
he wrote Harriman, “rather, this thought could be dropped in casual conversations 
(thinking out loud about the future), as well as being planted via…unofficial channels.”69 
Komer also widened the military campaign against the Lumumbists. He expanded the list 
of targets for air raids, approving planes to “hit truck convoys and arms depots in 
‘villages.’” The rebels, he argued, were using villages as “safehavens [sic],” and he 
believed this was a necessary measure (albeit a “desperate” one) to “scare off rebels 
before their counteroffensive starts.” “We can always change back later,” he wrote 
Bundy, “we’re already so damned that any likely increase in anti-US propaganda would 
be marginal.” He was convinced that “big civilian casualties” were unlikely, since 
“everybody dives for bush when our planes come over.”70 
The Johnson administration, however, pursued finding a political solution most 
vigorously, as it believed doing so provided the best opportunity for the United States to 
disengage from the Congo. In this regard, Komer saw Tshombe as a potential obstacle. If 
the OAU was going to provide a political umbrella under which the United States could 
eventually disengage, Tshombe would have to take great strides in improving his 
relations with the organization’s members who in general disapproved of the Congolese 
prime minister. Ben Bella, for example, referred to him as “a walking museum of 
colonialism,” and many other African nationalists viewed him as “a white imperialist 
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puppet.”71 Komer knew that it “may require some pressure on Tshombe to get him to 
make the necessary gestures to get more African states on his side,” that making 
“concessions” to this group of Africans who had opposed him for the past four years 
would be “painful.”72 Turning to the OAU for help would also come across as a sign of 
weakness on Tshombe’s behalf.73 Over the years, Tshombe had carefully constructed his 
image as a strongman, once telling an American consul that the “hard facts of African 
politics” was that “Africans appreciate only two things: Force and money.”74 Asking 
Tshombe to act otherwise was asking him to act against his own political instinct. 
Looking out for Tshombe’s political career, however, was not the United States’ 
first priority. “The important thing,” Komer wrote to Bundy, “is to find a way to close out 
this affair without letting it escalate (or US get over-committed), yet in a way in which 
we clearly ‘win.’”75 Komer thus insisted that Tshombe improve both his own and his 
government’s “acceptability in Africa.”76 He sent this message to Tshombe through 
Michel Struelens, Tshombe’s publicist in New York and personal representative to the 
U.S. government. “Washington,” Komer warned Struelens, “could not get out of step 
with all the rest of Africa in order to back Tshombe.” Komer wanted Tshombe to know 
that, “We couldn’t make Tshombe acceptable to the rest of Africa by our efforts alone—
it was really up to him and Kasavubu, as Africans talking to Africans, to do this job.” 
Komer promised that the United States would support and aid Tshombe “so long as that 
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government did its best both to restore domestic stability and free institutions and to 
improve its image in Africa.”77 
By March 1965, Komer’s plan had made some progress. Tshombe had gained 
some support at the OAU session held that month in Nairobi.78 Relations between 
Belgium and the Congo had also improved. Tshombe had made a deal in Brussels to 
restore Belgian aid. The Americans were of course happy to have the Belgians “out in 
front again.”79 The Lumumbists’ rebellion had also quieted down. Hoare and his 
mercenaries were succeeding in cutting off the Lumumbists’ supply lines through 
Uganda and Sudan, and internal problems within the CNL (largely an incoherent 
revolutionary ideology as well as the egos of its leadership) had led to the splintering of 
the group.80 Burundi, through which China had been supporting the rebels, had also 
experienced a pro-West coup, and had expelled the Chinese ambassador from 
Bujumbura, the country’s capital.81 
Komer was not one, however, to underestimate his enemy, telling Bundy, “All 
these swallows don’t make a spring.”82 Even by late March 1965, Komer and his 
assistant, Harold Saunders, a NSC Staff member, feared that Tshombe’s forces were “too 
thin to hold against another big rebel push.” The constant fear of a Lumumbist offensive 
only increased the Johnson administration’s urgency to put “together an African political 
umbrella for the Congo.” “This is the only sure way to turn off aid to the rebels,” 
Saunders argued to Bundy. “All this won’t solve the Congo problem,” he continued, “but 
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it might bring the level of instability within ranges the Congolese can manage and we can 
accept.”83 
By the end of March, though, another problem arose. A power struggle between 
Kasavubu and Tshombe was emerging. “The Congo couldn’t afford domestic political 
strife before it had even won the war,” Komer wrote. It was imperative, he believed, 
“That Tshombe and Kasavubu continued to work together.”84 In May, the first national 
elections since independence were held. The Congolese reaffirmed Kasavubu as 
president and Tshombe as prime minister, but the elections that month signaled that the 
balance of power was tilting in favor of Tshombe.  “Tshombists” had won 90 out of 166 
seats in Parliament. As one journalist noted, this was “a larger majority than that of 
Lumumba in 1960.”85 Rumors began circulating that Tshombe was going to contest 
Kasavubu for the Presidency in 1966. This kept the power struggle between Kasavubu 
and Tshombe “smoldering.”86 
The U.S. embassy took a “very strong line not only with Kasavubu and Tshombe 
but with other political leaders,” pointing out that the United States believed it was 
“absolutely essential Kasavubu and Tshombe reach [a] political truce for [the] good of 
[the] country.”87  But by the end of August the relationship between Tshombe and 
Kasavubu had only become more strained. As Komer informed Bundy, “As we move 
toward damping out the rebellion, jockeying of the politicians over the spoils has 
precipitated a new crisis.”88 Even though many considered the elections to have been 
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“free and fair,” rumors circulated that Kasavubu was planning to dismiss Tshombe as 
prime minister.89 “A Kasavubu/Tshombe split would be a minor disaster, which could 
really set us back and mess up our quiet little victory,” Komer warned Bundy.90  
The CIA was also reporting that as Kasavubu and Tshombe “concentrate their 
energies on fighting one another, the Congo’s basic problems are neglected.” While the 
agency believed the mercenaries could “keep the lid on any rebel activity,” it warned that, 
“Unless the political leaders turn their attention from infighting to solving the problems 
which caused the rebellion in the first place, the now relatively dormant insurrection may 
eventually reawaken.”91 Fearing this scenario, Komer had it impressed upon “both men 
that they have to stick together lest they hang separately.” Komer believed the Congo 
needed “both Kasavubu (as the symbol of legitimacy and the political boss of the key 
Leo[pold]ville area) and Tshombe (as by far the best P[rime] M[inister] in sight and the 
leader of Katanga).”92  
The warnings from the Americans, however, fell on deaf ears. On October 13, 
Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe as prime minister. “The heart of the problem,” Saunders 
wrote to Bundy, “has been that Kasavubu is beyond our grasp, and Tshombe listens as 
much to his go-it-alone Belgian advisers as he does to us.”93 “Our push to keep them 
together,” Saunders went on, “failed because Kasavubu just isn’t sensitive to the kind of 
leverage we have. His main interest is staying in power, which he does by manipulating 
the levers of tribal politics. He shows little concern for governing sensibly, so he couldn’t 
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care less whether we cut aid or pull out some planes.”94 “If Tshombe is really out,” 
Saunders warned Bundy, “the next job will be to keep him from going the Katanga route 
again.”95 
After dismissing Tshombe, Kasavubu revealed just how deft a politician he could 
be. He appointed another Katangan prime minister, Evariste Kimba. By doing so, as 
Saunders noted, he was “trying to preserve the Leopoldville-Katanga ‘axis,’ which holds 
together the Congo’s two main power centers.”96 Additionally, while visiting the OAU 
summit in October Kasavubu promised to remove the mercenaries from the Congo. This 
was a well-calculated way of targeting the strength of Tshombe’s power while bolstering 
his position amongst the pan-Africanists. During this period, Kasavubu also took strides 
to boost his relations with the Binza group, and in particular with Victor Nendaka, who 
headed the secret police (the Sûreté).97 
The removal of Tshombe placed the Johnson administration in a difficult 
situation. Komer wrote to Harriman, “I feel in my bones that, just as we close off the tag 
end of the last rebellion, we’re sliding into another all too familiar political crunch that 
could tear the Congo wide open again. Tshombe is not just going to sit back and bide his 
time.”98 The Johnson administration would have preferred to continue to support 
Tshombe because it had invested much in the former prime minister. As pointed out by 
Komer, the United States had “repeatedly made it crystal clear that we back Tshombe 
personally as PM [Prime Minister],” and as a result had been “practically calling the 
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signals for Tshombe and providing him with everything we thought he needed—money, 
arms, advisers.”99 Komer also had no doubt that Tshombe was a better leader than 
Kasavubu. In his opinion, Tshombe was “the one Congolese leader since independence 
that has demonstrated any ability to govern.”100 
 But as Komer noted, “If we backed Tshombe now we’d be going—for the first 
time—against our principle of legitimacy. We’d be backing the outs against the ins.”101 
As Komer suggested, the United States since the Eisenhower administration had 
consistently backed the Central Government. This is why, for example, the United States 
had opposed Tshombe between 1960 and 1963. Furthermore, in Komer’s eyes, Tshombe 
was expendable. While Tshombe had done a better job than most from the perspective of 
the Johnson administration, Komer noted, “His success in quelling the rebellion was due 
largely to US logistic (C-130’s) and…support. In short, we backed him to the hilt both 
militarily in the Congo and by a major diplomatic and propaganda effort to improve his 
image elsewhere in Africa and to cut off outside support for the rebels.” Komer was 
committed to the larger objective of the United States more than to Tshombe; “to put the 
Congo on its political and economic feet so we can eventually disengage.” While he 
agreed “Tshombe probably would give the Congo the best government in sight,” he knew 
“other options” remained open.102 
At the end of October, Komer had urged the State Department to make 
contingency plans in case the then emerging rift between Kasavubu and Tshombe became 
irreparable. Rather than be “at the mercy of the Congolese,” he wrote to Harriman, 
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“wouldn’t you agree that we should start contingency planning now. [original 
emphasis]”103 Komer believed Mobutu was the “key” to the problem, that the general 
could “force a compromise” between Kasavubu and Tshombe.104 “We have been 
providing limited aid to certain other personalities,” he wrote to Bundy. “We’ve in fact 
been seeking to influence the so-called Binza group to play ball,” that is to say, support 
Tshombe as prime minister.105 But the Binza Group, and Mobutu in particular, were not 
simply American stooges. As the first U.S. Ambassador to the Congo, Clare Timberlake, 
had warned the State Department at the outset of the crisis in 1961, “Kasavubu, Mobutu, 
or any other Congolese” should not be considered “in the pocket.”106 
Mobutu, with Machiavelli’s The Prince literally on hand, availed himself of these 
political divisions and began plotting a coup.107 When rumors of a possible coup reached 
Komer, he was not taken aback by the idea. Abandoning Kasavubu, whom he viewed as a 
poor governor, appealed to Komer.108 Abandoning Tshombe on the other hand would be 
a more substantial loss. Saunders was convinced that Tshombe looked “like the best man 
to govern,” but also concluded that, “Mobutu wouldn’t buy him as president.” The last 
thing the Johnson administration wanted was another political imbroglio in the Congo. 
Ultimately, Komer, Saunders, and Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley decided to back 
Mobutu. As Saunders wrote, “We could either back him in a coup or let him put together 
the best formula he can and get behind it…He controls the army (with our help). He has 
shown himself the most sensible leader in the current mess. At the moment, he knows the 
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ins and outs of the situation better than we do.”109 Komer and Saunders began putting 
together a “baksheesh” for Mobutu through the 303 Committee (the secret NSC group 
created by Bundy to coordinate covert affairs).110 
On November 24, 1965, Mobutu declared himself head of the government. 
Kasavubu, realizing he had few options available to him, publicly accepted Mobutu as 
leader of the Congo.111 The Congolese, tired of the political infighting, celebrated 
Mobutu’s bloodless coup.112 Tshombe, outmaneuvered, left for Brussels in December. At 
first he believed Mobutu would soon tire of the task of governing and recall him as prime 
minister. By the summer of 1966, Tshombe realized no such call was coming.113 He 
began planning a revolt against Mobutu to be carried out by his mercenaries and 
sympathizers in Katanga. The Johnson administration caught wind of Tshombe’s plans, 
and aside from wanting to prevent further political turmoil in the Congo, saw an 
opportunity to increase its influence over Mobutu.  
The Americans were concerned that they did not have the complete loyalty of the 
new president, and as a result they had been seeking opportunities in which to ingratiate 
the new dictator to the United States. Six weeks earlier, for example, they had informed 
him of a possible coup being organized by his opponents. Mobutu used the information to 
stifle it.  Ed Hamilton, an NSC staffer, wrote to Walt Rostow, who had replaced Bundy as 
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, suggesting that the 
United States “very quietly give Mobutu the information we have” on the coup being 
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planned by Tshombe. This, Hamilton believed, was of course in the best interest of the 
United States. If Tshombe pulled off the revolt, Hamilton warned, “It will…put us back 
into a Congolese Civil War.” Such a result, Hamilton argued, would have disastrous 
effects across most of Africa, and worse yet, could “create serious pressure for us to 
move in.” With the Vietnam War on their hands, the Johnson administration wanted to 
avoid a situation where it would have to commit troops. Furthermore, Hamilton warned, 
“If Mobutu finds out that we know about his plot and have not told him, it will cut our 
influence substantially.”114  
Upon being informed by the Americans, Mobutu stifled the revolt, and convicted 
Tshombe in absentia of high treason. Undeterred, Tshombe began planning a second 
revolt, but on June 30, 1967 his chartered plane was hijacked and he was taken to Algeria 
where he was imprisoned.115 Once word of Tshombe’s kidnapping arrived in the Congo 
in early July 1967, the mercenaries and sympathizers he had begun amassing revolted. 
Initially caught off guard, Mobutu requested assistance from the United States. Unwilling 
to send combat forces, the Johnson administration instead sent three C-130s to provide 
much needed logistical support.116 By November the remainder of Tshombe’s forces had 
been defeated. Cyrus Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, reported to Rostow that a 
high-ranking Congolese official had said the C-130s “had been an important and very 
positive turning point in Mobutu’s thinking toward the West.” This same official said, 
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“The importance of sending these planes was not so much a sign of US support, which 
was of course important, but was the feeling of awe and fear that the USG [U.S. 
Government] could and would send mighty and irresistible instruments of war on quick 
notice.”117  
Indeed, U.S. support of Mobutu during the revolts consummated the client-state 
relationship between the United States and the Congo, which provided the former an ally 
in the heart of Africa throughout the end of the Cold War.  It is important to note, 
however, that Mobutu’s rise to power had not been pre-ordained by the CIA during the 
period between 1960 and 1964, and that while the conditions of the Cold War contributed 
to his rise to power, local events, particularly the political split between Kasavubu and 
Tshombe in 1965, were a much more important factor. Had Mobutu not taken the 
initiative to present himself as a third option at this juncture, the United States would 
have likely ended up backing Tshombe. In short, while it can be concluded that the 
Johnson administration enabled Mobutu to take power, Mobutu’s own actions helped 
determine the final outcome.  
Once Mobutu was in power, the Johnson administration continued to support him 
despite his penchant for undemocratic and illiberal policies. “We believe,” Executive 
Secretary of the Department of State Benjamin Read wrote Rostow, “it is in our interest 
to continue our efforts to support the Congolese Government so that it can maintain its 
policy of close friendship and collaboration with the United States.”118 As U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam increased, the Johnson administration was happy to divest itself 
of the Congo under a regime that would bring political stability and a friendly 
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government to the West. But as Rostow wrote the president, “No one is betting we’ve 
seen the last of these mercenary adventures or that Mobutu will have an easy time 
holding the country together even without outside interference. But at least we’ve bought 
some more time; for the Congo, that’s worth celebrating.”119 For those who have 
examined the history of the Congo, however, buying “more time” at the cost of 
empowering Mobutu proved nothing to celebrate.120 
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CONCLUSION 
 
U.S. intervention in the Congo Crisis is critical to our understanding of both the 
nature of U.S. foreign policy and the current political landscape in the Congo.1 The 1960s 
were a testing ground for American liberalism.2 Nowhere had there been more optimism 
for what American liberalism could achieve abroad than in Africa. And nowhere on that 
continent did American policymakers expend more time and energy than in the Congo.3 
But American liberalism failed to deliver freedom to that country. By confining the 
meanings of liberty, equality, and development to an American framework, the United 
States found itself in competition with local leaders’ visions for their own country. As a 
consequence, the intervention not only failed to deliver freedom to the Congolese people, 
but tragically abetted Mobutu Sese Seko’s rise to power, a dictator whose kleptocratic 
rule removed any hope for meaningful development over a thirty year period.  
Certainly the actions of other international actors and Congolese leaders also 
affected how events unfolded. For example, the Binza Group colluded with the United 
States to keep Patrice Lumumba out of power, and to have Cyrille Adoula elected as 
prime minister in 1961. Belgian and Katangan leaders conspired to have Lumumba 	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assassinated that same year. Moise Tshombe partnered with the Belgian business 
community to help sustain the secession of Katanga, and the UN used a military force 
comprised of Ghanaian, Irish, and Indian soldiers to end to it in 1963. China, Algeria, and 
Cuba supported the Lumumbist revolution that broke out afterwards, which was crushed 
by a Belgo-American paratrooper operation. In short, decolonization of the Congo 
occurred at the intersection of local and international politics, and can only be understood 
in the context of both.4  
Nevertheless, the United States played a larger role than most throughout the 
crisis. Because of its superpower status, bearer of the title “leader of the free world,” and 
large amount of economic assistance (by far the most provided by any one country), it 
wielded an incredible amount of influence amongst international and local actors. The 
most significant consequence of this was how it affected the formation of the Congolese 
state. Despite its intention to create a liberal society, an authoritarian government 
emerged in large part because the U.S. intervention consistently defied the liberal values 
it sought to instill. Beginning in 1961, the Kennedy administration adopted Eisenhower’s 
policy to keep Lumumba, the first democratically elected prime minister, out of power. 
Rather than view Lumumba as a nationalist desiring freedom from foreign control, and a 
skillful politician who had managed to garner public support in a country rife with ethnic 
factions, it saw him instead as a communist-leaning rabble-rouser whose objectives 
threatened those of the United States.  
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That same year the Kennedy administration used threats, bribery, and blackmail 
in order to have Adoula elected prime minister. Adoula, for his part, believed partnering 
with the United States provided the only hope for the Congo to overcome the problems 
caused by colonial underdevelopment. American policymakers, however, refused to 
listen to his recommendations, ignoring his pleas to end Katanga’s secession quickly and 
to invest in the Congo’s infrastructure. Had American policymakers listened to Adoula, 
the failure of U.S. nation-building efforts in 1963, which led to an outbreak of leftist 
revolts, might have been averted. Rather than focus on improving the political and 
economic conditions that sparked the rebellion to begin with, the United States responded 
by strengthening the Congolese army, and recommended Adoula carry out a series of 
repressive policies in order to remain in power. Lastly, during Mobutu’s coup in 
November 1965, the Johnson administration could have chosen to back Tshombe, who 
after free and fair elections in May received signs of popular support from the Congolese 
people.5 While some would have rightfully questioned Tshombe’s ability to foster a 
democratic culture in the Congo, it would have at the least empowered an effective 
administrator.  
Of course few American policymakers dwelled on these missed opportunities. 
Some, including several prominent liberals, were even pleased by what they had 
achieved. Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, 
wrote in 1969 that “nation-building has gone forward,” and “that the Congo, once one of 
President Kennedy’s major crises, is beginning to recede quietly from the list of most 
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acute world trouble spots.”6 Two years later, Chester Bowles, Kennedy’s first 
Undersecretary of State and one of the leading architects for U.S. policies in the Third 
World, wrote that the Congo “celebrated the tenth anniversary of its independence in 
1970 in an atmosphere of stability and hope,” due to “the role of the United Nations, 
large inputs of United States economic assistance and the emergence of able leadership 
from…Joseph D. Mobutu.”7 Similarly, in 1987 Brian Urquhart, who had served as 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold’s Special Representative in the Congo, pointed out 
that while many considered the intervention a “synonym for failure,” it had maintained 
the territorial integrity of the Congo while preventing an American-Soviet showdown in 
Africa. “If the Congo had broken up or become an East-West battleground,” Urquhart 
asked, “would the Congolese, or world peace for that matter, have been better served?”8  
Nevertheless, there were others who had been disappointed by the outcome, 
especially Mobutu’s rise to power. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote, “That was not 
what we had worked for.”9 The historian Stephen Weissman notes too that, “[Adlai] 
Stevenson and some of Kennedy’s White House assistants were disillusioned by the 
Congo experience.”10 Reflecting on the event in 1971, Paul-Henri Spaak, who served as 
the Belgian foreign minister throughout most of the crisis, and who had been committed 
to carrying out the Kennedy administration’s vision for the Congo, put his finger on the 
crux of the matter. “Our cardinal mistake in Africa,” he wrote, “was to try to induce the 
Congo to follow a policy fashioned after our own image. In this respect we—as so many 	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before us—pursued what one might call ‘democratic imperialism’.”11 Indeed, by the end 
of the crisis, American liberalism had revealed itself to be more like the European 
imperialism that had preceded it than a revolutionary force for freedom. Its quest to 
impose liberal values proved to be at odds with the local populace’s desire for social, 
political, and economic equality. By the close of the decade, this proved true not only in 
the Congo, but also throughout the Third World, recasting the United States in the eyes of 
many, as the historian Ryan Irwin has noted, from “leader of the free world” to that of the 
“New Empire.”12  
This revelation resulted in profound consequences for both the United States and 
the Congo. Confronted with the ironies of liberal ideals, policymakers in the 1970s were 
no longer convinced that an adept foreign policy could be fashioned around such 
principles. They instead adopted a realpolitik paradigm that more or less defined U.S. 
interactions with the world for the next decade. Willing to acknowledge the limits of 
American power and ideas, policymakers who adopted this realist outlook sought the 
creation of client states in the Third World that relied on authoritarian governments to 
contain communism and ensure Western access to raw materials.13 In the Congo, this 
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meant support for Mobutu.14 Even President Jimmy Carter, whose brand of foreign policy 
relied on a human rights framework, found his administration left with little choice but to 
support the dictator in order to protect American interests.15 Mobutu, aware of this new 
American outlook, played up the communist threat in central Africa, particularly in 
neighboring Angola where a civil war raged throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, in 
order to ensure U.S. support throughout the remainder of the Cold War.16 
For the Congolese people, Mobutu’s reign would come to symbolize the 
unfulfilled promises of independence. It is no coincidence that some Congolese compared 
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his rule to that of the Belgians.17 As the historian Frederick Cooper has written, no word 
had better captured “the hopes and ambitions of Africa’s leaders, its educated 
populations, and many of its farmers and workers in the post-war decades better than 
‘development.’” “Its simplest meaning,” he goes onto write, “conveys a down-to-earth 
aspiration: to have clean water, decent schools and health facilities; to produce larger 
harvests and more manufactured goods; to have access to consumer goods which people 
elsewhere consider a normal part of life.”18 Mobutu’s kleptocratic rule ensured that the 
Congolese people would never obtain such a quality of life. The state and economy 
became so decayed that many Congolese referred to it as “le mal zaïrois” (“the Zairian 
disease”), producing conditions so hazardous to one’s health that even six years after 
Mobutu left power the average life expectancy was only forty-seven.19 Indeed, it is 
difficult to disagree with the journalist Michela Wrong’s assessment that, “Whatever 
bloody deeds were carried out on his orders, this will always constitute Mobutu’s worst 
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human rights violation: the destruction of an economy that quashed a generation’s 
aspirations.”20  
Such dire conditions also contributed to the current crisis in eastern Congo, what 
some scholars have called “Africa’s World War.” Since 1998, the year after Mobutu left 
power, approximately five million people have died there. While recent literature 
addressing this latest crisis dwells on the lingering effects of Belgian colonialism or even 
the Cold War conditions that helped Mobutu remain in power, this dissertation has sought 
to serve as a prescient reminder of how American liberalism—well intentioned though it 
may have been—produced equally calamitous results for the Congolese people.21 Recent 
calls for the United States to intervene in the current crisis should be carefully weighed 
against this history, as perhaps should all potential U.S. interventions claiming to make 
the world a better place.22 As the historian William Appleman Williams observed over 	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fifty years ago, U.S. foreign policy often tragically commits more harm than good “by its 
exaggerated confidence in American economic strength and military might, by its own 
arrogance and self-righteousness, and by its messianic distortion of a sincere 
humanitarian desire to help other peoples.”23 So it was in the Congo. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
Map of the Congo, 1960 
 	  	  
	  
 
(Modification by Jason Tyler and William Mountz of “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Small Map of 
the Republic’s Provinces at the Indepandence” © 2006 by Denis Jacquerye, used under a Creative 
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/.)	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